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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The normative theory of taxation explores the implications of postu-
lated social objectives for the choice of tax policy. Hence it derives
recommendations which are conditional on the social preferences or welfare
functions which are adopted. A model of the economy and a set of feasible
taxes constitute the setting within which the social objectives can be
pursued.
The theory can either adopt the optimum tax approach or the related
tax reform approach. The purpose of optimum tax theory is to characterize
the optimum choice of tax system, tax schedules and tax rates within the
assumed economic, informational and pOlitical constraints regardless of
the initial tax policy. The purpose of tax reform analysis is to assess
(usually small) revisions of the tax policy from a specific starting-
point. Both branches of normative tax theory are usually defined as
being concerned with the structure of taxation rather than the tax level.
The properties of the tax system do however have important implications
for the assessment of tax-financed public spending and thus for the choice
of tax level. Exploring such implications is therefore a natural exten-
sion of normative tax theory.
Normative tax theory is an application of second best welfare theory.
By the second best assumption the full use of lump sum taxes is ruled out.
The implications for economic efficiency are very significant. It has
been a major achievement of economic theory to demonstrate that under
certain conditions a competitive market economy, possibly supplemented
by appropriate correcting interventions by the government, produces a
socially efficient allocation. The key to the understanding of this
result is the observation that under the appropriate conditions the agents
of the economy do in fact individually bear the full social costs and
receive the full social benefits of their actions. Hence incentives are
such that private optimizing behaviour is in perfect harmony with social
optimization.
A crucial assumption behind this outcome is that a complete set of
lump sum taxes is available. In practice it is not. In particular,
redistribution through lump sums requires that we are able to detect the
exogenous characteristics of individuals on which lump sum taxes and
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transfers would have to be based. But in practice there is no device by
which the true skills and other characteristics can be screened. In other
words, the true initial endowments are hidden, and the assumption behind
the basic theorems of welfare economics that redistribution through lump
sums is possible, is not satisfied. When lump sum taxes are ruled out as
impracticable and the tax instruments are income taxes, excise taxes, VAT,
etc., private costs and benefits get distorted in the sense that they no
longer reflect the social costs and benefits. Choices are then motivated
by comparisons between private costs and benefits which may reverse the
outcome of comparisons between social costs and benefits.
Ideally a commodity should be used to the extent that the marginal
benefit from having more of it equals the marginal real cost of providing
it measured as the potential benefit from other commodities foregone.
When there is a tax on a commodity,there is a private incentive to use
it to the extent that the benefit from having more of it is no less than
the private cost which includes the tax,which in general is not a real
cost but simply a transfer of spending power from the private to the
public sector within society. An exception is of course externality-
reflecting taxes. Thus private agents are encouraged to make choices
that are not socially efficient in the first best sense. This is a major
concern of normative tax theory along with the concern with income distri-
bution.
It is important to distinguish between tax-induced changes in quan-
tities and tax distortions of the allocation. No matter how taxes are
moulded one does not escape from income effects. Even lump sum taxes
well known to be compatible with first best efficiency change the alloca-
tion as compared to a no-tax situation. The concern is therefore with
allocative distortions defined as changes deviating from the lump sum
tax income effects. It is clearly desirable as such to choose a tax
structure which minimizes the efficiency loss from tax distortions. On
the other hand it is desirable to use the tax policy for distributional
purposes.
Normative tax theory has derived a number of characteristics of
optimum taxes and welfare-improving tax changes under various circum-
stances. The basic insight underlying most special results is that taxes
should distort the real allocation as little as possible for a given
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distribution and within the constraints on feasible taxes. Translated
into the price space this insight implies that prices strongly affecting
real quantities through high price elasticities in absolute values should
be relatively less distorted than prices having less effect on real quan-
tities. And there must be a trade-off between conflicting concerns with
distribution and efficiency.
There are several strands of research in normative tax theory. There
is an important distinction between analysis focusing on efficiency and
neglecting distributional concerns and analysis explicitly concerned with
distribution. Within each broad category models can be classified accor-
ding to a number of criteria. Models can focus on various markets and
distortions or interactions between various markets and distortions. The
focus may be on the labour market, the capital market, consumer goods or
certain interactions between these markets. We can also~abel models
according to the kinds of taxes that are analysed, such as income tax,
commodity taxes, expenditure tax, or according to the technical forms of
taxes, such as linear or general tax schedules. Most tax models choose
assumptions by which they escape from dealing with tax-induced changes in
equilibrium prices. Only rather few analyses are concerned with endoge-
nous prices. In most tax models taxpayers are assumed to be individuals.
Normative models of multiperson households as taxable units are rather
rare.
The present study consists of seven separate papers which contribute
to the nOnDative theory of taxation. Strictly speaking one can argue
that the first article entitled "Some important properties of the social
marginal utility of income" is a paper in general welfare economics
rather than tax theory in particular. It has, however, useful applica-
tions in normative tax theory. The paper contains an analysis of how the
social marginal utilities of income assigned to different persons change
in response to changes in prices, the provision of public goods and other
parameters faced by the individual. The effect of a parameter change is
interpreted as composed of a change in the real value of marginal income
and a change in total real income (or utility level). It is implied that
even if utility levels are kept constant, social marginal utilities of
income remain unaltered only under special conditions, which are exposed
and interpreted. Some of the formal results are known from before.
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The main contributions are interpretations and applications.
The second contribution is the article 'Vhich commodity taxes should
supplement the income tax." The analysis takes as its point of departure
a continuum of consumers economy in which an optimum non-linear income
tax exists and is the only tax instrument in operation. Individuals face
exogenous wage rates. The welfare effects of introducing small excise
taxes to supplement the income tax are then explored. Essential in this
context are changes in the tax distortions of work incentives. It is
shown that a commodity should be taxes or subsidized depending on whether
it is positively or negatively related to leisure in a sense which is
precisely defined. The results are related to earlier contributions to
the literature on direct versus indirect taxation.
The third paper is entitled "The choice of excise taxes when savings
and labour decisions are distorted." The framework is a simple two period
life-cycle model with identical individuals who work in period 1 and are
retired in period 2. Initially there are optimally chosen uniform income
and commodity tax rates, which lead to distortions in both the labour/
leisure choice and the consumption/savings choice. The purpose is to
demonstrate in an intuitively comprehensible way how differentiating
commodity taxation by slightly increasing the tax on one consumption good
can mitigate existing distortions. The sufficient conditions for a welfare
improvement are simila~ to that derived by Corlett and Hague in the early
fifties plus some conditions on average and marginal consumption propensities.
In optimum tax models income is usually assumed to be endogenous as
the result of tax-affected labour supply or savings decisions. There
may, however, be reasons for assuming that there is a mixture of endoge-
nous and exogenous income. If the income tax cannot discriminate between
the two kinds of income, we face the second best tax problem analysed in
"The optimum taxation of mixed endogenous and exogenous income." There
is a discrete distribution of individuals according to exogenous income
and exogenous wage rates. The total income of an individual consists of
exogenous income and endogenous labour income. An optimum linear income
tax is analysed. Special attention is focused on how the composition of
income may affect the optimum degree of income tax progressivity.
In the papers surveyed above the taxable units are individuals as
has been the tradition in normative tax theory. The special problems
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involved in taxing families are then missed out. Such problems are dealt
with in "Income taxation of two-person households." A model is construc-
ted to analyse the tax treatment of secondary wage earners in two-person
households. The households have different income opportunities, and
potential secondary wage earners differ in their willingness to take a
job. In a variety of numerical cases the optimum tax structure is computed
allowing for income distribution and the tax distortions of the labour
market participation of secondary wage earners. Special tax systems of
the kinds actually in operation are analysed and compared.
General equilibrium effects of taxes on prices and wages are addressed
in the paper entitled "Choice of occupation, tax incidence and piecemeal
tax revision." A model is presented in which workers move between two
different occupations in response to economic incentives which are dis~
torted by a linear income tax. Prices and wages assume equilibrium values
which are affected by the tax parameters. Incidence and welfare effects
of small tax revisions are analysed within different variants of the basic
model and with particular attention paid to the role of tax-induced wage
and price changes. It is demonstrated that within the economic setting
of the model one may neglect such wage and price effects in assessments
of piecemeal tax revisions.
In the last article with the title "Evaluation of public projects
under optimal taxation" we return to the standard model of a continuum
of taxpaying individuals facing exogenous wage rates. In this paper the
scope of analysis is extended to the implications of optimum taxation for
cost-benefit analysis. The conventional cost-benefit criterion accepts
or rejects public projects on the basis of the sum of unweighted net
benefits. It can generally be blamed for neglecting distributional
objectives and tax distortions. It turns out, however, that more commonly
accepted social welfare criteria can be reduced to the conventional
criterion in certain interesting cases. In this paper conditions are
established under which the conventional cost-benefit criterion or a
simple modification of it is valid as such a reduced form in the presence
of distributional objectives and optimal second best taxation. Such
results may help simplifying cost-benefit analysis.
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Some Important Properties of the Social
Marginal Utility of Income
Vidar Christiansen
University of Oslo. Norway
Abstract
This paper contains an analysis of how the social marginal utilities of income assigned to
different persons change in response to changes in prices. the provision of public goods and
other parameters faced by the individual. The effect of a parameter change is interpreted as
composed of a change in the real value .ofmarginal income and a change in total real income
(or utility leve!). It is implied that even if utility levels are kept constant. social marginal
utilities of income remain unaltered only under special conditions. which are exposed and
interpreted. The results are useful in applied welfare economics.
I. Introduction
The social marginal utility of income or the distributive weight assigned to
an individual is a key concept in applied welfare economics concerned with
income distribution. A very good basic introduction to this concept is found
in Meade (1976). An excellent survey of various approaches to the concept
is found in Stern (1977). In this paper, we analyze some important proper-
ties of the social marginal utility of income which have not received proper
attention in the literature.
Most modern books in applied welfare economics. for instance cost-
benefit analysis, make use of or at least refer to distributive weights. I But
the discussion of circumstances which determine the distributive weights is
rather scanty. In most cases the weights are simply treated as conditional
on the value of some measure of real income. Often the weights are only
assumed in principle to vary among population groups that are understood
to be different with respect to economic well-being.
Economists sometimes appear to believe that if social preferences are
egalitarian, a lower social marginal utility of income should always be
assigned to a person on a higher level of utility than to a person on a lower
level of utility. Similarly the social marginal utility of income should be the
same if two individuals enjoy the same level of utility. But. in general. these
1 A few references which may serve as examples are Brown & Jackson (1978). Lavard (197~)
and Pearce & Nash (1981). .
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are spurious conclusions. It is therefore important to consider more closely
the relationship between the social marginal utility of income. the utility
level and the conditions faced by the individual and perhaps also by other
individuals. We begin by exploring the circumstances under which the
social marginal utility of income is uniquely determined by the utility
level(s). We then investigate how social marginal utilities of income are
affected by changing the parameters of the economy (prices. provision of
public goods, etc.). Some applications of the analysis are also discussed.
II. The ModeJ
We consider a market economy with a public sector. Consumers are
assumed to act in accordance with standard theory of consumer behavior.
The utility of an individual is expressed by the indirect utility function
V(y,al.
where y is the exogenous income of the individual and a is a vector of other
parameters. These parameters may be of different kinds. i.e., prices. public
goods or other exogenous parameters which affect an individual's situation
such as health status or job characteristics. Some of the parameters may
vary across individuals, while others may be common parameters in all
utility functions. Examples are provided by differing wage rates and uni-
form commodity prices.
We consider a population of individuals with uniform preferences. Ho-
mogeneous preferences represent a common assumption in much of the
. literature to which this analysis is relevant.
Social preferences are assumed to be represented by a Bergson-Samuel-
son welfare function,
W(VI, ••• , VN), (l)
which is increasing in all arguments.
The question to which we address ourselves first is under what condi-
tions relative distributive weights are determined solely by the utility levels
of the individuals, Since only relative weights matter in economic analyses,
we are not interested in absolute values. The social marginal utility of
income of person i is
i . aw a0W =-_._
a0 al'
(2)
The relative weight is expressed as
Wi = (aw/a0) avi/ayi
Wi (aw/avl) avi/ay. i=2 .... ,N (3)
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III. When are Relative Weights Uniquely Determined by
Utility Levels?
Since the arguments of the W-function are all utility levels. the relative
distributive weights Wi/WI will only depend on utility levels when
av- = f(V) g(c),
ay
(4)
where c denotes the parameters of a which are common to all individuals.
Expression (4) is a partial differential equation which can be solved to
obtain the class of utility functions
V(g(c) y+h(a». (S)
Equation (S) is equivalent to
av
aaj = ah/aaj
av g(c)
ay
and
for all iwhen ai is not a common parameter. (6a)
av
aCj _ (ag/ac) y+ah/acj for all i.
av g(c)
ay
(6b)
In order to interpret (6) it is useful to distinguish among four cases defined
according to whether the parameter is common or individual and whether
or not it is a price. When ai is the price of a commodity. we know from
Roy's identity that the quantity demanded is
av
aatX·=---
I av'
ay
(7)
Then (6) implies that the demand for a commodity is independent of income
if the price is individual and a linear function of income if the price is
common. The best example of an individual price is probably the price of
leisure. which varies with the (after-tax) wage rate. In this case. (6) requires
the income elasticity ofleisure to be zero. A more intuitive interpretation of
these results is easily provided.
The social value of a marginal income unit to a person depends partlyon
his utility level and possibly the utility levels of others and part ly on the real
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value of a marginal income unit to this person. The more expensive the
goods on which he tends to spend a marginal income unit. the lower the real
value (or purchasing power) of his marginal income. no matter how badly or
well off he is. He will derive less utility from marginal income than before.
Expressions (6a) and (6b) imply that the marginal propensity to spend
income on a commodity is zero or constant. respectively. If only one
person faces a compensated price increase. the marginal real value of his
income is lowered. and so is the social marginal utility of income, unless no
marginal income is spent on the good which becomes more expensive, as
implied by (6a). If a common price increases, the marginal real value of a
person's income is depressed and more so, the higher his marginal propen-
sity to spend money on that good. Relative social marginal utilities of
income are left unchanged only if this marginal propensity is the same for
everybody as implied by (6b).
Let us now assume that the parameter is some physical good, e.g. a
public good. An extra unit of the good tends to add more to the marginal
value of income, the more of a marginal income unit the person is prepared
to give up in order to obtain the extra unit of the good. This amount is equal
to the rise in marginal willingness to pay for the good as an additional
income unit is obtained. Relative social marginal utilities of income are left
unchanged only if this change in marginal willingness to pay is the same for
everyone, as implied by (6b). If the good does not effect everybody. the
common change in marginal willingness to pay as income rises must be
zero, as implied by (6a).
Equations (6a) and (6b) are strict conditions. They imply that the social
marginal utility of income will be uniquely related to the level of utility only
under certain strong restrictions on the preferences of the individual him-
self. It is not left to some social authority to deterrnine, on the basis of a
Bergson-Samuelson welfare function, whether the (relative) social marginal
utilities of income should be functions of utility levels only. It follows that
two persons who enjoy the same utility level may have different social
marginal utilities of income if they otherwise face different conditions.
IV. The Effects of Compensated Parameter Changes
Since we cannot expect relative social marginal utilities of income to
depend solelyon utility levels, it may be interesting to see how they are
affected by compensated parameter changes. We should then examine the
compensated derivative of tu with respect to some parameter a. denoted by
aJ~omp. For simplicity subscripts are omitted, although a particular individu-
al and a particular element of the a-vector are in fact considered. Let us
also introduce the notation:
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).= evte« (8)
Then
aw.w=--A..av (9)
Since all utility levels are kept constant by the compensation
wcomp = aw Å.comp.
a av a uo:
Let E(a, V) be the expenditure function. At the individual equilibrium
e». V(a, y» = y, (lI)
from which it follows that
A.= l/Ev. (12)
Then it can easily be seen that
A.~omp= -EavlEt = -A.2Eav' (13)
To find Ea. we fix the utility level at 01 and write
V(a,E(a, VO»= 01, (14)
which implies that
Ea = - VJA.= +mia.Eia. V», (15)
where m is simply the individual' s marginal willingness to pay for a margin-
al rise in the relevant parameter. Hence
Eav = -myEv = -m/A.. (16)
This result is substituted into (13) to obtain
(17)
From (9) and (lO) we then find that
(18)
Since only relative marginal utilities of income matter, elasticities are more
appropriate tools. We therefore define the compensated elasticity
(19)
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It can be seen immediately that
,:.comp = am
""'a s: (20)
Let us now interpret the marginal willingness to pay. m, more carefully.
If the parameter we have considered is a price, say the price of good i. then
m= -Xi, which is seen from (7). Let the price be denoted by Pi and the
expenditure derivative by Xiy' Then (20) can be written as
åicomp = +p x,P; r-ty' (21)
which is minus the marginal propensity to spend income on good i. In order
to exclude changes in relative social marginal utilities of income, the
elasticity must be the same for everyone, which implies that marginal
expenditure propensities must be the same. This result confirms our earlier
findings as to when relative social marginal utilities of income are left
unaltered when utility levels are unchanged. Expression (21) implies that if
a price rises and everybody is compensated. the marginal real value of
income and consequently the marginal utility of income are reduced more
strongly for those who are more heavily inclined to spend marginal income
on the good which becomes more expensive.
If the parameter considered above was the amount of a public good, say
g, then m is the marginal willingness to pay for a marginal unit or, in other
words, the Lindahl price of g:
(22)
If a wealthier person (in terms of y) tends to place a higher value on the
public good, the value of his marginal income will rise as compared to that
of a poorer person.
If the health status of a person improves but his income is reduced so as
to leave him no better off, the marginal value of his income rises if his
marginal willingness to pay for better health is positively income elastic.
V. The General Effects of Parameter Changes
Of course, most changes in the parameters of the economy are not compen-
sated changes. So, to obtain more general results let us now set aside the
compensation requirement. Our results thus far also prove useful in the
more general context. We can now easily derive the effect of a change in a
parameter a on l:
l = A.(a. E(a, V). (23)
Hence
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• - 'comp, • E V
Åa - Åa "T",(, V a' (4)
From (12) and (15) we see that EvVa=m. so that
(25)
Thus the effect of a on). has been split into a compensated effect (which we
have already studied) and an income effect. The marginal social utility of
person r s income is in general
i aW).i(J)=--a0 . (26)
Differentiating and using (25), we find that
(27)
where (15) has been recalled. From (26) we obtain
i = aW).i +).i a2W).i
(J)y a0 y av' (28)
Substituting into (27) we get
(29)
In this quite general form, the formula is not very illuminating. But if a is an
individual parameter the last term vanishes, since mi=O for j:J;:.i, and (29)
then simply reads
(30)
Omitting the superscript and invoking (18) we obtain
(31)
A simple manipulation then leads to
• +am.(J)a= amy -(J)y'
y
(32)
where wa and wy are elasticities with respect to a and y, respectively.
Formula (29) may also be useful once a more specific welfare function is
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postulated. The special class of welfare functions most frequently used in
applied welfare economics is probably the additive form
w= 2: 0, (33)
where the cardinalization of 0 is chosen by the government so as to reflect
its distributional preferences properly. When preferences are uniform
(34)
where bi is the vector of individual parameters apart from income. In the.
additive case w=,A.. so that (25) can be used to study the effect on the social
marginal utility of income. Employing (17), we can rewrite (25) as
• 1 •
A.a = Amy +A.ym. (35)
A simple manipulation then leads to
(36)
where la and ly are elasticities with respect to a and y, respectively.
Formulas (32) and (36) are quite similar. Expression (32) is valid when the
changing parameter is individual. while (36) is valid when the welfare
function is additive. In the latter case A. and iu coincide.
If the income of an individual rises. he becomes better off than a person
who does not receive any more income but otherwise faces the same
economic conditions. Thus an inequality will arise. If the social marginal
utility of income of the person who becomes better off falls. the government
can be said to showaversion towards inequality and more so. the greater
the relative change in the social marginal utility of income. Hence the
absolute value of wy can be taken as a measure of (local) inequality
aversion. Formulas (32) and (36) tell us that the social marginal utility of
income will rise relatively more in response to a parameter change. the
more strongly the marginal value of income increases. the greater the loss
of income needed to give compensation and the greater the inequality
aversion.
Suppose that a is a common price. say Pk. Let ek denote the expenditure
(or Engel) elasticity of good kand :rk the budget share of good k. Using
these entities. we can write (36) as
(37)
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The social marginal utility of income will then rise or fall depending on
whether the Engel elasticity is greater than or lower than the inequality. (.(' ) ..,aversion -Ay'-
VI. Remarks on Applications
The (relative) social marginal utilities of income are essential in all branches
of applied welfare theory concerned with distributional effects. They are
particularly crucial in optimum conditions which counterbalance the distri-
butional effects and the effects on allocative efficiency of policy measures
in terms of tax policy, income maintenance programs, investment projects,
etc. A typical example is provided by the theory of optimum taxation. In
this field, relative marginal utilities of income are used to characterize
optimum tax schedules and rates. J
A model frequently studied in optimum tax theory describes a population
of individuals who have the same preferences and differ only with respect
to their efficiency as workers, which is in turn reflected by differing wage
rates. In this model it is important to know how the social marginal utility of
income varies with the wage rate, which in this instance is the only cause of
variation in the marginal utility of income. If we assume that the marginal
tax rate on income is constant (as it is in the case of linear tax schedules),
we can consider the after-tax wage rate. Let this be denoted by z and work
effort by h. Let p and x denote the vector of commodity prices and the
consumption bundle, respectively. The budget constraint of an individual is
then
+hz+px=y ; (38)
and the indirect utility function is
V(z,p,y). (39)
Using the notation introduced earlier in the paper. we observe that when z
changes
m=h and my=hy. (40)
Since the wage rate is an individual parameter. we can make use of (31).
from which it follows that
(41)
2 Formula (37) is the same as formula (50) in Frisch (1959), but his derivation of it is different
and far more complicated. The interpretation and application of the formula also differ.
3 See e.g. Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980).
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If, as is usually assumed, work effort is an inferior good. h; is negative. If.
in addition, the government is inequality averse. both terms in (41) are
negative, and the social marginal utility of income is negatively related to
the wage rate. The interpretation is the same as before. A higher wage rate
implies that leisure becomes more expensive. If a person is inclined to
spend some of his marginal income on leisure, the marginal purchasing
power of income is reduced. This effect tends to reduce the marginal utility
of income. On the other hand, a higher wage rate implies that the individual
becomes better off and also for this reason only becomes entitled to a
reduced social marginal utility of income. as the government is inequality
averse. Hence the normal case is that the social marginal utility of income
declines as the wage rate rises.
Another normal case is that an individual's pre- and post-tax wage
income increases as the wage rate becomes higher. A situation whereby
consumption of market goods is noninferior is sufficient to obtain this
result. From the analysis above it then follows that the social marginal
utility of income is negatively related to pre- and post-tax wage income.
Once optimality conditions have been established in tax theory or other
relevant areas, it may be interesting to explore the comparative static
effects of changing certain parameters of the economy. For instance. how
do optimal tax rates change in response to changes in exogenous prices or
the provision of certain public goods? In such comparative statics analyses,
we obviously need to know the effects on social marginal utilities of income
examined earlier in this paper.
The relationship between the social marginal utility of income and the
wage rate discussed above confirms the conventional notion of this rela-
tionship. Let us now consider a case which may have a more unconvention-
al outcome. Suppose that a transfer payment T is made from one population
group to another. For simplicity each group is assumed to be homogeneous.
The transfer payment is received as a lump sum. But it is financed by a
proportional tax on the labor income of the other group. Prices and wage
rates are assumed to be fixed. These assumptions make the case under
consideration as simple as possible. Let v(Y+ T. a) be the utility function of
the recipients of the transfer payment, and let V((l-t) ur, Y.a) be the utility
function of the taxpayers. The wage rate is denoted by ur, the tax rate by t,
and Y is exogenous income. Let h denote the labor supply of the taxpayers.
It is assumed that h is determined in accordance with the standard textbook
theory of household behavior. An additive welfare function is assumed so
that
W=v+V. (42)
The possible combinations of T and t are given by the constraint
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T= tuih, (43)
Eliminating T by means of (43), we can write the welfare function with its
arguments as
W= v(y+twh. a)+ V((l-l) ur, Y. a).
Let
(44)
).=ovloy, A=oVloy. (45)
The social optimization problem of the government is then to maximize W
with respect to t. The first-order condition of this maximization is
W' = dWldt = ).wh-Awh+;.twh, = O,
where h,=ohlot.
The second-order condition is
(46)
W'<O. (47)
The recipients of the transfer payment are assumed to be worse off and to
be assigned a higher marginal social weight than the taxpayers. We can
rewrite (46) as
l-N)' = -th,!h. (48)
This is a standard trade-off between the distributional improvement and the
loss of efficiency caused by the tax/transfer policy. We may note that the
marginal effect of the tax rate on labor supply at the optimum is negative
under our assumptions:
u.e», (49)
and the absolute value of the corresponding elasticity is less than unity:
-ht = -th/h < 1. (50)
Let us now examine the effects of a shift in external circumstances repre-
sented by a change in one of the parameters of a (denoted by a to avoid
subscripts). Differentiating (46), we get
(Sl)
where, for simplicity, no direct effect on labor supply has been assumed. In
order to simplify even more. assume that only the marginal utility of income
of the worse-off group is affected. We then see that
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(51)
Now it follows from (47) and (50) that the tax rate and the transfer payment
will both fall if Å.a<O. The preceding analysis in this paper has shown that
even if the less well-off group becomes worse off, it may be given a lower
social marginal utility of income because the marginal real value of income
is somehow reduced or, in other words. the ability or opportunity to derive
satisfaction from marginal expenditure is reduced. The effect then arises
that the transfer payment to the less well-off group is reduced when the
recipients become worse off. Whether this will happen depends among
other things on the degree of inequality aversion. The important conclusion
is that comparative statics analysis of distribution and welfare policy within
the conventional analytical framework requires more insight than simple
observations of whether external shifts make various groups better or
worse off.
VII. Concluding Remarks
It has been emphasized in this paper that the weight attached to a change in
the income of a given individual in a Bergson-Samuelson type of social
welfare function is in general not solelya function of utility levels. Even if
all individuals have identical preferences and face identical external circum-
stances, the weights will depend on these circumstances. Thus. while
weights will depend sole ly on utility levels. for a given set of circumstances.
as soon as these circumstances change (e.g. a change in relative prices), the
weights will change as well. Once some of the external circumstances are
allowed to vary across individuals, the weights at any point in time will not
solely be a function of utility levels. Indeed. two people with the same
utility level may have different weights. Or, whether and in what direction
they differ may depend on the external circumstances. One individual may
have a higher weight than another, even if the latter has a lower utility level
than the former. This fact was emphasized in principle by Sen (1973) in his
criticism of the utilitarian approach." Sen's main point was that when
people are different, the approach of equating marginal utilities from in-
come (as required in a first-best welfare optimum) does not, in general,
amount to equating total utilities.
Another objective of this paper, which is at least as important as these
general conclusions, has been to add to our understanding of the relations
between the social marginal utilities of income. utility levels and external
circumstances such as prices, provision of public goods and more personal
4 We may note, however, that this fact is not limited to the utilitarian case. i.e. to the case of
an additive welfare function.
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characteristics. This has been accomplished by establishing the effects of
changes in various parameters of the economy on social marginal utilities of
income, distinguishing between compensated and real income effects and
interpreting the implications. At the same time tools have been provided for
comparative statics analysis of optimum welfare and distribution policy.
This kind of analysis has been surprisingly rare. The formulas may also be
useful for the purpose of revising distributive weights-once derived from
the implicit trade-offs underlying actual decisions or some other source-in
response to changing external circumstances.
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The analysis takes as its point of departure a continuum of consumers economy in which an
optimum income tax exists and is the only tax instrument in operation. The welfare effects of
introducing small excise taxes to supplement the income tax are then explored. Essential in this
context are changes in the tax distortions of work incentives. It is shown that a commodity
should be taxed or subsidized depending on whether it is positively or negatively related to
leisure in a sense which is precisely defined. The results are related to earlier contributions to the
literature on direct versus indirect taxation.
1. Introduction
The history of debates on the proper roles of direct and indirect taxation
goes back at least to the days of Gladstone, as well described by Atkinson
(1977).The prevailing political opinion of the balance between the two types
of taxes has varied over time. At present the swing in a number of European
countries seems to be in favour of reforms towards tax systems which rely
more heavily on indirect taxation and less on income taxation. In view of
this long economic-political record, it is not surprising that the choice
between income tax and commodity taxes has also become an important
subject in tax theory.
An early contribution to the understanding of this issue was Corlett and
Hague (1953-54). Their main model considers a three-good economy,
containing leisure and two taxed commodities. There is only one consumer
(or a population of identical consumers). Labour is the only source of
income. Producer prices are fixed. The government's revenue requirement is
given. The starting point of the analysis is a situation in which the two
commodities are taxed at uniform rates. The question which is analyzed is
then how the government can raise welfare by slightly differentiating the tax
rates. The answer which is derived is that the consumer good which is the
stronger substitute for labour (complement with leisure) should be taxed at
-Previous versions of this paper have been presented at seminars at the University of Bergen
and the University of Stockholm. l am indebted to seminar participants. to Tony Atkinson,
Søren Blomquist, Kåre P. Hagen, Agnar Sandmo and the referees for valuable comments and
suggestions.
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the higher rate. The degree of substitutability (or complementarity) can be
measured by the compensated cross-elasticity with labour (leisure). It is
intuitively easy to grasp the essence of this result. As expressed by Sandmo
(1976): 'The economic rationale of this rule is clearly that since we have
barred ourselves from taxing leisure, we can do it indirectly by taxing
commodities that are complementary with liesure.'
As Corlett and Hague put it: 'the main analysis considers small changes in
tax rates and does not indicate the size of the movements away from the
initial equilibrium position needed to obtain an "optimum" system of
taxation'. Thus, it may be considered as an early contribution to what is now
known as tax reform analysis. But, as has been shown, the same result is
valid at optimal taxation; see for example Sandmo (1976).
It is important to note, as was emphasized by Corlett and Hague, that
taxation of the two consumer goods at uniform rates is equivalent to a
proportional income tax. Deviation from uniform tax rates is therefore
equivalent to the introduction of an excise tax in addition to a proportional
income tax. In this sense the model is suitable for throwing light on the
income versus commodity tax issue. Although the model is rather special, it
may be argued that the insight obtained is rather basic.
Meade (1955) discussed the role of commodity taxes as a supplement to
the income tax within a more general, but purely non-mathematical
framework. He allows the income tax schedule to have a more general form,
and the taxpayers may have unequal income. His approach is clearly
described in his own words:
We assume, therefore, that the revenue is being raised by a progressive
income tax which, as explained on p. 47, introduces throughout the system
a large rate of divergence between the value of the marginal product of
effort and the marginal cost of that effort .... The question which we shall
discuss is whether, given this situation, it would be desirable to tum to
some extent from the direct taxation of income to the indirect taxation of
particular goods and services as a means of raising revenue [Meade (1955,
p. 112)].
His reasoning leads him to the conclusion that a welfare improvement
would be obtained by making a small marginal change in the tax system
which raises the price of those things which are jointly demanded with
leisure, and lowers the price of those things which are good substitutes for
leisure, provided that seriously adverse effects on the distribution of income
are avoided. This is a result which is very close to that of Corlett and Hague.
It is, however, less precise, as one might expect from a non-mathematical
analysis. In particular the substitute concept is not precisely defined. Meade's
analysis deals with the welfare effects of 'a small marginal change in the tax
system'. Thus, his analysis may also be considered as an early contribution to
tax reform theory.
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A third important contribution to the literature on direct versus indirect
taxation is Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). In their analysis the taxpayers are
assumed to have homogeneous preferences, but different wages. Optimality
characteristics of simultaneous non-linear schedules for income and
commodity taxes are derived. These characteristics are related to the
properties of the taxpayers' common utility function. It turns out that
whether a good is complementary with or a substitute for leisure in the
Edgeworth sense (dermed by the sign of the cross derivative of the utility
function) is crucial in determining the excise tax to be imposed on it. The
great merit of the paper was to show that if the utility function is weakly
separable between labour and all goods taken together, then there is no need
to employ indirect taxation in the optimum solution.
A fourth key paper to be mentioned in this field is Mirrlees (1976) which
derived conditions for optimal mixed taxation consisting of optimal tax
schedules and rates. Some details of this paper will be discussed in section 8.
The existing body of optimum tax literature has obviously a good deal to
say about the optimal choice of indirect taxes in addition to the income tax.
Yet economists who want to apply these theories, for instance as political
advisers, do encounter a number of problems. One reason is that modern
optimum tax results are often given in such a form that they are hard to
convey to the layman on the political scene or elsewhere.' There is obviously
a need for simpler characteristics of optimal tax policy. In older analyses of
commodity taxes such as Corlett and Hague (1953-54) and Meade (1955) the
key to understanding the role of commodity taxes is presented in terms of
substitutability and complementarity between leisure and consumer goods.
No doubt this approach has a strong intuitive appeal both to the expert and
the layman. In recent and technically more complicated optimum tax theory
the possible roles of substitutes and complements are much less exposed or
even left completely in the dark, in my opinion at the expense of intuitive
insight This is also one reason why the connection between the various
analyses included in the brief survey above is not easy to see, although one
would suspect that they are closely related In particular one would expect
the simple implications of the older analyses to be embodied in some form in
the more complicated results of modem theories. Further exploration of this
subject therefore seems worthwhile.
The first purpose of this paper is to provide a mathematical- and more
precise analysis of the problem formulated and discussed by Meade (1955).
In order to define the starting-point more precisely than was done by Meade,
the shape of the initial income tax schedule is assumed to have been
optimized by a welfare-maximizing government. The analysis will then
examine how welfare can be raised even further by turning slightly from
income taxation to the taxation of particular commodities. This will allow us
IAn exposition aiming at a larger public is found in Atkinson (1977).
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to review the Meade results in a precise manner. It also paves the way for
the second task, which is to relate the Meade type results to those of
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Mirrlees (1976). The third and closely
related purpose is to focus attention on the roles of various relations between
leisure and the demand for other goods, which I believe to be most helpful
guides to the understanding of theoretical results in this field of tax analysis.
In contrast to a lot of modern tax literature the technical analysis is going to
be rather simple.
It may be useful to give a preliminary idea of the approach to be followed
as it deviates somewhat from the standard analysis. The behaviour of the
consumer/taxpayer is assumed to be ordinary maximizing behaviour both in
the commodity and labour market. But for analytical reasons it is useful to
treat it here as a two-stage optimization whereby the demand for
consumption goods is optimized for a given supply of labour in the first
stage, and the supply of labour is optimized in the second stage taking into
account the relations between commodity demand and labour supply
established in the first stage. This approach will enable us to extend the
tradition of making use of relations between the demand for various goods
and labour supply in throwing light on the choice of excise taxes. The
income tax will be treated in an analytically simple manner by applying a tax
function with a shift parameter which allows us to carry out a shift in the
whole tax schedule to accompany the introduction of an excise tax.
The main assumptions underlying the analysis to follow are presented in
section 2. Individual behaviour is described in section 3, and section 4 briefly
presents the optimum income tax. The analysis of marginal commodity taxes
in section 5 is the main part of the current paper. Section 6 discusses the
roles of substitutes and complements. Sections 7 and 8 provide comparisons
with the results of Atkinson and Stiglitz and those of Mirrlees. Section 9
takes a closer look at the treatment of leisure goods. Section 10 presents
some concluding remarks and also draws attention to some of the limitations
of the preceding analysis.
2. Main assumptions
The analysis will be based on a number of assumptions which have
become common in modern optimum tax literature (including the above
references). A one-period model (or timeless economy) is considered. This is
important because we have then barred ourselves from discussing effects on
savings behaviour which might be interesting. Individuals are assumed to
have identical preferences on consumption bundles and work effort (leisure).
Work is the only source of income apart from possible government transfers.
The wage rate of each person is exogenous and determined by his ability.
It is then convenient to consider the ability level and the wage rate as equal.
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There is a continuum of individuals distributed by ability (wage rate). The
distribution is characterized by the density function f(a), where a is the
ability level which is taken to be positive. Producer prices are given. There is
no tax evasion.
Each person chooses his work effort and consumption bundle optimally
taking his own ability, the prices and the tax policy as given. This individual
behaviour, which is analysed in the next section, is taken as given by the
government when designing its tax policy. The revenue requirement is given.
An additive welfare function is used as welfare criterion.
3. Individual behaviour
We study an individual who does an amount h of work at a given wage
rate, a (reflecting his ability). His gross income is:
I=ah. ( 1)
He faces an income tax schedule T(I), so that his disposable income
becomes:
y=I - T(I)=ah- T(ah). (2)
This income is spent on n consumer goods in quantities Xl'" .,x" at prices
Pl,. .. ,P". Let x and P denote the consumption vector and price vector,
respectively. The scalar product of the two vectors is written as Px.
Preferences are described by the utility function u(x,h). The individual is
assumed to maximize u as a price-taker subject to his budget constraint. As
suggested above, it will prove useful to conceive of this maximization as
being carried out in two stages. First the work effort, h, is treated as fixed,
and Il is maximized with respect to x. We establish the Lagrange expression:
L=u(x,h)-w(Px- y), (3)
and derive the wen-known necessary first-order conditions:
aL-a =u,(x,h)-(I)Pj =0,
X,
i= 1,... ,n. (4)
Px-y=O. (5)
Partial derivatives are indicated by appropriate subscripts. These conditions
define a special kind of demand functions:
xi(P,y,h), i= 1,... .n: (6)
J.P.E.-C
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Adopting the terminology of Pollak (1969), we may call them conditional
demand functions since they express the demand for consumer goods
conditional upon the value of h. åx;/oh is the marginal effect on the demand
for good i of an increase in work effort when disposable income, y, is
somehow kept constant. The corresponding conditional indirect utility
function may be written as:
v(P, y, h) =u(x(P, y, h), h), (7)
where x(·) is a vector function.
We know from duality theory that:
i= l, ... ,n, (8)
(9)
(10)
v,=w,
Subscripts y and h indicate partial derivatives with respect to these
arguments, respectively. The second stage of the optimization is to maximize
(7) with respect to h taking into account that y is a function of h. Provided
that the income tax function is differentiable, the first-order condition for an
interior optimum is:
v':: : = v,(P,y,h)a(l- T'(ah»+ v,,(P,y, h)=0, (11)
where the marginal income tax is denoted by T=dT/dl. The differentiability
assumption will be discussed in more detail below.
The second-order condition is:
v" <O. (12)
For given prices and tax schedule h, x, I, v and w become functions of the
wage rate or ability parameter, a. We denote the (unconditional) indirect
utility function by V(a).
4. The optimal income tax
We shall explore the effect on welfare of switching slightly away from pure
income taxation to the combined taxation of income and some commodity.
As it seems natural to exhaust the opportunities for welfare improvements
within the original system before introducing a new tax instrument, we shall
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assume that the initial income tax has got an optimal design. We can then
benefit from making use of the optimality characteristics. In particular it will
allow us make use of the envelope properties.
The optimal income tax has been analysed in a number of papers [see, for
example, Mirrlees (1971, 1976, 1977)], and we shall not go into details in the
present context. It is not the purpose of this paper to extend the analysis of
the pure income tax. On the contrary, we shall make assumptions about the
optimal tax schedule (differentiability, etc.) which mean that we have to be
somewhat modest about the generality of the analysis. The analysis of the
optimal income tax is a complicated piece of mathematical economics. The
optimization problem is usually formulated as an optimum control problem.
But, as emphasized by Mirrlees (1977), it is hard to tell, because of the
special nature of the problem, when the optimum is characterized by the
standard first-order conditions usually found in the literature. In particular, it
may be dubious to represent the individual optimization simply by the first-
order conditions of that problem in the social optimization. It is not the aim
of this paper to take up these mathematical problems which apply to a wider
class of optimum tax problems than the one presented here.
The analysis will be based on a number of crucial differentiability
assumptions without which the analysis becomes much more complicated.
First, the tax function itself is assumed to be differentiable. This may not be
true in general, as pointed out by Mirrlees (1971). As we shall see, the
assumption has got important implications. The budget set corresponding to
a particular tax schedule and the consumption points chosen by different
individuals are often illustrated in an I,y-diagram. For a given wage (ability),
a, indifference curves can be drawn on this diagram to illustrate the trade-off
between gross income and net income and hence the consumption-leisure
trade-off' of an a-individual. One' such indifference curve is shown in fig. 1.
We shall adopt the common assumption that an individual with a higher
ability has a flatter indifference curve through any given point (I,y) than an
individual with a lower ability. [See Seade (1982).] With this assumption it is
obvious that individuals on different ability levels can have the same
consumption point only if this is a comer point of the budget set. With
comers ruled out by the differentiability assumption, gross income becomes a
strictly increasing function of the individual wage-rate except for possible
wage-rates at which no labour is supplied. Let I(a) denote this relationship.
[For more details see Seade (1982).]
In the following analysis we shall make use of shifts in the tax function.
Introducing a shift parameter S we obtain an income tax function T(I, S). It
is common to assume that the economic variables are differentiable functions
of the ability parameter a. [See, for example, Mirrlees (1976).] In the current
analysis it is an essential assumption that the economic variables are
differentiable with respect both to a and S. These assumptions are to some
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extent related. In general one of the problems encountered in tax
optimization (in particular with a finite population) is that some consumers
may be left indifferent among widely different consumption bundles. If this
were the case, a small change in a might lead to discontinuous jumps in
consumption points. In that case a small change in the tax schedule is also
likely to produce discrete shifts of consumption points.
The case is illustrated in fig. 1. It shows the budget curve (B-B) resulting
from a particular tax schedule and the indifference curve (I'-I') for a person
of ability a'. As the figure has been drawn, this person is indifferent between
point P and point Q. With the usual assumption that people with higher
ability have flatter indifferencecurves, people with a greater than a' will be to
the right of Q and people with lower a than a' will be to the left of P. Thus.
there will be a discrete jump. If the a'-person is initially at P, and a marginal
shift in the budget curve takes place which makes it slightly less favourable
at arid around P, the person will move his consumption point discretely to
Q. Such discrete shifts are not permitted in the current analysis.
Differentiability is crucial.
y
I I
B
B
ah
Fig. 1.
Let US now tum to our characterization of the optimal income tax. We
start out by considering the situation in which a general income tax is the
only tax instrument of the government. When designing its tax policy the
government must take into account the whole population of individuals, each
following the behaviour described above, and the ability distribution j(a). A
total tax revenue amounting to ro is required. The government must then
, choose its tax policy within the budget constraint
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J T(I(a)j(a)da= TO, ( 13)
where the size of the population has been normalized at unity.': The shape of
the tax schedule is chosen so as to maximize
w= S V(a)j(a)da ( 14)
subject to (13).
It is not the concern of this paper to characterize in detail the optimum
shape of the income tax function. A rather compact characterization will do
for our purpose. Let. us therefore assume that the optimal shape of the
income tax function has been determined up to a number of parametric
shifts. The last part of the optimization can then be carried out by means of
usual parametric optimization. In order to do this we make use of the shift
parameter S in the income tax function, T(I,S). A shift is generated by
changing S. It is denoted by Ts=oT/aS. Let us also assign the shadow price
J.lto the tax revenue constraint (13). The tax function can then be optimized
with respect to S by means of the standard Lagrange expression
L= S V(a,S)j(a)da+ J.l(ST(ah,S)j(a)da- TO). (15)
The first order condition can then be expressed as
dL S . SdS = - roTsjda+J.lj Tsjda+J.l rahsjda=O, (16)
where we have used the fact that av;as= -roTs, which is easily established
by applying the envelope theorem to (7). The second and third tenn of the
left hand side express the resulting change in tax revenue evaluated by means
of u: The Lagrange multiplier has the usual interpretation:
J.l=-ewtsr: evaluated at the optimum. (17)
At the optimum an arbitrary marginal shift in the tax function must neither
lower nor raise welfare, otherwise a shift could always be devised which
would increase welfare, and it follows that the initial schedule would not
have been optimal.
In order to be able to differentiate h with respect to S, as done in
expression (16), our differentiability assumptions are obviously essential. As
discussed above, a situation such as the one depicted in fig. 1 might lead to
discrete jumps in the consumption point in response to a marginal shift in
the tax schedule: It is important that such cases have been ruled out.
2For simplicity integration limits are omitted.
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A shift parameter, S, can obviously be used to express any shift in the tax
function from the optimal one. To see this let T*(I) be the optimal tax
function, and let F(I) be some arbitrary function of J. The income tax
function can generally be written as T(I, S)= T*(I) +SF(l). The optimum
value of S is obviously zero, and a small change in S will generate a marginal
shift, of which the first-order effect on welfare is zero.
s. Marginal commodity taxes
Let Ph''''P" denote the fixed producer prices per unit of X1, ... ,X",
respectively, and let p denote the corresponding price vector. Suppose that
commodity taxes may be levied as taxes tt, ... .t; per unit of X1, ... ,X",
respectively. Let t denote the corresponding vector. Negative taxes are
allowed, which means that commodities may be subsidized.
We are now prepared to consider the introduction of marginal excise taxes
to supplement the optimal income tax. What commodities should then be
(positively) taxed, left untaxed or subsized, respectively?
It should be noted at this stage that proportional taxation of all
commodities is obviously equivalent to a proportional income tax. So this
possibility is already covered by assuming the existence of an optimal initial
income tax. The question we are asking is therefore: What commodities
should be taxed if differentiated indirect taxes may be imposed?
In order to deal with commodity taxes, we must write the tax revenue
constraint as
fT{ah,S)Ida+ Itxf åa= ro=O. (18)
The special case tt=tz= ... =t,,=O takes us back to (13) and the results of
the preceding section, which we now take as our point of departure.' The
imposition of marginal unit tax rates t1" •• , t" can now be analysed by
applying the envelope theorem to the Lagrange expression:
L= f v{P, y, h)I da + .u(f T{ah, S)I da+ f txf da- ro). (19)
Making use of (8) and bearing in mind that Pi = PI + t, and t,=0 for all i, we
find that:
oW-A-= - f (l)xt!da +.u f xJ da+ .ufT' ah,J da. 'Vi,at, (20)
where hrl =oh/at,.
3The exposition is simplified by omitting the arguments of the functions where no confusion is
likely to _arise. The reader should bear in mind that h-h(a,S.l). yaah- T(ah.S). XI =XI(a,S.l).
and f=f(a).
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Let us now pick one good. say good l, for further consideration. How a
small excise tax on good l would affect social welfare depends on the sign of
(21)
..- Eq. (21) expresses the welfare effect of levying a marginal commodity tax oncommodity 1 without changing total tax revenue. The first term of (21)
captures the immediate effect of the tax burden imposed by the new tax
while the second and third term together capture the effect of the ensuing tax
changes which are required to keep total tax revenue unaltered.
There is not much to say on the basis of (21). Further manipulation is
obviously necessary to be able to arrive at policy recommendations. The first
thing we do is to define a marginal shift in the income tax function of which
the immediate effect is to impose a tax increase X 1 on each taxpayer.
Formally:
(22)
This analytical trick is a crucial point which may require a more detailed
explanation. Since the income tax is a function of gross income, and the
function must be the same for everybody, it is only admissible to define such
a shift if X 1 can be expressed as a function of gross income alone. Taking the
initial income tax function as given, and recalling that preferences are
uniform across individuals, the individual decision variables ultimately
become functions of the wage-rate only. We can therefore express Xl as a
function x1(a) which is the initial relationship between Xl and a.4. Moreover.
as we have seen already, gross income is a strictly increasing function of
a which can be inverted so that a becomes a function of I. Inserting
this relationship into xl(a) we obtain a function xf(I) which is exactly the
kind of relationship which allows us to write eq. (22). We can now write
T(I,S)==T*(I)+Sxf(I). Hence, the shift is well defined for alII.
Our differentiability assumptions are crucial at this stage. If the tax
schedule were kinked, there would be people with different wage-rates and
different consumption bundles earning the same income. Then there would
not be a unique value of Xl associated with each value of I, and (22) would
not be a meaningful definition of a shift in the income tax function.
The reader should not be confused by the fact that I == ah is a variable in
the tax function, while we also write h as a function of S. A change in S
changes the tax associated with each value of I == ah. This is a quite ordinary
shift. But, since the individual will normally respond to the shift in the tax
·x. is used as a function symbol both in x.(P,y,h) and :c.(a) since this is not likely to cause
any confusion. .
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schedule by changing his consumption point, the chosen value of h (or I)
depends on S. The actual change in the tax paid by an individual is the
combined effect of a shift in the tax function and a movement along the tax
schedule. This is analogous to a shift in an ordinary partial demand function
which implies that we can write the price as a function of the shift parameter.
Since (16) is true for any marginal shift in the tax function from the initial
optimum, it is also valid for the shift defined by (22). Hence, if we substitute
Xl for 15 in (16):
- J wxl/da+/JJ."C1/da+/JJ T'ahs/da=O,
or:
- Jwxt/da+ /Jf xt/da= -/Jf T'ahs/da. (23)
Inserting this expression into (21) we obtain:
(24)
Now the complexity of the formula has been reduced, and we can approach
the problem of signing. In general (hr, -hs) can be of any sign, and the
question is whether positive terms outweigh the negative ones or vice versa.
A more interesting approach is to ask whether there are classes of utility
functions or demand patterns which ensure sufficiently unambiguous
reactions across individuals to guarantee a unique sign. Indeed. we know of
one such case already from the weak separability result of Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976).
Since jJ, T', a and / are all positive, what we want to explore is the sign of
(hrl-hs). The effect of tl on h is obtained from the optimality condition (11):
11,(p+t, ah- T(ak, S),h)a(l- T'(ah,S» + "h(p+t,ah- T(ah,S), h)=O.
Differentiating with respect to tl we find:
and hence:
(25)
where (11) has again been applied. hs is found in a similar way by
differentiating (11):
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(16)
A number of substitutions can be made by means of the relations."
(27)
We find that:
1 [V" Vt Vt a (v1)Jhs=- -v --v" --v a-:::- .v" v ss v y v y ol vy y y y (28)
Since y and h are functions of a, and, as we have seen, a can be expressed
as a(l), we can write:
Xl (P, y, h)=xt(P, y(l), h(l) == - Vt(P, y(l), h(l»/vy(P, y(l), h(l)),
which hold at the initial equilibrium where S==tt =0.6 Hence we flnd'that:
aOX1== _a!_(v1) == _a!_(v1)OY + a oxt(P,y,h) oh
al al v, oy Vy al ah al
== _(vt, _ V1~')(I_ T')a+ oX1(1:,y,h) a ~h,
v, Vy oh ol
and due to (11):
_a!...(V1)==(Vt, _ Vt~y) v" + axt(:,y,h) a~h.
al v, v, v, v, oh et (29)
This result simplifies (28) so that:
(30)
Applying (25) and (30):
lo h 1 ( V",V1 axt(p,y,h) ah)
'Jr - S=-- Vu ---+v a-
l - v" V y ah al ., (31)
'RecaJ1 that T(I,S)==T·(I)+Sxf(I). Hence, T'(l,S)-oT·/OI +Sox!/ål. aud oT/oS=oxVol.
&rhese parameters have been suppressed. However. we shall use the panial derivative oh/ol to
denote åh(I,S,tl)/ol evaluated at S=tl =0.
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We know that Xl = -vdv". DitTerentiating with respect to h, we obtain:
which is evaluated at the initial consumption point. Inserting this result into
(31) we obtain:
lo -h = Vy OXl(P,y, h) (1- ah)
''tt S n ~h a ~I .v o o (32)
Under the assumptions which have been made, a and I are positively related.
By definition I=ah, which implies that l-aohjoI=hdajdI>O.
From the second-order condition of the individual optimum we know that
vn <O. It then follows from (24) and (32) that:
OXl oW
oh >0, for all a~<O,ott
OX1=0 oW (33)for all a=>--=O,oh ' atl
OXl aw
oh <O, for all =s:>O.tl
Analogous results may, of course, be derived for ;~2'••• ' XII. Thus, there are
certain demand patterns which uniquely determine whether a small tax or
subsidy on a commodity should be recommended. The partial derivative of
the conditional demand function, oXl(P,y,h)joh, expresses the effect on the
demand Cor X l when an individual who is initially optimally adjusted is
forced to work a little more without any change in disposable income. A
detailed discussion of conditional demand functions is found in Pollak
(1969). Adopting his terminology, we say that
(a) if ox';oh>O, XI is positively related to h;
(b) if oxt!oh=O, XI is unrelated to h; and
(c) if ox';oh<O, x, is negatively related to h.
We can now state:
Proposition I. Starting from a situation in which an optimal income tax is the
only tax, a welfare gain is achieved by imposing a (positive) marginal excise tax
on a commodity which is negatively related to labour and by introducing a
marginal subsidy on a commodity which is positively related to labour.
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. In other words, commodities one typically buys more (less) of if more leisure
is obtained without any loss of income, are candidates to be taxed
(subsidized). This is a very simple result, although it may not be quite as
simple to determine in practice what kind of relationship holds true for a
particular commodity.
Proposition 1 gives a more precise meaning to the results of Meade (1955).
A precise meaning has been assigned to Meade's references to 'substitutes for
leisure' and 'things which are jointly demanded with leisure'. The relevant
relations between the demand for various goods and the demand for leisure
(or labour supply) are those precisely defined by Pollak (1969) as stated
above. In a rough sense these relations are a kind of complement and
substitute concepts, which are akin to but not identical to the usual Hicksian
concepts used by Corlett and Hague. With this background it is interesting
to explore further the various relations between leisure and the demand for
the various commodities, which we now do.
6. The roles of substitut~ complements and quasi-separability
It may be interesting to relate the results of this paper to the conventional
substitute and complement concepts. This may be helpful when trying to
trace the effects of working time on demand, and it may reveal to what
extent the results of the simple Corlett-Hague model carry over to the more
complicated model of mixed taxation studied in the current paper and in
modem tax theory.
The simplest procedure is to establish directly the relationship between the
Pollak concepts and the Hicksian concepts. Let us consider the conditional
demand function,
/
xi(P,ah- T(ah),h), (34)
at the unconditional equilibrium; that is where h is optimally adjusted to the
price and tax parameters. Let m denote the marginal wage rate:
m=a(1-T'). (35)
The effect of a change in m on x, is found by differentiating (34):
Hence:
ox, ox,;am
oh ah/om
AX,m-",,-.oy (36)
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It is well known that the labour supply responds positively to a higher
marginal wage rate so that oh/om>O. For convenience let us rule out inferior
goods so that oxJoy>O. Then we see that if x, and h are substitutes,
oxJ om<O, then XI is negatively related to h in the Pollak sense. Xi is
negatively related to h if they are 'weak' complements, and positively related
to h if they are 'strong' complements. Thus, we find that a complement with
leisure tsubstttute for labour) should be taxed and so should a sufficiently weak
substiuue for leisure, while a strong enough substitute for leisure should be
subsidized from our tax reform point of view. Likewise the demand for a
complement with or sufficiently weak substitute for leisure should be
discouraged in the Mirrlees sense at the full optimum, while the demand for
a strong enough substitute for leisure should be encouraged (see section 8
below). We may note that the effects pointed out by Corlett and Hague do
playa crucial role, even in the present context.
An alternative way to relate our results to the roles of substitutes and
complements may bring out more clearly how the various effects arise. It
starts out considering the crucial difference (hr_-hs) of formula (24). Each
term may be decomposed into a compensated effect and an income effect:
hrl - hs= hrll u+ income effect- hsl u - income effect
(37)
since the shift is designed in such a way that the income effects are equal and
cancel out. From the definition m=a(1- T') it follows that:
am et:
as = -a as· (38)
Making use of the assumption that 1$=Xi> we find that:
(39)
Eqs. (38) and (39) together imply that:
(40)
Hence we can derive:
h I _ ah am __ ah aXi -
s u - am as - am a al . (41)
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We insert this result into (37) and obtain:
oh I eh ex;ht,-hs=-o +-",-a~I'
t;" om o
(42)
where the sign of the compensated derivative (ah/at;)I .. defines whether hand
x, are substitutes or complements. The presence of ox;/ol in (42) shows that
a sort of income effect is important. It should be noted that this effect arises
only because it determines the change in the marginal after-tax wage-rate
which in turn has a pure substitution effect. The greater the inequality
aversion of the government, the steeper will the initial income tax schedule
tend to be. If a tax is levied on a commodity of which high-income people
will buy far more than low-income people. the steepness of the income tax
schedule can be reduced significantly without changing the overall
distributional profile of the tax policy. Hence, the marginal income tax is
reduced with favourable effects on efficiency.Tbis is exactly what is expressed
by the second term of (42).
If the choice of commodity taxes is approached in terms of ordinary
Hicksian substitute and complement concepts, one must also allow for the
income effect on commodity demand discussed above. which in general may
be positive or negative. In tbis sense Meade was right in making his
qualification about the distributional impact of a commodity tax. If
sufficiently adverse (from an egalitarian point of view) it may, as noted by
Meade, dominate the otherwise advantageous effect of a tax on a
complement ~th leisure.
The role of the income effect may be related to the tax results obtained in
the case of quasi-separability [see Deaton (1981)]. Goods i and j are said to
be quasi-separable from leisure (work) if the marginal rate of substitution
between good i and good j is independent of leisure (work) along an
indifference curve, if the consumer is compensated for the change in leisure
(work) by a proportional change in the vector of all goods (including leisure).
An important implication of quasi-separability is that compensated changes
in the wage-rate affect commodity demands proportionately. Since a sole
change in the marginal wage-rate is equivalent to a compensated change in
the wage-rate, we have that in the case of quasi-separability:
(43)
where <> is independent of i. We can then reformulate (36) to obtain:
(44)
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The message derived from this formula is that commodity taxes should be
levied on commodities with sufficiently high income elasticities. as may be
the case for a typical luxury. This result bears a certain resemblance to the
finding that progressive (non-linear) commodity taxation is desirable under
quasi-separability [Deaton (1981, p. 1249)]. This means that the tax-rate
should be higher the more luxurious one finds a good, in the sense that it is
more highly valued by people on high utility levels than by people on less
favourable indifference curves. It also seems interesting to relate the results of
the present analysis to those of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Mirrlees
(1976), as will be done in the following two sections.
7. Comparison witb Atkinson and Stiglitz
From Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) we know that commodity taxes are
always non-optimal regardless of how the population is composed if the utility
function is of the weakly separable form u(tj>(x),h) so that o(ut/ut)loh=O
for all i. It is easy to verify that this is equivalent to ox;/oh=O for all i, as
indeed it should be if our results are correct. This equivalence sheds new
light on the Atkinson-Stiglitz result.
The optimality conditions for x when h is given are:
(45)
(46)
Let us introduce the notation xj =oxjloh. Differentiating the equation system
(45) and (46) we obtain the system:
(47)
.J Ul .J u,. , O
hl +-hl+"'+-x,,= .
Ut Ul
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We immediately see that:
(48)
Eq, (48) allows us to state:
Proposition 2, The demand pattern ax jl ah=O, for all j, obtains if and only if
the utility function belongs to the class of weakly separable utility functions
u(q,(x),h),
For later application it is useful to solve the equation system of the two-
good ease using commodity 2 as the numeraire:
OXt O(Ut!Ul) l (49)ah ah D'
OXl O(Ut!Ul) Ul 1 (50)-=
Ul D'oh oh
where
o Ul o Ul----
D=-
åx, UlOXl"l
"1 1
"l
As usual, " is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave in Xl and ;Cl' which
implies that D>O,
8. Comparison with Mirrlees
Mirrlees (1976) established conditions for optimal mixed taxation
consisting of income and commodity taxation. His analysis is presented in a
very general form. Let us now consider the case in which simultaneous
optimization of a non-linear income tax and excise tax rates on the various
commodities takes place.
Sticking to the notation of the current paper, we can write the demand
functions used by Mirrlees as:
(51)
(with P, I and a replacing q, z and n, respectively). Let us define
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which denotes the compensated derivative of x, with respect to Pic'
In our notation the following necessary optimum conditions derived by
Mirrlees can be established:
i= 1,... ,n, (53)
where v(a»O [Mirriees (1976, eq. (9.86»].
Adopting Mirrlees' own interpretation, ei is a measure of the extent to
which commodity taxes encourage consumption of the different commodities.
Then axi/aa>O implies that the consumption of commodity i should be
discouraged, while axi/aa<O implies that it should be encouraged.
The results of Mirrlees apply to the full optimum, while the analysis of the
preceding sections of this paper is concerned with the introduction of small
excise taxes to supplement the income tax. However, the results are closely
related to each other. To see this, rewrite (51) in the following way:
Xj(P, y, l, a)æxf(P, y, l/a)
æXj(P,y, ah/a) æ'''CI(P' y, h), (54)
which is identical to the conditional demand function (6). We immediately
see that:
aa
aXI(P, y, h) .~.
ah a
(55)
,
We can therefore say that if XI is negatively related to h, the consumption of
commodity i should be discouraged by the optimum excise taxes, while if x, is
positively related to h; the demand for commodity i should be encouraged by
the optimum excise taxes.
Condition (53) was explained by Mirrlees (1976, p. 347) in the following
words: 'This surprisingly simple criterion says that commodity taxes should
bear more heavily on the commodities high-a individuals have relatively
strongest tastes for.' We have seen that a good is negatively related to labour
if a reduction in hours worked, holding income constant, results in an
increase in demand for the good. Such a reduction in hours worked with
constant income can be achieved by increasing ability. It is in this sense that
a good that is negatively related to labour is a good for which people of
higher abilities have 'strongest 'tastes'.
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9. Leisure goods and the Becker-Lancaster approach
In much of the literature on excise taxes and tax-distorted labour supply a
special importance is attached to leisure goods. It is typical that after
showing that there is no need to employ differentiated indirect taxation in
the presence of a weakly separable utility function, Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980) make the following comment: ' ... and it is quite possible that this
separability requirement måy not in practice be met. for example. in the case
of leisure goods'. This comment leads to no further conclusion. But it seems
to be a popular belief among many economists that taxation of leisure goods
should be recommended. It is therefore interesting to discuss whether this is
an implication of the tax theory.
An approach to the relationship between working time (or leisure) and
market goods which may be useful for this purpose, is the Becker-Lancaster
approach [Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966)]. The key idea of this
approach is that the basic goods enjoyed by a consumer are produced in the
household by means of own effort and commodities purchased in the market.
Recreation may be one such basic good which is produced by means of a
certain input of time (leisure) and leisure goods.
We shall consider a simple case where utility is derived from two basic
goods, of which one is recreation and the other is simply a market
commodity. The enjoyment of the latter is assumed not to be time
consuming. Let Z denote the amount of recreation. Leisure, r, is the amount
of time spent on recreation. Commodity 1 is now interpreted as the market
good used as an input in the production of z, The household production of
recreation is described by the technology function:
(56)
Partial derivatives are denoted by z" and z, and are assumed to be positive.
Xl may consist of sporting equipment. travelling, tickets for concerts or
amusement parks, etc.
The relationship between r and h is given by the time budget:
r+h=k=constant (57)
The utility function is now written as:
U(Z(Xttr), xl,h) =u(z(x1, k -h),Xl,h), (58)
which is basically a function of Xl' Xl and h, as before. Note that henters
twice, once because of its opportunity cost through the time budget and once
because work may be disliked or enjoyed as such. The following notation is
used:
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i= 1,2;
As was discussed in section 7, a small excise tax on Xl should be
recommended or not depending on the sign of o(ut/u2)/8h. We easily find
that:
(59)
U2 U2
Then the following expression is obtained:
(60)
where both effects of h are allowed for. Let us consider the terms in reversed"
order. The last term expresses how the marginal valuation of recreation
changes with work effort. It seems natural to assume that this effect is non-
negative. Probably recreation is more highly valued the harder a person
works. For a given labour supply 8(U::/U2)/OZ<0 if X2 is a normal good.
which seems to be a natural assumption. especially at this level of
aggregation. If Xl and r are technically independent, =xr=O, or technical
substitutes, Zxr<O, the first term on the right-hand side is non-negative, and
the whole expression becomes positive. If Xl and r are technical
complements, zxr>O, the overall sign is positive if Xl and r are sufficiently
weak complements, and negative if they are sufficiently strong complements
in a technological sense. Thus, a small excise tax on Xl should be
recommended only if Xl and leisure are strong technical complements.
Otherwise a small subsidy should be recommended.
It follows that it is not necessarily appropriate to recommend taxation of
leisure goods, even if one is willing to make the tempting assumption that
they are technical complements with leisure within a Becker-Lancaster
framework. The notion behind the belief that leisure goods should be taxed
is presumably that by making leisure goods more expensive, recreation is
made less attractive and so is leisure time. The weak point in this argument
is that even if recreation becomes less attractive compared to other goods,
leisure goods may be substituted by leisure time in the production of
recreation, and the labour supply may shrink. Recreation may simply be
made more time-intensive and less commodity-intensive. As an extreme
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example a long cheap cottage holiday may be substituted for a short service-
intensive luxury cruise.
We may explore this matter further after adding a few more simplifying
assumptions which reduce the efforts needed to bring out the main point.
Utility is assumed to be a function of z and X2 only, which means that there
is no utility or disutility from work effort per se. This utility function is
assumed to be homothetic. The technology function z is assumed to be
homogeneous of degree one. The respective marginal rates of substitution
can be expressed as:
(61)
and
(62)
where ccand p are both increasing functions.
The elasticities of these functions are denoted by i and 11. We also define
the elasticities of substitution: •
(f" == l/i (63)
and
(64)
In order to focus on demand properties, taxes are left on one side. The
budget constraint of the consumer then becomes:-
(65)
The optimum choice of the consumer is determined by eq. (65):
(66)
(67)
and
(68)
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In order to study compensated effects, utility is assumed to be constant:
u(Z,X2)== constant. (69)
Let el and e2 denote the partial elasticities of z, Also, let =" denote the partial
elasticity of z" with respect to Xl' Since z" is homogeneous of degree zero,
the partial elasticity of z" with respect to r is -z", Let a caret C) over Xl' X2'
Z and r denote the compensated elasticity with respect to P l' The elasticities
are derived by means of the equation system (66H69). We tind that:
(70)
(71)
(72)
and
U::Z A U2X2 A O
-Z+--X2= ,
U U
which is equivalent to:
(73)
From (71) and (72) we get:
(74)
We see that even if the effect of a higher Pl is to make Z less attractive, =<0,
r may still rise because of the positive substitution term elO'",. From (70), (71),
and (73):
A -l( A)z=- O'"+O'"O':z,,,y (75)
where
Combining (74) and (75), we get:
(76)
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Zx is assumed to be negative so that the term in parentheses is positive.
Hence, we see that the substitution properties of the z-function are crucial in
determining the sign of i,
If (J:: is big enough so that substitution possibilities are good, r will become
positive, because a higher P 1 motivates a large-scale substitution of X 1 by r.
Thus, Xl and leisure become substitutes, even though they are used jointly to
produce recreation. If (Jz is small enough so that substitution possibilities
dwindle, r obviously becomes negative, and Xl and r are complements.
Substitution between leisure time and leisure goods is a complication
which must be carefully allowed for when excise taxes on leisure goods are
considered. This is not to argue that leisure goods should be left untaxed. A
number of leisure goods are probably not easily substituted by leisure time.
And even if a commodity is a substitute for leisure, we know from section 6
that it may be desirable to tax this commodity if the substitution property is
moderate. Hence, there. is good reason to believe that many leisure goods
should be taxed. But a general prescription to this effect may easily prove
too hasty. Which specific commodities show such demand properties that
they should be tatted (subsidized) is, of course, an empirical question which is
not going to be pursued any further in this paper.
10. Conclusion
Within a tax-theoretical framework and starting from a situation in which
an optimal income tax is the only tax, this paper has analysed which
commodities should be taxed (subsidized) if small excise taxes may be levied
and the income tax adjusted to keep total tax revenue unchanged. The
answer is simple. A commodity should be taxed (subsidized) if it is positively
(negatively) related to leisure in the Pollak sense, which means that more
(less) of the good is consumed if more leisure is obtained at constant income.
Furthermore, it was shown that the result of Atkinson and Stiglitz. that no
excise taxes should be levied if the utility function exhibits weak separability
between leisure and all other goods together, simply means that if all
commodities are unrelated to leisure in the Pollak sense, no commodity
should be taxed (or subsidized). It was also demonstrated that the sign of the
same relation determines whether the consumption of a commodity should
be encouraged or discouraged in the Mirrlees sense when the income tax and
excise taxes are all set optimally." The analysis has provided a link between
the older analyses by Corlett and Hague and by Meade and modem
optimum tax theory on the roles of direct and indirect taxation.
The analysis has been confined to circumstances where all essential
functions are ditTerentiable. This approach, shared with a number of other
analyses in this field, has allowed the use of ordinary differential calculus.
7See Mirrlees (1976, p. 347).
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Although of limited generality, it seems that differentiable cases can
contribute to our insight into the optimum choice of commodity taxes to
supplement the income tax, and thus have a fair claim for interest.
The partial nature of the analysis should be noted. The choice between
direct and indirect taxation has a number of interesting aspects, of which the
effect on labour incentives, focused on above, is only one. The argument for
excise taxes most firmly rooted in economic theory is, of course, the
externality argument for Pigouvian taxes. This aspect is well known and
hardly needs elaboration. It has therefore been suppressed in the present
context. Two aspects have received little attention in the theoretical literature
so far. One is the choice of excise taxes when savings decisions are distorted
by income taxation, and the other is the implications of tax evasion for the
choice between direct and indirect taxation. Further exploration of these
aspects within the framework of optimum tax theory or tax reform theory
would certainly be worthwhile in order to broaden the basis of economic
advice in this practically and politically important field.
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The framework is a simple two period life-cycle model with identical individuals who work in
period 1 and are retired in period 2. Initially there are optimally chosen uniform income and
commodity tax rates, which lead to distortions in both the labour/leisure choice and the
consumption/savings choice. The purpose is to demonstrate in an intuitively comprehensible way
how differentiating commodity taxation by slightly increasing the tax on one consumption good
can mitigate existing distortions. The sufficient conditions for a welfare improvement are similar
to that of Corlett and Hague plus some conditions on average and marginal consumption
propensities.
l. Introduction
It is well known within tax theory that an income tax and a general tax on
consumption (for instance a general purchase tax, VAT or expenditure tax)
both distort the marginal trade-off between work and leisure by driving a
wedge between the wage rate paid by the employer and the wage rate
received by the employee. It is also known that excise taxes on particular
commodities may help to mitigate this distortion. and thus may be re-
commended despite the fact that they tend to distort relative commodity
prices. In an early contribution Corlett and Hague (1953-54) showed that by
taxing a commodity which is complementary with leisure. one can indirectly
make the enjoyment of leisure relatively more expensive. and hence to some
extent counteract the opposite effect of a tax on income or general
consumption. [For a modem exposition of this result see Sandmo (1976).]
The same basic idea was discussed in Meade (1955). A central reference to
modem tax reform analysis is Dixit (1975). which derives a number of
results. including a generalization of the Corlett and Hague result. These
analyses are all carried out within the framework of a timeless or one-period
model.
Another well-known fact in tax theory is that an income tax distorts the
trade-off between consumption and savings (or present and future consump-
*The revision of this paper has benefited a lot from the comments of the two referees.
0047-2727/85/S3.30 (g 1985, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Hcllandl
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tion), while a general tax on consumption is neutral in this respect. This
recognition has led to several studies of the relative merits of taxes on
income and consumption when savings and labour supply distortions are
both allowed for. [See, for instance, Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) and King
(1980).]
The purpose of this paper is to approach the question of choosing excise
taxes on particular commodities when the income tax distortion of savings
behaviour is taken into account in addition to the wage distortion. As a
starting-point for extending the analysis in that direction, the optimal
balance between taxation of income and consumption in general will be
assumed rather than analysed. The more precise question to be taken up is
under what conditions the introduction of a small excise tax on a particular
commodity should be recommended. Hence the analysis may be regarded as
an exercise in tax reform theory.
The analysis will focus on pure efficiency aspects. Hence only one
individual (or a population of identical individuals) is considered. To simplify
the analysis, only two periods are considered. The person works, consumes
and saves from one period to the next. In these activities he is faced with a
two-period budget constraint, which is affected by the tax policy. The model
can be interpreted in two ways. It can be considered as a simple extension of
the one-period model needed to cope with intertemporal problems, while a
fixed population is assumed. Or one may assume that in the background
there are in fact overlapping generations, but we shall consider only one
representative generation. This would be more in line with the model of
Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) and King (1980). If all generations are assumed
to be equally endowed, it also seems natural to require that they should be
treated equally, so that the tax policy should be the same in all periods. In
any case this may be a convenient simplffication.
We shall assume that a person supplies labour only in the first period. The
nearest interpretation is, of course, that the person is retired in the second
period. This assumption is in line with the approach of Atkinson and
Sandmo (1980) and King (1980). It is a useful simplification, In particular it
makes it easier to relate the results of the two-period model to the one-
period results of Corlett and Hague (1953-54) or Dixit (1975).The important
extension of the current analysis is the introduction of savings, and ad-
ditional complications in other respects are rather avoided.
We consider a simple tax system. First, there is a proportional income tax
with the same tax rate in both periods. The tax rate is denoted by t. Second,
there is a proportional tax on consumption, which we may think of as a
general purchase tax. The tax rate is constant over time. It is denoted by r,
This is equivalent to a situation with two taxes on wage and interest. An
important and well-known property of a purchase tax is that it is non-
distortive with respect to the trade-off between savings and consumption
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provided that the tax rate is constant over time. This is a property which
distinguishes the consumption tax from an income tax. The existence both of
an income tax and a general purchase tax allows us to consider the effects of
differentiating an originally uniform commodity tax when savings are distor-
ted by an income tax. In order to differentiate the indirect taxation the
introduction of an excise tax on one commodity, say commodity l, is
considered. The tax rate is denoted by 't l' and is assumed to be the same in
botb periods. For simplicity, and without important consequences, prices are
assumed to be constant over time. Section 2 presents an analysis of the
individual behaviour. The tax policy is described in more detail in section 3.
The main analysis of differentiating the indirect taxation is developed in
section 4. Some brief concluding remarks are presented in section 5. There is
an appendix for deriving mathematical results.
2. Individual behaviour
In general there are many consumption goods. The reform to be consi-
dered is to increase tbe tax on one consumption good consumed in both
periods. Let Xi denote the quantity of this commodity consumed in period i.
All other commodities may as well be lumped together and treated as one
composite good. Let Yl denote its quantity in period i. Let h be the amount
of labour supplied, s be the amount of savings in period l, and i be the (pre-
tax) interest rate. The pre-tax wage rate and producer prices are assumed to
be constant, and are all set equal to unity by proper normalizations. The
interest rate is also taken to be constant. •
The assumptions are in line with those made in mucb of the optimum tax
literature, and simplify the analysis a lot. Different justifications might be
provided. A simple one is to assume that there are two commodities being
produced under constant returns to scale with commodity prices given from
the world market. As is well known, factor prices are then determined
independently of factor supply. One might assume that savings take place at
a given interest rate in an external financial market, and marginal productiv-
ities of labour being constant. Or more complicated stories might be told, for
instance making use of golden rule assumptions, as in King (1980).
The preference ordering of an individual is represented by a utility
function whicb is assumed to be additively separable between periods. This
kind of assumption is fairly common and allows us to obtain more striking
results. We write the utility function as
(1)
It is convenient to refer to U 1 and U2 as the utility functions of period l
and period 2, respectively. The individual is faced with the budget
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constraints:
(2)
and
(1+r)(x1+ Y1)+(1 +r)rtX1 -(1 +i-it)s=O. (3)
We have assumed that the general purchase tax is levied on an excise tax
inclusive price. We might use (2) or (3) to eliminate s and only consider
explicitly the choices between different commodities consumed at the same or
at different dates. We shall, however, choose to keep s as an explicit variable.
The individual is assumed to maximize (1) with respect to the consumption
bundle, labour supply and amount of savings subject to (2) and (3) taking
prices, interest rate and tax parameters as given. We treat this optimization
as carried out in two stages. In the first stage U 1 is maximized subject to (2)
and Ul is maximized subject to (3) for a given arbitrary amount of savings.
These standard textbook optimizations lead to ordinary demand and supply
functions and the indirect utility functions corresponding to U 1 and U 2'
respectively.
If we divide (2) and (3) by (I-c), we can introduce the new variables,
q=(l +r)/(l-c) (4)
and
ql =(1+ r){1+ rd/(l- c), (S)
which can be interpreted as consumer prices of Yi and Xi' respectively. We
also define:
11= -s/(l-t) (6)
and
11=(1+i-it)s/(l-t). (7)
For a given s, Iland Il can be interpreted as exogenous incomes received in
the respective periods. We can then write the indirect utility functions as
(8)
and
/
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(9)
Let
A.i=oV;/iJI;, i= 1,2. (lO)
• The labour supply function is written as
(11)
The final optimization takes place by maximizing V= Vl + V2 with respect to
s. The necessary first- and second-order conditions are
V'=dV/ds= -Åt!(I-t)+Å.2(1 +i-it)/(I-t)=O, (12)
and
(13)
3. The tax policy
Taxes are set by the government so as to satisfy a given revenue
requirement. The government may lend or borrow at the given interest rate
so that the revenue requirement is given in terms of the present value of the
tax proceeds, T, or its second-period equivalent, (1+i)T. To simplify the
notation we define:
(14)
We can then express the revenue requirement as
Ræ(1 +i)(tc1 +(1 +t)tlXl + th) + !Cz+(1 + t)t1Xz+ tis=(l + ilT, (15)
where T is given exogenously. Initially t1 =0. t and t are assumed to be
chosen so as to maximize V subject to the constraint (15) and subject to the
individual optimizing s. The optimization is carried out by using a Lagrange
function:
L= V+Jl(R-(l +i)T), (16)
where J.l is the shadow price of the revenue constraint. We shall not deal with
/
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the optimum taxes in detail. We shall only make use of the first-order
conditions,
aL" aL"
--=--=0,at at (17)
where the asterisks indicate that the derivative is evaluated at the optimum.
These conditions imply that at the initial optimum:
(18)
4. IJitroduction of a small excise tax
Let us now consider the marginal welfare effect of introducing an excise
tax on commodity 1. We consider a tax reform which in general involve
changes in all three tax parameters represented by the vector (dt, dr, dr d.
The tax reform is welfare-improving if dV~ O, and dR ~ O with at least one
strict inequality. l It is convenient to choose a reform such that d V= O which
implies that we must have dR>O in order to obtain a welfare improvement.
By slightly increasing tt from zero initially, we shall normally get dV <O and
dR> O keeping the original tax parameters fixed. In order to restore the
utility level, changes dt and dr must be implemented. Several changes are
then possible. .State in mathematical terms, the surface d V = O is of dimen-
sion two in the three-dimensional tax space, and several curves on this
surface may be considered. But since t and t have been optimized initially, it
makes no difference which particular curve (vector dt, dr) we select as far as
the first-order effect on revenues is considered. To see this, remember that by
the optimality assumption dR/d V must be the same for any small deviation
(dr.de) from the initial situation, as implied by (18). The welfare change dV
resulting from a small movement (dt,dt) is determined by being required to
offset the partial effect on welfare of imposing a small tax dtt• Hence dV is
given, and since dR/dY is given and the same in any direction (dr.dr), dR is
also determined independently of the choice of direction. This is, of course,
an envelope property of the original situation. Hence the net effect on tax
revenue, that we are concerned with, is independent of the particular choice
of path on the surface where the net welfare effect of changing all three tax
parameters is zero.
For analytical reasons we choose a path of tax reform represented by the
vector (dt, dr, dr l)=(t', r', 1)dr l' such that d Vt=d V2=0, keeping savings
constant These conditions determine zhe compensating variations t' and t',
lFor a general introduction, see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 382).
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One verifies immediately that a change in savings has no first-order effect on
utility since savings are optimized in the initial period.
It follows that the introduction of a small excise tax will be welfare-
improving if the reform defined above has a positive total effect on tax
revenue, dR/d-r1 >0. In order to analyse this effect, we have to compute the
vector of tax reform (t', r', 1) from the conditions dVt/dt1 =dV2/dt1 =0. This
is a straightforward computation which has been done in the appendix. We
find that
(l-c)(1 +t)ish(xtlh-X2/is)
t' ( 19)
and
(l-t)(1 +r)c1c2(X!/C2-Xli/cdc' (20)
The general purchase tax rate will rise or fall depending on whether the
consumption of commodity 1 as a share of current income (from labour or
capital) is higher or lower in period 1 than in period 2. The income tax rate
will rise or fall depending on whether the expenditure share of commodity 1
is higher or lower in period 2 than in period 1.
Making use of these results, as shown in the appendix, we find that the
total effect on tax revenue can be expressed as
dR t+t dh t ds
-=(l+i)--+i--,
d-r1 l + r dr 1 1+ -rdr 1 (21)
where all derivatives with respect to r 1 are total derivatives which also take
into account the compensating variations in t and c. Whether the tax revenue
will increase depends on the responses of labour supply and savings. This is
not surprising since these are the decisions which are distorted in the first
place. We may note that if t=O savings decisions are not distorted and only
the labour supply effect remains as long as the purchase tax is present. The
same thing is obviously true if the interest rate is zero.
In order to find the effects on labour supply and savings, we need to make
use of the price changes, q'l and q', derived in the appendix:
(22)
We see that the price of commodity 1 increases and relatively more the
J.P.E.- E
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greater the share of commodity y in total consumption over the two periods.
, 1+. -"1+-"2
q=---' .
l-t Cl +C2
(23)
We see that the price of y decreases. The relative fall is greater the greater
the share of commodity 1 in total consumption over the two periods.
Let us then analyse the effect on labour supply. Since the price
changes which take place are compensated changes, we can make use of the
compensated partial derivatives:
(24)
and
Ohle",=oq Yl' (25)
For given s the individual is compensated in period 1. So for no change in s
we can look at compensated effects. But in general s will also change so that
in period 1 there is an income effect on labour supply in addition to the
compensated price effects. Hence we tind that
(26)
From (22) and (23):
•
(27)
where the' sign is determined by the sign of the expression in parentheses.
This is exactly the criterion of Corlett and Hague (1953-54, formula (8»,
allowing for the fact that each commodity is consumed in two periods. The
etrect of differentiating the commodity taxation depends on the substitution
effects pointed out by Corlett and Hague. To use their own words: 'If there
are three goods, X, Y and L2, a consumer will always work harder as the
result of the introduction of the indirect tax (total tax paid remaining
constant) if it is levied on that good (X or Y) which is more complementary
lL denotes leisure.
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with leisure: If in the current analysis commodity is more complementary
with leisure than the composite commodity it follows that y is more complemen-
tary with work effort than X, which means that a"t/(xt +x2»a",/(Yt + yz).
Hence we have a benchmark which allows us to extend the analysis of the
effects of differentiating commodity taxation directly from the result of Corlett
and Hague. We shall refer to (27) as the Corlett-Hague effect.
A modem ~nd more general version of the Corlett-Hague result is
theorem 6 of Dixit (1975): 'In a competitive economy with constant producer
prices and an initial equilibrium with equal proportional distortions, a small
change in tax rates holding commodity tax revenue constant will increase
welfare if all commodities whose prices are lowered are better substitutes for
the numeraire than all those whose prices are raised: Although Dixit's
analysis and modem exposition may be a more adequate reference than the
original Corlett-Hague article;' we shall continue to associate the relevant
effect with the names of the pioneers in this field, as done by Dixit in his
article.
The existence of savings adds two kinds of effects to the Corlett-Hage
effect. First, a change in savings affects the labour supply. Since normally the
income effect is negative, a positive effect on savings reducing the income left
for consumption in period 1 will bring about a greater supply of labour.
Thus there is a connection between the distortion of savings and th.:
distortion of labour supply. Second, the effect on savings is important as
such since it can mitigate or aggravate the original distortion of savings.
Let us now analyse the effect on savings. We then recall formula (12), the
first-order optimum condition for savings:
-ld(1-c)+l2(1 +i-it)j(l-t)=O.
We can now make use of the compensated price effects on the marginal
utilities of income."
ali I = - A./Xi i= 1,2, (28)
OQl Yi ali'
•
aA.fI = -A., ayi, i= 1,2. (29)oq Yi ali
3This wås strongly pointed out by one of the referees.
"Let there in general be n commodities with quantities written as XI, ••• .x, and prices as
ql •... .q•• or simply q in vector notation. Let V(q.l) and e(q, V) be the indirect utility (unction
and the expenditure function, respectively. Let subscripts, apart from the commodity index of ."C"
denote derivatives with respect to the relevant arguments. Also let a superscript c indicate that
compensation is provided. Then from the equilibrium condition e(q, V(q, I)) = l we lind that the
marginal utility of income, Å(q,I), equals e; I. Hence
Å:= -e; 1e.,= _e;l ei."" _e.-1 :cite.= -Å-Xit.
For further discussion of this result, see Christiansen (1983).
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Differentiating the first-order optimum condition we then get:
" ds l. (aXl' oy! ,)
V -d +-1- A.l -:::;--1 q 1+ -:::;--1 q
'tI -t O 1 O 1
1 • (1 (ax., 0Y2 ,) Å.. , O---A.2 +i-it) ~ql +-~-q ----it = .
l-t 012 012 l-t
(JO)
Eliminating A.2 by means of the first-order condition and solving for ds/dr l'
we get:
i(l-t) (1+'t)CIC2(xtlCl -XZ/C2)]
+(I+i-it)' S(Cl+C2) , (31)
where (20) has been used. The right-hand side is an expression in square
brackets with a positive coefficient. The expression in square brackets con-
sists of three main terms. The first term is positive ifqtCXt/O[1>qtOX2/CI2'
This partial effect is easily interpreted. At optimum a marginal unit of expen-
diture must be equally valuable to the consumer regardless of whether it is
consumed in the first period or in the second period. When a price rises. the
real value (or purchasing power) of a marginal expenditure unit is reduced.
By how much it is reduced depends on the propensity to spend marginal
expenditure on the good which becomes more expensive. If this propensity is
lower in period 2 than in period 1, the value of marginal spending is reduced
less in period 2. Then it becomes advantageous to transfer some spending
from period 1 to period 2, which simply means saving more. The interpreta-
tion is, of course, analogous for the opposite sign.
The marginal consumption propensities do, of course. in general depend
on preferences as well as the parameters of the economy (prices. interest rate
and tax rates). Even if preferences were in some sense identical over periods.S
marginal consumption propensities might still ditTer.
The interpretation of the second term is quite similar. The term is positive
if the marginal propensity to spend income on other market commodities
(than commodity 1) is higher in period 2 than in period 1 (since q' <O). In the
present model the marginal propensity to consume the composite com-
modity in period 2 is obviously higher the lower is the marginal propen-
sity to consume commodity 1 in that period. This is because q 0Y2/CI2+q! OX2/
'Preferen<:eS for consumption bundles might be identical in the sense that U I(x I' Y I.hl ==
rp(XhYl)+t/I(h) and Uz(xz,Yl)==rp(xz,Yz).
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cI2 = 1 from the budget constraint. In the first period there is not such a
tight relationship because marginal income can in addition be spent on
leisure. Yet there is a tendency towards one commodity having the higher
propensity in one period and the other commodity having the higher
propensity in the other period.
The third term of (31) is the effect of the change in the after-tax interest
rate which arises if the income tax rate changes. The income tax rate will fall
and savings be stimulated by a higher net interest rate if the expenditure
share of commodity 1 is higher in period 1 than in period 2.
To sum up we have found that savings will be encouraged if:
(i) the marginal propensity to spend income on the more strongly taxed
commodity is higher in the first period than in the second period:
(ii) the marginal propensity to spend income on other commodities is
higher in the second period than in the first period:
(iii) the share of the more strongly taxed commodity in expenditure is
higher in the first period than 'in the second period.
In a more compact way we may say that savings will be more encouraged
the greater the propensity, both at the margin and on the average. to spend
income on commodity l in period l as compared to period 2.
Let us now bring together the various partial effects by making use of (21l,
(26), (27) and (31) to get:
(32)
•
.where the savings effect is given by formula (31). The first term is the
Corlett-Hague effect, The second and third term express the fact that
stimulation of savings has an indirect positive effect on welfare through the
labour supply response as well as a direct positive effect by reducing the
initial distortions. Each effect has been discussed above.
We have considered a reform which introduces a marginal excise tax on
one commodity and adjusts existing taxes to keep the utility level constant.
, (The particular choice of compensating adjustments is arbitrary because of
the optimality of the original taxes.) Then, if tax revenue increases, a welfare
improvement is obtainable by increasing government expenditure, or by
taking the tax reform one step further, whereby taxes are lowered so as to
make the after-tax price vector of the economy more favourable to the
consumers without loss of initial government revenue. In this sense the tax
reform may be welfare-improving. The 'formulae (31) and (32) establish a
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number of characteristics which can serve as guides in identifying such
welfare-improving reforms whereby marginal excise taxes are imposed in
addition to the existing income and purchase taxes. In addition to the
Corlett-Hague characteristics these are such simple characteristics as mar-
ginal and average propensities to consume the various commodities.
Proposition. Starting from a situation with an optimum proportional income
tax and optimum uniform commodity taxes, a marginal tax reform which
introduces an excise tax on a particular commodity is efficient under the
following sufficient conditions:
(a) the particular commodity is more complementary with leisure than other
commodities;
(b) the marginal consumption propensity of this commodity is higher in the
first period than in the second period;
(c) the marginal consumption propensity of other commodities is higher in the
second period than in the first period: and
(d) the expenditure share of the particular commodity is higher in the first
period than in the second period.
5. Concluding remarks
In the tax literature the choice of commodity taxes has mainly been
discussed in relation to labour supply distortions in a timeless economy. The
tax distortion of savings has mainly been attended to in analyses of the
balance been the taxation of income and the taxation of total consumption
expenditure (in the form of a general purchase tax or an expenditure tax).
The present analysis has combined the roles of labour supply and savings
distortions due to income and purchase taxes in the search for excise taxes to
supplement an initially uniform purchase tax and a proportional income tax.
This has been done within the simplest possible model capturing only the
most essential features of an economy with tax-distorted labour supply and
savings. All taxes are proportional. Capital market imperfections and un-
certainty are non-existent. Distributional considerations are ignored.
Economic growth problems are not discussed. A tax reform approach has
been adopted by analysing the effects of deviating slightly from uniform
commodity taxation. The optimum choice of commodities for imposing smaU
excise taxes has been shown to depend on the degree of complementarity
with leisure, as demonstrated by Corlett and Hague. and the marginal and
average propensities to consume the various commodities at different stages
in life. If the marginal and average propensities to consume a commodity are
falling over the life cycle, an excise tax on that commodity will stimulate
savings. An intuitive explanation is that the consumer will be encouraged to
postpone more of his spending as the future real value of marginal spending
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increases as compared to the present one. In addition the after-tax return to
savings rises as the income tax is reduced." -
Appendix
We have defined a direction of marginal tax reform which implies that for
fixed savings utility levels in both periods are kept constant. To keep utility
levels constant the introduction of marginal excise tax dr 1 on commodity 1
has to be accompanied by compensating variations r' dr 1 and t' dr 1 in rand
t, respectively. Compensation implies that
d
d Vd(1+r)(1+.l)/(1-t),(1 +.)/(I-t), -s/(1-e»=O (A.l)
ri
and
d
-d V2«1+r)(l +rd/(l-t),(1 +.)/(l-t),(1 +i-it)s/(I-t»=O. (A.2)
'tI
When we recall that initially ti =0, it follows from (A.l) that
. (l+r r' l+r . t' )
A.l - --Xl - --Cl - --t' Cl- --s =0.l-t l-e (1-e)2 (1-e)2 (A.3)
(A.4)
From the budget constraints (2) and (3) we have that
(1+'t)c1 +s=(l-t)h (A.S)
and
,. (1+'t)C2 -s=(l-t) is, (A.6)
when initially 'tI =0. Due to (A.5),eq, (A.3) is equivalent to
(A.7)
6Sinceincome effectsof changing the balance between taxes cancel out, the ambiguous effects
of a change in the interest rate on savings. demonstrated in every elementary textbook. is not
relevant in the present context.
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And, due to (A.6), eq. (AA) is equivalent to
(A.8)
We can then solve for r' and c' to obtain:
(A.9)
and
c'_(1-t)(1+t)(c~XI-CIX2)
- (l-t)clis-czh(l-t)'
(A.I0)
Eq. (A.5) and eq. (A.6) imply that
(A.l l)
Inserting this into (A.9) and (A.lO), we get:
(l-c)(1 +t)ish(xtlh-xz/is)r' (A.12)
and
c' (l-c)(1 +t)CIC2(XZ/C2 -;\:t/cd.
S(Cl +Cl)
(A.B)
We are now prepared to derive the total effect on tax revenue. dR/dtl,
which takes into account the compensating variations in t and t. Differentiat-
ing eq. (15) from the main text, we find that
(A.14)
Differentiating the budget constraint (2), we get:
Clt' +(1 +'t')dctld't'l +(1 +t)Xl +ds/dr, -(l-t) dh/d't'l +hc' =0. (A.15)
Also employing (A.7), we get:
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dCI 1 d.s l-tdh-= -----+----.
d-rI 1+ t dr I 1+ r dr I
(A.16)
Also differentiating the budget constraint (3), we get:
Then employing (A.S); we obtain:
dCl 1 ..
-d =-(1 +l-rt)d.s/d-rl·ti 1+t
(A.1S)
Substituting from (A.7), (A.S), (A.16), and (A.lS) in (A.14), we obtain:
dR t+t dh t d.s
-=(1 +i)----+i----.
dtl 1+t d-rl l +t dr,
(A.19)
Moreover, we tind the effects on the prices defined by eq. (4) and eq. (5) in
the main text:
=1+t.YI+Yl>O,
1-t Cl+C2
(A.20)
q'=~(I+t) (I-t)t'+(I+t)(
drl 1- t (1- t)2
-(1-t)2(1 +t)x1is+(I-t)2(1 +t)x2h+(1-t)(1 +t)2CZX1 -(1- t)(1 +t)2CtXl
= -(I-t)2s(Cl +C2)
(A.2I)
where (A.S) and (A.6) have been used
J.P.E.- F
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Abstract
In optimum tax theory all income ~s usually assumed to be endogenous.
The present paper analyses the optimum uniform taxation of a mixture of
exogenous income and endogenous labour earnings. The tax policy is a
linear income tax. The population consists of individuals with different
wage rates and exogenous income endowments. Special attention is focused
on the role of the composition of income. Counter-intuitive results are
derived.
THE OPTIMUM TAXATION OF MIXED ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS INCOME
By
Vidar Christiansen
1. INTRODUCTION
In optimum taxation analysis income is usually treated as completely
endogenous, e.g. as a result of labour supply decisions. The opposite
polar case would of course be simple from an analytical point of view
since any income tax scheme would then be equivalent to a system of
lump sum taxation. There would be no loss of efficiency from redis-
tribution or net taxation. The policy problem would be reduced to that
of selecting the first best allocation with the desired income dis-
tribution.
For practical purposes the intermediate case with mixed endogenous
and exogenous income may, however, be more relevant than the purely en-
dogenous income case. My argument ~s that the primary sources of income
are labour and inherited capital. The latter source of income can for
many purposes be treated as exogenous. In particular, this will be true
in a one generation model where the bequest behaviour of the preceding
generation is a fact of history. Moreover, certain kinds of inherited
capital, for instance land, is essentially of an exogenous nature.
I shall assume that endogenous and exogenous income cannot be or
for some reason are in fact not taxed differently. There may be adminis-
trative and other practical difficulties in distinguishing between the
two kinds of income. One kind of income may fairly easily be dis-
guised as another type of income. In particular, income from inherited
capital can hardly be identified from the return to savings of own labour
income, which is not a primary source of income.
The purpose of this note is to analyse the uniform taxation of
mixed endogenous and exogenous income. Apart from the distinction bet-
ween types of income the model is firmly rooted in the tradition of
- 2 -
optimum income tax analysis. A comparison with Sandmo and Dixit
(1971) is of particular relevance.
I
2. THE MODEL
A timeless model is considered. Each individual is endowed with
an exogenous income and faces an exogenous wage rate which may be
taken to reflect his skill level. There is a number of individuals
simultaneously distributed by these two characteristics. A linear in-.come tax is considered. Each individual chooses his supply of labour
giving rise to endogenous labour earnings. The following symbols are
used:
w • wage rate
e • exogenous income
t • the marginal tax rate
h • labour supply
a • lump sum transfer payment
'" • (1 - t)ww ..net wage rate
I - wh + e ..gross income
C • (1 - t)I + a ..consumption
V«t - t)w, (1 - t)e + a) = indirect utility function
A .. øV/øa ..marginal utility of income
R ..total net tax revenue
An additive welfare function is used as the objective function at
the government. The cardinalisation of the indirect utility function
is then chosen so as to reflect the distributional preferences of the
government. The net tax revenue is required to be equal to a preset
level RO. Everybody is asnuned to have SOT'lC!enrnC!r::~Lncone . The size
of tllC!popu latLon is set ~qual to n , A subscript i is used to
assign a variable to the ith individual.
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3. THE TAX DES IGN
The tax revenue requirement may be expressed as
(1) n °R = .:rtI. - na = R~=1 ~
or
(2) R = :rtw.h.«l - t)w., (1 - t)e. + a) + :rte.-na = RO.~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(2) implicitly defines a as a function of e , a(t). Let a I = da/dt.
The optimum tax problem is to maximize
(3) W = :rV«l - t)w., (1 - t)e. + a)~ ~
taking .into account the relationship between t and a imposed by the tax
revenue requirement. The first order condition becomes
The second order condition is
(5) Wit < O.
It is convenient to rewrite (4) as
(6) W' = - :rA.(I. - I) - :rA.(I - a') = O~ ~ ~
or
(7) +-ncov O, , I) - :rA.<l - a') = O~
where I = :rI./n. The first term on the left hand side of (7) may be~
interpreted as the distributional effect of marginally increasing t
while the second term captures the effect on efficiency •.When the
marginal utility of income is negatively correlated to income this
is an argument in favour of redistributing more income to the rela-
tively poor by increasing the marginal tax rate and the lump sum
transfer.
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But since economic incentives are adversely affected, the increase
in the transfer payment will be less than the average gross burden
which is imposed on the taxpayers, a' < l. Society as a whole
suffers a loss of income in the process of redistribution. So the
two opposing effects must be balanced against each other.
Differentiating (2) we find that
and hence
(8)
ahi 2- Ltw.I. -~-- - Ltw. shw + LI.~ ~ aa 1 1a' = --__;:~;__;;..;;;...--;:-:--------dh.
1- LtWi -a-a- + n
where shw is the Slutsky derivative of h with respect to the net wage
rate. (For simplicity the subscript is omitted.)
We then find that
I - a'
ah. ah. 2
1 1 1 )= ---- __ ~=--(oLI.-(LI.) (Ltw.-~-) -oLI. +nLtw.L-~- + oLtW. shwah . 1 1 1ea 1 1 l ca 1
n(n - LtW. ~)
1 aa
(9)
ah. 2I - a' ... t_~_ (L(w.~ (I. - I» + LW. shw).ah. a ea 1 1
n - Ltw.-_1
1aa
We can then rewrite (7) as
( 10)
ah.
1 -oLW.-~- (I. - I), .J") t'\ a ea 1W ,.. - nco""1\ , I - 1\ ------:::-:---- ah.
1n - Ltwiaa-
2nLw. sh
1 w- tA ------:::-:-- ah.
1n - Ltw.-"I-
1ea
= o
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The covariance still represents the distributional concern. The
second term normally differs from zero if the marginal propensity
to pay income tax differs across individuals. Then marginal redistri-
bution will change the total tax payment and hence aggravate or alleviate
the initial efficiency loss from second best taxation. The third term
captures the marginal efficiency loss due to the private incentive to
substitute socially less valuable leisure for socially more valuable
income when the marginal tax rate increases. The social opportunity
cost of leisure in terms of income foregone, w, exceeds the social and
private willingness to pay for leisure, (l-t)w, when t>O.
Formally, the optimum tax condition is no different from the one
obtained in the case of earned income only, but the contents of the
various expressions are generally different. Hence a further explo-
ration is called for.
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4. THE RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND MARGINAL UTILITY OF INCOME
The covar1ance between the marginal utility of income and total
income plays a crucial role in the analysis above. Let us therefore
explore this relationship in more detail. A change in total income is
made up of a change in earned income and a change in exogenous income.
Earned income is affected directly by the wage rate and indirectly
through effects on work effort both by the wage rate and the exogenous
income. Since
(19) aI = ~-t C«l - t)w, (1 - t)e + a) - 1 - t
where C is total consumption of an individual, we can express a change
in total income due to changes in wand e as
(20) ac acdl = - dw + "'ade •dW* (J
Letting sCw denote the Slutsky effect of w* on C, writing Ca for ac/aa,
and making use of the Slutsky equation, we can rewrite (20) as
For constant income, dl = O, (20) defines a downward sloping curve
in the (de,dw)-diagram below. We easily see that
(22) dwde l
-C
I = -S-c-w-+-:-:--:::C~a
The curve defined by dl = O divides the (de,dw)-diagram into two half-
spaces showing the directions of change which increase total income and
those which reduce total income. The shaded area shows the changes which
increase total income.
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dw
dl = O
de
Figure 1
Changes in the wage rate and the exogenous income will affect the
marginal utility of income in the following way:
(23) dA dAdA = --- (1 - t)dw + ~a (1 - t)de
dW* a
= A~ (1 - t)dw + ~~ (1 - t)h dw + ~~ (1 - t)de
where AC is the compensated (or purely marginal) effect of w* on A.l)
w
We further obtain
(24) dA = A~~ (1 - t)dw + ~~ (1 - t)h dw + ~: (1 - t)de •
Setting dA = O we get another curve in our diagram. Th~/slope is
given by
dw I - A(25) de A = Xh +ahA t
a a
where a partial derivative is indicated by subscript a.
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dw
dA = O
dA > O
de
Figure 2
When consumption is normal and the welfare function exhibits ine-
quality aversion, h and A are both negative and the slope is obviouslya a
negative. The shaded area shows the changes which reduce the marginal
utility of income. In general the curve defined by dl = O and the one
defined by dA = O do not collapse into one. They do only if
(26)
C A_____a~~_ = ~~~a~~_
sCw + h Ca A ha + h Åa
which is equivalent to
(27)
C A Aa a a.
sCw = A ha = AC
w
If the curves do not collapse we have either the situation depicted 1n
figure 3 or the one depicted in figure 4 below.
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dl = O dw
dA
dl < O
dA < O
dA > O
de
< O
dA
dl > O
Figure 3
The shaded area shows the changes which imply that when total
income increases the marginal utility of income goes down. We see
that there are two cones of directions of change in which total ~ncome
and marginal utility of income move in the same direction.
A similar picture is obtained in figure 4.
dA = O dw
dl < O
dA > O
dl > O
dl
de
dl <
dA < O
dA > O
Figure 4
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If the typical increase in total income is generated by directions
of movement into the shaded area there will be a negative covar~ance
between total income and marginal utility of income. Note that this
will always be the case if wand e are both increasing.
The effect of a change in total income on the marginal utility of
income depends on whether the change is due to a change in the wage
rate or a change in the exogenous income. Let us examine the two al-
ternatives. Let dl be a given change in total income.
For de = 0,
(28) dw dl=
sCw + h Ca
For dw = O ,
(29) de dl=-Ca
Let - dA and - dA denote the reductions ~n A corresponding to (28)w e
and (29), respectively.
Combining (24) and (28) we see that
(30)
Combining (24) and (29) we get
(31) - dAe
- Aa= -C- (1 - t)dI.
a
We see that
dAe according as
(32) h Å/Aa a
AC
w >= - - s tc :A < Cw aa
~ 11 -
We may note that C = (1 - t)wh + 1. Some polar cases may bea a
interesting. If the income effect on labour supply is very small
an increase in total ~ncome will always have a stronger effect on the
marginal utility of income if it is due to a change in
exogenous income than if it is brought about by a change in the wage
rate. If the cross substitution effect is very small, i.e. sew is
close to zero, the opposite will be true.
Let us now try to get more insight into the formal results derived
above. When a person's income increases and he becomes better off, the
marginal utility of income decreases. This is true for an increase ~n
exogenous income as well as the pure real income effect of an increase
in the wage rate. However, an increase in the wage rate will in addition
reduce the marginal value of income because a marginal income unit buys
less leisure than before as leisure becomes more expensive. This effect
occurs when marginal income is used to buy some leisure, h < O. Toa
focus on one effect at a time.let us for the moment assume away this
effect. The magnitude of the real income effect of increasing the wage
rate depends on how strongly the wage rate increases. Since a rise in the
wage rate has a positive substitution effect on earned income, it must be
smaller the stronger the substitution effect is, to bring about a preset
change in observed income. If for a moment we also neglect the substitution
effect, s =0, (30) and (31) coincide. A wage change is then equivalentcw
to a change in exogenous income, both affecting equally full (potential)
and observed income. The effects on the marginal utility of income are
pure income effects which are the same in both cases. Then observed in-
come and the marginal utility of income obviously move in opposite
direction no matter why income changes, as is confirmed by formula (26).
When there is a positive substitution effect, the increase in the
wage rate required to produce a given rise in earned income gets lower,
and the real income effect of such an increase in the wage rate falls
below that of an increase in exogenous income. Hence the effect on the
marginal utility of income also becomes smaller when w changes than when
e changes, as we also see from (32) since by assumption the left hand side
is zero and the right hand side is positive.
However, if there is also a marginal real income effect of changing
w, h < O, the total effect of changing w on the marginal utility of income
a
gets stronger. The individual gets better off and the real value of
marginal income is reduced.3) So this will be an~fect in the opposite
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direction. If Ih I is sufficiently large, this effect will dominate, anda
a change in earned income will have a stronger effect on the marginal
utility of income than an equally large change in exogenous income.
It might be possible to have increasing exogenous and total income
combined with a diminishing wage rate. Since w, unlike exogenous income,
has a marginal real income effect on A which is positive when w decreases,
it might also be possible to have a positive covariance between I and A
as shown in figure 3 and figure 4. But I do not expect this to be the
prevailing case in practice.
The above analysis is useful for discussing the effects of the
composition of income on the marginal utility of income. These effects
are important when considering the impact of the composition of in-
come on the optimum tax design to which we shall turn in the next
section.
5. EFFECTS OF THE COMPOSITION OF INCOME ON THE OPTIMUM TAX DESIGN
It would be interesting to know how changes ~n the composition of
income would affect the optimum tax policy. For instance would a
larger exogenous component work in favour of higher or lower progres-
sivity? More precisely we may ask: If the population with the
original characteristics were replaced by a population with the same
observed distribution of actual income but with higher exogenous
income and lower earned income, would the government then want to
change the tax policy. This is obviously a complicated question.
If we consider the first order condition for the optimum tax rate,
there are a number of effects to take into account. In general
little or nothing can be said about how substitution effects, in-
come effects, etc. change with the wage rate, exogenous income, etc.
It may, however, be of interest to consider simple cases.
Let us first make clear some implications of the experiment we
conceive of. First, there is no change in I. for i = 1,•••,n at the~
original tax policy. It follows that C. is also left unchanged for~
all i. Moreover, the tax revenue constraint remains fulfilled without
changing any tax parameters. However, it may be desirable to change
the tax policy.
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Let us consider the case where the preferences of the individuals
are represented by a Stone-Geary utility function:
(33) u = a ln(L - L) + ln(C - C)
where L denotes leisure, a is a positive parameter and L and C are
parameters usually interpreted as minimum requirements.
Let us define
(34) x = L - L
and
(35) y = C - C
The budget constraint can then be expressed as
(36) m = w* + (1 - t)e + a - C - w*£ = w*x + y
where the available amount of time (for labour and leisure) has been
set equal to unity.
The Gossen condition becomes
*= w
which is equivalent to
*w x == ay
or
1 *y=-wx.a
Also employing the budget constraint,we then get the demand functions:
(38)
m C C,Y = = -+ a
ma -x = = L - L = 1 - h - L .
( 1 + a)w*
(37)
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We see that
(39) ahw- =aa - (1 + a)(l - t)
which is independent of wand e.
The Slutsky derivatives with respect to the net wage rate, sxw
and s ,are derived from the Gossen condition and the condition thatyw
utility is constant. Hence
X + w*s - rv S-u. ywxw
and
= O
which is equivalent to
a
x sxw + 1. sy yw = O
and hence
syw
= _ ay s
x xw *= - w sxw
We find that
(41 )
2 w*x ay 2w s = - = = - w shw'xw (1 + a)(l 2 (1 + a) (1 2- t) - t)
s = sew = alyw (1 + a)w *
(40)
2Since our experiment leaves e and y unchanged, w shw also retains its
initial value.
Inspecting (9) we now see that if preferences are of the Stone-
Geary type, there will be no change in (I- aI). The absolute value
of X can of course be manipulated by the conventional choice of units
of welfare. It is convenient to keep X fixed. Then there will be no
change in the second and third term of (10), i.e. the efficiency terms.
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The remaining question is how the first term, i.e. the equity term,
is affected. When ~ is fixed, the change in the covariance equals
redA. - O)I./n=cov(dA., 1.). If the changes in the marginal welfare
1. 1. 1. 1.
weights are negatively correlated with income, the marginal tax rate
should be increased. Let us assume that initially marginal welfare
weights are negatively correlated with income. Then the covariance
will be reduced if marginal welfare weights are reduced relatively
more at higher income levels than they are at lower income levels
neglecting the requirement that the mean value should be preserved.2)
Since the mean restoring adjustments are proportional changes,
absolute mean preserving changes in the marginal welfare weights will
then be negatively correlated with income. The relative change in
some marginal welfare weight, A, when e increases and w changes to
keep income unaltered, is from (22) and (24):
(42)
A lA - heIsea a a w
(1 - t) de.
1 + heIsea w
Unfortunately there is not much to say about how this expression
changes with income in general. However, it may be interesting
to consider the special case in which distributional preferences are
adequately represented by the special cardinalisation of the
utility function presented in formula (33). Let us first introduce
the corresponding indirect utility function, denoted, by v, which
is obtained by plugging (37) and (38) into (33):
(43) a In ( ma ) + In mv =
(1 + a)w* + a
ln[( )a a]
ma m=
(1 + a)w* 1 +
= In[C m a)1+a(~*)a]=ln(ml+a (3)+
where a is defined implicitly....
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We easily derive that
(44) x 1+a 1= = --m y
(45) x 1+a=a 2m
and hence
(46)
x
a-,,- = --- m
I would like to argue that this is not an arbitrary special case,
but rather one which may have a special claim for interest. In applied
welfare economics the welfare weight is frequently assumed to be some
isoelastie function of total consumption expenditure
(47) -oJo. = C •
(See for example Stem (1977».
As a special case o is often assumed to be unity, which may even
have some empirical support. (See Christiansen and Jansen (1978,
p. 233). If in addition the minimum consumption requirement, C,
is zero, (44) and (47) are equal. Even if C > 0, one can hardly
argue that (44) is a less plausible specification than (46).
We find from (39) and '(41) that
a
h (1+a)w *a--= =--Sew aI y
(1+Ct)w*
and from(39):
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* ClC = w h + 1 = 1 - --~-- = -----a a l+a 1+0.
Hence
ha 1
Ca Sew = - ~(-:-l+-Cl~)-y-= - -m-
due to (37).
The numerator of the fraction in (42) then becomes
A-lA - h C Is =a a a ew m
The denomimator becomes
l-L *w--- =
_. *
(l-L)w (1+a)
y
We see that if the utility function (33) represents the individual
preferences as ~ell as the distributional preferences of the government,
then the optimum degree of income tax progressivity is unaffected by
the composition of income.
Intuitively it might be tempting to believe that the existence of
exogenous income should lead to a higher marginal tax rate because
efficiency effects might be believed to be less important and perhaps
because high income people might be believed to have more unearned
income. But in general this intuition does not hold. As we have seen
the composition of income is not necessarily important. But in general
we cannot tell whether studies of optimum taxation neglecting exogenous
income tend to over - or underestimate the optimum marginal tax rate.
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FOOTNOTES
1) Let E(w*,V) denote the expenditure function. From the condition
* -lE(w ,V(w*,(l-t)e+a» = (l-t)e+a we find that A equals E • Hence
v
= - E-2 Ev w*v =
-?E -h E
v a v = Aha
2) As an alternative formulation we could divide (10) by ~ and consider
the covariance r.(A.I~ - l)1.In. The change would then be1. 1.
cov(d(A. I~), 1.) •1. 1.
3) These effects are analyzed lonmore detail in Christiansen (1983).
4) A more straightforward route is to observe that S1.nce A = uc'
which only depends on C, A does not change when C remains the same.
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INCOME TAXATION OF TWO-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS
By
Vidar Christiansen
ABSTRACT
A model is constructed to analyze the tax treatment of secondary
wage earners in two-person households. The households have different
income opportunities, and potential secondary wage earners differ in
their willingness to take a job. In a variety of numerical cases the
optimum tax structure is computed allowing for income distribution and
the tax distortions of the labour market participation of secondary
wage earners. Special tax systems of the kinds actually in operation
are analyzed and compared.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Most normative tax theory has explicitly or tacitly been concerned
with the taxation of single individuals. The special problems raised
by the taxation of couples have received little attention. One excep-
tion is Blundell and Walker (1982). At the same time the taxation of
families has been an issue in the tax debate in many countries. The choice
of taxable unit has been a source of contraverst. Different countries have
adopted different schemes such as joint taxation (the United States),
single filing (Sweden), optional single or joint filing (Norway) or in-
come splitting.
There has, however, been considerable interest in the positive
analysis of the labour supply of spouses, which is highly relevant to
the tax design problem. A large number of empirical studies are reported
in the literature. Although estimates vary, there is general agreement
that the labour supply of married women is far more responsive to
economic factors (wages, taxes, etc.) and non-economic circumstances
(number of children, etc.) than men's labour supply. The latter is often
found to be very inelastic. In the wake of these econometric studies
there has been a growing interest in exploring the effects of alter-
native tax treatments of the family, see for example Feenberg and Rosen
(1983).
The purpose of the present analysis is to study the taxation of two-
person households from a welfare point of view. We consider an exogenous
population of two-person households. The households may be married couples
or people living together as unmarried couples. If both categories are
included we assume that they are treated equally by the tax authorities.
Our assumption implies that in the world of our model tax rules do not
motivate the formation or breaking up of households. The couples may
have children, but they are not treated explicitly in the model. Hence
child allowances are neglected. Single persons are not included in the
analysis.
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Each person is endowed with an exogenous earnings capacity equal to
the wage that the person will obtain if entering the labour market.
There is a discrete number of wage levels. A pair of potential wage
levels, w., W., will then characterize the earnings capacity of a
1. J
household. By -convent Lon Wi>Wj if and only if Dj. Let nj_j denote the
number of households with the pair of potential wages w., W., where by
1. J
convention w.>w .. These numbers then characterize the discrete distri-
1.= J
bution of potential wages.
In each household the person with the higher potential wage is
always in the labour force. This person is called the primary wage
earner. The other person chooses whether to take a job or not. This is
the secondary wage earner. In parts of the analysis she or he is also
assumed to have the option of taking a part-time job. These are the
only choices made by households in the model. Thus we abstract from a
large part of household behaviour in order to focus on participation
in the labour force.
A household will incur a certain disutility from having a secondary
wage earner. In other words the potential secondary wage earner has a
certain reservation wage, or a certain willingness to take a job, which
varies among households due to a number of circumstances. Persons may
have different abilities to do a job. Hence efforts required to manage
a job may vary. People with children or other family members in their
care are less inclined to take a job than those without such duties.
Preferences with respect to income and leisure may vary. Health, age,
etc. may be important. To capture the effect of such factors a para-
meter z is included as argument in the utility funciton. The value of
zis a characteristic of the household. We assume that there is a
continuous distribution of z which is independent of potential incomes.
In other words, if households are grouped by pairs of potential wages,
the same distribution of z applies to all groups. This is mainly a
reflection of the desire to keep the analysis fairly simple.
An income tax is imposed on each household. The tax /riability of
a household is a function of the actual earnings of the two persons.
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Since potential earnings and the reluctance to take a job (the value of
z) are unobservable in practice, the tax policy is obviously constrained
to a second best system. Further constraints may be added by requiring
taxation on an individual base or, at the other extreme, joint taxation
of the two household members. The alternatives will be discussed below.
Throughout the paper optimum taxation is used synonymous to optimum
second best taxation with no further constraint on the choice of system.
When there is a need, we shall make explicit reference to first best
taxation or special constrained second best systems. The government has
a fixed tax revenue requirement.
For the assessment of alternative tax policies an additive welfare
function is formulated. The purpose of the analysis is to explore the
optimum taxation of secondary income and to compare special tax systems
such as taxation on an individual base, joint taxation etc. The ana-
lysis will be carried out by means of numerical examples using special
functional forms and parameter values.
We slnlld like to emphasize that our interest is in the broad struc-
ture of the taxation of secondary income. Our concern is with the main
features and not the details of the tax schedule. Our ambition is not
to prove that a tax rate should be 0.4 rather than 0.5. Our purpose
is rather to explore if the marginal tax rate should increase, be
constant or decrease, whether a special tax system is likely to be
close to or far from the optimum, etc.
The paper is organized in the following way: The formal model is
presented in a general form in Section 2. The special functional forms
used in the computations are introduced and discussed in Section 3.
~ection 4 defines more precisely the scope and limits of the analysis.
Optimum tax rules are derived in Section 5. The computational method
is described very briefly in Section 6. Results are presented and dis-
cussed in Section 7. There is a short concluding sectio~. A couple
of computations considered in the main text are presented in more detail
in an appendix.
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2. THE FORMAL MODEL
Let t .. denote the tax imposed on a household earn~ng incomes w.
~J ~
and wj' where Wo = O. (For convenience we shall often write only ti
instead of tiO.) Moreover, let wij denote the correspondi~g after-tax
income:
(1) w .. = w. + w. - t ..
1J ~ J ~J
Vi, j
The preferenceof a household are described by a utility function
(2) u(w ..,6, z),
1J
where 6 = O if there is no secondary wage earner, 6 = 1 if there is
a secondary wage earner working full time, and 0<6<1 if the secondary
wage earner takes a part-time job.
Moreover,
(3) au/aw .. > O, dU/aO<O, au/az<o.
~J
Let us first consider the choice between a full-time job and no job.
Then a household characterized by a special value of z will have a secon-
dary wage earner if
u (w..,1 ,~»u(w. O' O,z).
1J 1
It will have no secondary wage earner if the opposite inequality holds.
Normally there will be a critical value of z denoted by z.. such thatlJ
households endowed with this value of z are indifferent between having
one or two wage earners.
equation
Formally z .. is implicitly defined by the
~J
(4) u(w ..,1,"t •• ) - u(w.O' O,z ..) = O.1J 1J 1 1J
There is a secondary wage earner if z < z ..•
~J
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Let z be distributed by the density function f(z)o The
cumulative distribution is described by F(z), where f(z)=dF/dzo
Let us assume that z ~ zO°
We can then write the welfare function as
(5) w=r
i
Zo °~Jr (I U(Wo o,
°<. 1J
J=~ zo
00
1,z)nij f(z)dz + I u(wiO' O,z)nijf(z)dz).z ..
~J
Total tax revenue, R, becomes
(6) R= i~j~i (tijnijFij+ ti nij O-Fij)),
where F ..=F(z;.).
l.J -J
The structure of income taxation is then determined by the tax
parameters t .. and t. for all i and j.
~J ~
3. SPECIAL FUNCTIONAL FORMS
In this section we shall introduce special functional forms for the
utility function and the distribution of z to be used in the numerical
calculations. But before we do so a general discussion of principles
may be of interest.
We would like the form of the utility function to satisfy a number of
requirements:
(i) It should comply with reasonable behavioural assumptions.
Eii) It should, with a proper choice of cardinalisation~ reflect
plausible distributional preferences.
(iii) It should allow us to work with simple analytical expressions
and carry out fairly simple calculations (avoiding numerical
integration, etc.)
The final choice is, of course, likely to be some
conflicting concerns.
between
- 6 -
There may be many reasons why households with the same income oppor-
tunities choose to supply different amounts of labour. Number of chil-
dren, age, health condition, differences in pure preferences and a
number of other characteristics are obviously important. It would not
be feasible to include explicitly in the model all characteristics of
this kind. But it might be desirable to model explicitly $ome of the
more important factors. In our present model there is, however, only
one variable (z) to capture the various factors. It is then important
to keep in mind the underlying factors when the role of z is considered.
A particularly difficult question is how households with different
characteristics should be treated in the distributional preferences.
Should a household with a high reservation wage for a secondary wage
earner be given a higher or a lower distributional weight than a house-
hold with a lower reservation wage? One problem is that the factors
behind the reservation wage are a mixture of very different factors.
It may be very useful to consider various kinds of factors.
One category consists of properties of pure preferences. This
concept is not easily defined in a rigorous way. We have in mind that
different households choose to behave differently although there are no
observable differences in the circumstances under which they make their
choices. For some reason of their minds their indifference curves slope
differently. This phenomenon is phrased in various ways. Some people
are said to be lazy or to cultivate the non-materialistic values of life.
Others are characterized as industrious or as greedy. Thete seems to be
little or nothing to go by in deciding how differences in pure prefe-
rences should be allowed for in distribution~l preferences.
A second category of factors are such that are commonly considered
to reduce welfare if a person is working. A person may be physically
or mentally less able to work than some other person. And it may some-
how take more effort to do a job if one is less able or less qualified,
or opportunities are unfavourable. It may seem intuitively reasonable
that those who are less favourably endowed should be given a higher
distributional weight when the persons in question are working. But
on second thoughts the matter is not so simple.
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To see this let us consider the following illustration. Let r be
some observable measure of labour supply, say number of working hours.
Then let y be some parameter which converts working hours into units
of effort,where y is a characteristic of the individual. Now suppose
that work effort is represented in the utility function by yr = z.
Let us also assume that r is fixed. We then consider a utility
function u(w,z) where w denotes disposable income.1) i
",
If u denotes the utility level, u(w,z)=u, which imp1itit1y defines
the disposal income required to obtain a particular utility level for a
given work effort: w(u,z). Let subscripts denote partial derivatives.
Then the social marginal utility of income can be expressed as
(7) A = u (w(u,z),z) = A(u,z).
w
I
I
i
This formulation allows us to distinguish between the effrcts on A of a
change in z along a given indifference curve (the compens.ted effect)
and the effect via the change in utility level (the real income effect).
Analytically the former effect is
A =u W +u =-
Z ww z wz
u uww z
uw
+ uwz
The latter effect is
A u = u w uuz wwuz = uww uw
uz
Then we can write
(8) A = A u + A ,z u z z
and we can easily establish that
(9)
A z
T
-uww u ~-uz a ( Z(- --)- - -)
u aw uw w
=--
1)
I
Even though z varies in our model because households ~ave different
characteristics (y varies), the utility function is a so valid if we
consider a change in working hours (r) for a fixed ch racteristic (y).
I
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The first term is positive when inequality aversion prevails (u <O),ww
and implies that cet.par. a lower utility level tends to increase
the marginal utility of income. The second term is negative under
normal assumptions (work effort is inferior) and implies that the
relative marginal valuation of income is reduced when income
increases. There is in general no reason why anyone of these effects
should dominate the other.
On the other hand there may be other persons who are particularly
well qualified for do-it-yourself activities such as cooking, growing
vegetables, painting, doing repair work on cars, houses, etc. They
may be reluctant to work even though income prospects may be good
because their opportunity cost in terms of self-made goods foregone
may be too high. It may seem reasonable that a relatively lower distri-
l)bu~ional weight should be assigned to such ppople if they are ~ot working.
At last there are factors which tend to reduce welfare in general
and also the ability to work such as a poor health. The low welfare
may tell in favour of relatively high distributional weight. It may,
however, be the case that a person with a lower level of welfare may
also be considered as less able to benefit from a marginal unit of income.
This discussion leaves considerable scope for making alternative
assumptions. But we are not entirely free to choose. A simple assump-
tion would be that the social marginal utility of income is independent
of work effort, so that
( 10) u = a(w)w
and hence
(11) , u = b(w) + d(z) •
But let us now consider the case in which there is no income effect on
labour supply:
(12)
uw = g(z).
uz
Empirical studies for Norway by Strøm et al. suggest that Ithis may be
'close to reality. See Strøm and Ljones (1985, p. 24).
1) This point may, however, be of minor relevance in the present model
since household production activities are not explicitly dealt with.
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(tt) and (12) together obviously imply that
( 13} u = cw + d ( z) ,
where c is a constant. But this means that there is no inequality aver-
sion. The distributional weight is the same for everybody. This is not
anattractive property. In order to retain the possiblity that there is
no income effect we have to discard assumption (10), and thus accept that
(14) u * O.wz \
The clåss of functions consistent with no income effect so that (12)
is valid is found by solving this partial differential equation. We
obtain the class of functions
(15) u = CP(w+G(z»,
where u lu = 1/G'(z) = g(z).w z
Including o as an explicit argument, we can write u = ~(w+G(z,o» or,
since ~' > 0, we can use the transformation u = w + G(z,o). There is
obviously no income effect on the choice of O.
We shall consider two alternative specifications of the utility
function. For the sake of reference we shall label the first alternative
as the logarithmic specification and the second alternative as the expo-
nentialspecification.
~e utiZity fUnction - Zogarithmic specification.
The first alternative is the utility function:
( 16) u(w .., o'z) ...k In w .. - o In z, -
1J 1J
where k is a positiv~ constant.
It is convenient to introduce the notation:
(t7), h = In z •
We can then rewrite the utility function as
- 10 -
u (w •• , C, h) = k Tn w.. - oh.1J 1J
We have retained the function symbol u, since no confusion is
likely to arise. We easily see that
u = k In w ..-h if both persons are working, and,1J
u = k In wiO if only one person is working.
The critical value of h separating the two cases is then given by
(18)
w.. w.+w.-t ..h .. = k In __ 1J,,--= k In __ 1__,J.___1....J_
1J wiO wi-ti
The utility function plays a double role. It is assumed to motivate
household behaviour. The chosen cardinalisation also appears 1n the wel-
fare function of the government. Let us first discuss the utility func-
tion from the point of view of household behaviour which in the current
analysis is ~ to labour supply behaviour.
We see that the critical value h .. increases as the secondary income,1J
increases. More households will then find their h-values to be
below the critical level, and more households will have a secondary
wage earner. Under ther~~le assumption that a secondary income
will raise total disposable income, an increase in primary income will
lower h ..•1J
rate of secondary wage earners.
Thus there is a negative income effect on the participation
We see from (18) that the labour supply of a category of households de-
pends only on the ratio between disposable income if both persons are
working and the disposable income if only one person is working. Leaving
taxes aside, this means that the negative income effect of say a 10
per cent increase in the income of the primary wage earner will be exactly
offset by the positive effect on labour supply from a 10 per cent increase
in the income of the (potential) secondary wage earner. This is of
course a special assumption implied by the choice of functional form.
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By varying the value of the parameter k the volume of labour supply
from secondary wage earners can be adjusted to a reasonable level.
The welfare function implied by the choice of cardinalisation of
the utility function has two important properties which may be subject
to discussion. First, the marginal social utility of income (or the
distributional weight assigned to a household) is independent of h.
It is independent of the number of wage earners in the household and
the disutility incurred by having a secondary wage earne~. Assessing
this assumption raises difficult questions as d~scussed in some detail
above.
Xhe utiZity fUnction - exponentiaZ specification.
Let the utility function be
(19)
b-aw mo pu = -e z z
where a, b, m and p are parameters; a > O, O < b ~ 1, m > O, P ~ O,and
m + p < 1. As we shall see below there is no income effect on labour supply
if bgl and a negativp- effect if b<l. The social marginal utility of income
then becomes
(20) uw
b-aw b-l mo p= abe w z z.
We see that
For a given income the social marginal utility of income
is higher when there is a secondary wage earner.
The elasticity of u with respect to w is
w
(21) flww =
b= b-l-abw
which is obviously negative and decreasing as income rises.
Let us consider two households, labelled 1 and 2, respectively,
both with the same value of z. The relative distributional weight is then
- 12 -
(22)
If there is no income effect, b=l, the relative distributional weight
depends only on the absolute difference between disposable incomes.
Unfortunately this is hardly an attractive property. If there is
an income effect, b<l, relative income matters too.
The elasticity of u with respect to z is
w
(23) u = m o + p,wz
which is higher when there is a secondary wage earner (0=1)than other-
wise. The parameters m and p then determine how strongly the social
marginal utility income is affected by the level of z. We shall assume
that u gets higher as z increases.w
A useful transformation of u is
(24) u* = _1 In (-u)-1
m
a b (o + .E.) In=-w - zm m
a b (o + P)h.=-w -m m
If disposable income is w .. when there are two wage earners in the1.J
household, and disposable income is wiO if there is only one wage
earner in the household, then the critical value of h is given by
a b
- w •• - h..
m 1.J 1.J
=_ ,
m
which implies that
(25) h..
1.J
a b= - w ••m 1.J
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If b - 1, (25) reduces to
a
h.. - -( w. - t.. + t.)
l.J m J l.J 1.
and the income effect vanishes.
In general
øb .• ab b-1 b-l(26) 1.J -- (w •• - wiO )Øv. m 1.J1.
wbicb is negative if b< 1.
øb •• ab b-1(27) 1.J -- w .•Øv. m lJ
J
The participation rate is an increasing function of the extra in-
come obtained by a secondary wage earner.
~e distribution of hand 3.
We now restrict b to be non-negative (z > 1) and choose a
Gamma distribution with density :
(28) -hg(b) - he ; h > 0,-
"and the cumulative distribution:
(29) -hG(b) - 1-( 1+h)e •
Then z is distributed by tbe density function
(30) 2fez) = In z/z ,
and the cumulative distribution is
(31) F(z) - 1- l _In zz z
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Figure 1. The Gamma distribution with density g(h) = he-h.
This distribution implies that no potential secondary wage-earner
would be willing to take a job without being paid. Some, but few,
would be willing to accept a very low pay. Some would demand an ex-
tremely high pay in order to take a job. Most people are in between.
The distribution is singlepeaked. These very general features are
hardly very controversial. Apart from this we shall make no attempt
to justify this particular distribution in its own right. We consider
the essential test to be whether the labour supply function derived
from this distribution and the utility function is judged to be rea-
sonable.
_ - 15 -
A further argument is that the chosen distribution in combination
with either utility function allows us to compute the welfare level
by simple methods since the relevant integrals are expressed by analy-
tical functions. Being able to compute the welfare level (at a rea-
sonable computational cost) is a great advantage since different
tax vectors can then be compared directly from a welfare point of
view. This can be used in the search for an optimum. We are not re-
stricted to rely on first order conditions alone, but can actually
check numerically that deviations from the assumed optimum do reduce
welfare, that constrained optima are actually less favourable than
unconstrained optima, etc. And different tax systems can be compared
rather easily.
Labour suppZy functions.
For each group of households defined by pair of potential incomes
there is a labour supply function expressing the participation rate
of potential secondary wage earners as a function of wage rates and
taxes. For wages w. and w. the participation rate is F .. = F("z ) =
l. J l.J i .
Applying the logarithmic specification n~ the utility !unction,G(h •• )
l.Jthe critical h-lev~l ~s given by formula (18) and th~ supply function
becomes
(32) F..
l.J
w.. wiO k= 1 - (1+k In 2J_)( )
wiO wij
From (32) and the definition of disposable income we can derive a
number of elasticities in order to measure labour supply responses to
changes in economic data. One measure which may be of interest is the
elasticity of F.. with respect to the net l.ncome of thel.J.
secondary wage earner defined as w. -
J .
income and w. is the secondary income.
J
the net increase in tax payment due to the
t .. + t., when w. is the primary
l.J l. l.
We may note that t ..-t. is
l.J l.
secondary wage income. This
elasticity is by definition:
(33) E ... =
l.J J
w. -t ..+t.
J l.J l.
F ..l.J
aF ..
l.J
dW.
J
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It may also be interesting to consider the elasticity of
respect to the net primary income w.-t.:
l l
F ••lJ with
(34) M••• -l.J 1
w. - t.
1 1
F .•
1J
aF ..
1J
Øv.
l
It turns out that a property of our labour supply function is that
(35) M... - -E ....
lJ l lJ J
Applying the exponential specification of the utility function
the participation rate becomes
(36)
a b b
F (1 a (b b» - - (w..- w·O).• ·1- ~ w .• - Wl·O e m lJ 11J m lJ
Part-time uork:
We shall also consider the case where a secondary wage earner has
the option of taking a part-time job. We shall then apply the exponen-
tial specification of the utility function. To allow for part-time work
o can now assume three different values: O if there is no secondary wage
earner,ox if there is a secondary wage earner taking a part-time job, and
l if there is a secondary wage earner working full time. Let wpj be the
part-time wage rate corresponding to the full-time wage rate wj• Em-
ploying the transformation of the utility function
u* • !.wb - (o + E.)hm m '
we now obtain two critical h-levels. Households with h close to zero
are almost solely concerned with income and choose to have secondary
wage
tial
just
job:
earners in full-time jobs. For a value of h equal to h .. (poten-
lJ
full time wages being wi and wj), the secondary wage earner is
indifferent between taking a full-time job and taking a part-time
- 17 -
a b a b-w .. -h .. =-w .. -xh ..
m l.J l.J m ap J 1.)
where w .. is the disposable income of a household with gross incomesl.PJ
w. and w .• For some larger
1. pJ
wage earner is just indifferent
value of h, h .. , the potential secondaryl.PJ
between taking a part-time job and
not taking a job at all:
a b- w .. - x h..
m l.PJ l.J
a b=-wm iO
So the choice of the potential secondary wage earner becomes:
full-time job if h < h ..,l.J
Part-time j ob if ·h.. < h < h .. ,l.J = = l.PJ
no job if h > h ...l.PJ
The participation rate becomes F(h .. ). The share of potentiall.PJ
secondary wage earners in this group working full time is F(h ..) andl.J
the share of part-timers is F(h .. ) - F(h ..). If the full-time secondl.PJ l.J
wage increases, more people will work full time instead of part time.
If the part-time wage increases the part time group will attract more
people both from the group of non-workers and the group of full-time
workers.
In the case of part-time work the welfare function takes the
following form:
z ... fl.J(37)W=I:I: u(w ..,. . < . l.J
1. J=l. Zo
1, z) n .. f(z)dz + I: I:
l.J i j~i
z ..l.PJ
f (w .. ,x,z)n ..f(z)dzl.PJ l.Jz ..l.J
+ I: I:
i j~i
co
f u(wiO' O,z)nijf(z)dzz ..l.PJ
The corresponding tax revenue becomes:
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(38) R= I: I:
i j~i
z ..
J~J t ..lJZo
n ..f(z)dz + :t :t
~J . ic i~ J=~
z.
J~PJt .. n ..f(z)dzlPJ ~Jz ..~]
00
+ I: :t
i j~i
J
z ..lP]
t. n .. f(z)dz
l ~J
4. SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE ANALYSIS
We are interested in the optimum tax structure. Our model has,
however, strong limitations which imply that it is suitable for analy-
sing only part of the tax structure. In particular, actual wages of
primary wage earners are exogenous. It follows that the marginal tax
rate on primary income for a fixed secondary income has by itself
no mst~ effect. It could therefore become quite high. It
could even exceed 100 per cent. To see the mechanism involved let
us consider on the one hand households with low primary income and
on the other hand households with high primary income. Assuming that
inequality aversion prevails, one would like to tax high income house-
holds at a high rate. From a pure distributional point of view one
would like to impose particularly high taxes on those households who
add a secondary income to a high primary income. However, by taxing
'the additional income at a high marginal' rate considerable distortions
may arise. To combine the concerns with equity and efficiency, already
those households who earn only a high primary income should be faced
with a very high tax rate compared to those who earn a low primary
income. Hence a very high marginal tax on primary income may be
implied.
Due to various incentive problems this is not realistic. A person
may be able to earn a lower income than his potential income and would
prefer to do so if the marginal tax rate exceeds 100 per cent. In
practice also the primary wage earner has some scope for varying his
work effort. Also the concern with tax evasion does not allow extre-
mely high marginal tax rates. As a compromise between elaborately
modelling and completely neglecting these factors we shall simply
- 19 -
restrict marginal tax rates from "exploding" by imposing upper limits.
As long as marginal tax rates are restricted to a reasonable level
we consider the completely exogenous behaviour of primary wage earners
to be an acceptable approximation which allows us to focus on the
behaviour of secondary wage earners. This is in line with the common
view and empirical evidence that the most important variations are
observed in the female labour supply.
By our approach the policy analysis is confined to the taxation
of secondary incomes. The advantage of the model is that it allows
us to analyze this issue within a rela::ivp.ly simple framework.
Refinements in other respects would add a good deal of complexity.
Let us now consider more closely the role of an upper limit on
marginal tax r~te$ related to primary incomes. Let us consider two
income levels, w2 and w1• Restrict the marginal tax rate to be no
greater than c. Then
t2 - t(39) 1 < c ,w2 - w =1
(40) .
t21 - t 11 < Q' .w2 - w =1
Let us then consider the trivial relation:
which is easily transformed to:
t21-t2 t21-t 11 w2-W1 t2-t1 w2-w1 t11-t 1= :+w1 w2-w1 w1 w2-W1 w1 w1
We immediately see that if the constraints (39) and (40) are both
binding then
(41)
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which means that the marginal tax rate on a low secondary income is the
same for a high and low primary income. So constraints on marginal
tax rates associated with primary income may have immediate implica-
tions for marginal tax rates on secondary incomes. If (41) holds,
the ~~ issue to be analyzed is how the marginal tax rate on a low
secondary income compares with that on a higher secondary income.
In practice family taxation usually takes the form of joint tax-
w +w =w.+w ••r s 1 J
the household.
ation, taxation on an individual base or a mixture (as ~resently in
Norway). Joint taxation by definition implie~ that t =t .. if, rs 1J
The tax liability depends only on the total income of
Also by definition taxation on an individual base im-
plies that t ..-t'O+t.O. Each person of a household is taxed as a1J 1 J
single person. The total tax imposed on two incomes is the same if
they are earned by members of the same household as when they are
earned by persons belonging to different households.
5. OPTIMUM TAXATION
The optimum set of taxes is the one that maximizes the welfare
function (5) subject to the tax revenue requirement (6) and the con-
straints on marginal tax rates. These constraints take the following
form:
(42) t'+l .-t.. < c(w. l-W')1 ,J 1 J- 1+ 1
for i = 1,2,••, n-l, j=O, ••, n-l'
and j < i, where j=O implies
that there is no secondary income.
The number of strictly positive wage levels has been denoted by n.
The parameter c is the upper limit imposed on the marginal tax rate.
To avoid an arbitrary asymmetri, the same upper limit is in principle
valid for marginal taxes on secondary income.
But since this constraint is less likely to be effective, we disregard
it at this stage.
The Lagrange function of our optimization problem is then
(43) L = ly + lJ(R-Ro) - 1: L u .. (t. 1 • - t.. - c(w. - w »
i j~i 1J 1+,J 1J 1+1 i·
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Necessary first order conditions become:
(44)
aL aw------+atkj atkj
aR
1..1 -"\-- - 1..1k 1 • + 1..1 • = O, k=1,2 , • • • ,n j =0 , • • • ,n,otkj - ,J kj
and j < k,=
or
(45) 1..1 •• = O and t. 1 . - t.. < c(w. 1 - w.) for i=l,2•••,n-1~J 1+ ,J 1J - 1+ l
and j < i,
1..1 •• æ O for all other indices, and R = RO.
~J
Similar conditions are derived in the case of opportunities for
part-time work.
So far the number of income levels has been arbitrary. To deal with
system-constrained opti~zation it is convenient to consider a small
number of income levels as we shall do in the subsequent computations.
Let us introduce three income levels: w,=l, wZ=2, and w3=3.
The conditions of (44) are then equivalent to
Joint taxation implies that
t11 - t20 since 2w, • w2'
t21 - t30 since w2 + w, - w3,
t22 - t3l since 2w2 - w3 + w,'
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In place of the conditions (46) we now get:
Taxation on an individual base implies that
The conditions (46) are now replaced by the conditions:
6. COMPUTATIONAL METHOD l)
To solve the respective optimization problems we used a programme
for solving a system of non-linear equations. The special programme
used is the TK-solver programme.2)The programme is not capable of
handling inequality constraints. We therefore assumed various subsets
of constraints to be binding neglecting the remaining ones. The budget
constraint was always assumed to be binding. We then solved the equation
system consisting of these effective constraints and the first order
conditions (46) [or (47) or (48)] with respect to the tax parameters and
the shadow prices (Lagrange multipliers) assigned to the constraints.
If neglected constraints were then violated this candidate for a solution
1) The computations are partly joint work with Gunnar Bramness.
2) For a description see Konopasek and Jayaraman (1984).
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of the original problem was discarded. So it was too if shadow prices
turned out to get a wrong sign, thus violating the Kuhn-Tucker condi-
tions (45). By this procedure we reached solutions of all the first
order Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the original optimization problem.
We also made use of the objective function to check directly
that imposing a constraint did reduce its value. Also systematic
searches in the neighbourhood of some of the solutions were carried
out to verify that they do imply maxima. Also different starting-
points were tried. And direct welfare comparisons with quite different
tax vectors were made. Thus we did not rely sole ly on first order
conditions.
7. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we report the numerical results obtained by
applying the respective speci f i.cat Ions "Jfthe utility function.
Lot2arithirrr:.cepeeif-icat-ion .of the utiZity funation
We first consider two cases in which there are two income levels.
In the first case income levels are 1 and 2. In the second case income
differences are made larger by choosing income levels 1 and 3. The
tax revenue requirement is chosen so as to make the resulting tax level
equal to one third of the national income. Other exogenous characteristics
of the economy are the same in both cases. Optimum taxes and other
endogenous variables characterizing the economy at optimum taxation
have been calculated. The data and results are reported in table 1.
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We see that the marginal tax rate on primary income is effectively
constrained to 0.75 as might be excepted. The most striking feature
of the results is that the marginal tax rate on a low secondary income
is very low, while the marginal tax rate on high secondary income is high.
We then consider an economy with three wage levels. Four different
tax systems are then considered. First, optimum taxes are calculated.
Second, optimum taxes a:c.e calculated on the condition that people should.
be taxed on an individual basis. Third, joint taxation of household
\
members is imposed and optimum taxes are calculated under this restric-
tion. Fourth, a presumably far from optimal tax system is considered.
The system is constructed by reversing main characteristics of the optimum
system making marginal taxes on secondary income high at intervals where
they are low in the optimum system and vice versa. More precisely, marginal
taxes are exogenously set equal to 0.75 on primary and low secondary income
and equal to 0.25 on medium and high secondary income. Then there is
only one degree of freedom left, and tl is determined so as to satisfy
the revenue requirement. The system is referred to as "the reversed system".
A survey of the data and results is presented in table 2.
Also in this model we obtain a pattern with a second best marginal
tax rate which is very Iowan a low secondary income, but steeply in-
creasing as the secondary income increases.
The welfare weights or social marginal utilities of income which
materialize at the second best optimum are easily computed. As a normali-
sation the weight assigned to a household earning two low incomes is set
equal to unity. The following results are obtained:
gross incomes
1,0
1,1
2,0
2,1
2,2
3,0
3,1
3,2
3,3
welfare weight
1.9
1.0
1.5
0.9
0.8
1.3
0.8
0.7
0.6
Since a marginal primary income is taxed at a higher rate than a marginal
secondary income for efficiency reasons, a household earning only one
income is left with a lower disposable income than a household earning
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the same gross income by having two wage earners. Hence the one-income
household also gets a higher welfare weight at the optimum. This fact
reflects that the optimum welfare weights are affected both by the
distributional concern and the efficiency effects present in our model.
As a benchmark which may be of some interest, we have also considered
the first best tax system. In this system the tax levied on a household
is determined by its potential incomes and reluctance to supply labour,
which are exogenous characteristics. Taxes vary so as to equalize social
marginal utilities of income. Hence disposabl~ incomes are equalized.
For each pair of potential incomes there is a critical first best value
of z (and h) drawing a line between those households which should have
a secondary wage earner and those which should not. Households with a
lower value of z are faced with a higher tax and choose to have a secondary
wage earner, while those with a higher value of z are faced with a lower
tax and choose not to have a secondary wage earner. Since the first
best system is a purely hypothetical one we shall not elaborate any
further on details.
It may be of some interest to compare the labour market partici-
pation rates of potential secondary wage earners under the various
systems. Let us recall that F .. is the participation rate in the group
1.J
of households with potential incomes w. and w .• The following results
1. J
are obtained:
Tax system:
first optimum individual joint reversed
best taxation base taxation system
FU 0.49 0.72 0.76 0.50 0.17
F2l 0.49 0.64 0.69 0.30 0.13
F22 0.84 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.61
F3l 0.49 0.57 0.62 0.49 0.10
F32 0.84 0.72 0.70 0.65 0.54
F33 0.95 0.79 0.76 0.74 0.77
We observe that joint taxation reduces the participation rate for
low secondary income significantly compared to the optimum second best
system. With the reversed system this effect is dramatic.
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To compare the welfare levels achieved under the various systems
we have computed the increase in tax revenue under optimum <second best)
taxation which would reduce welfare to the le~el_"achieved under the
alternative system. The extra tax revenue is assumed to be collected,
but used for no purpose - neither redistribution nor public spending.
This would be a waste of resources equivalent to the welfare cost of an
inefficient tax system. We then find that the tax revenue would have
to be raised by only 0.24 per cent to reduce welfare to the level.achieved under taxation on an individual base. It would have to be
\raised by 5.5 per cent to bring down the welfare level to that of the
joint taxation system. An increase of 11 per cent would give a welfare
level equal to that of the reversed system. The first best tax system
would yield a welfare" level of 4.66 which is clearly of a different
order of magnitude from the figures in table 2. This suggests that the
comparisons between the welfare achievements of a first best and a second
best system, sometimes presented in the literature, may tell us very
little about the welfare effects of practically feasible tax reforms.
Exponential specification of the utility function
We consider the income levels l and 2. Exogenous parameters are
varied to produce four cases. The results are reported in table 3.
The general pattern is the same as it was with the previous
.specification. The marginal tax rate on a low secondary income is low,
while the marginal tax rate on a high secondary income is high. The
optimum progressivity is, however, sensitive to the degree of inequa-
lity aversion. This is seen by comparing case l and case 2. In case
2 the parameters a and m have been increased. This is mntamount to
an increaseiin inequality aversion as we can see from the formulas
(20) - (23)~ We see from (36) that there is no shift in the labour
supply function. The switch to this case produces a negative income
tax and there is a substantial rise in the marginal tax rate on low
secondary income. The marginal tax rate on a high secondary income
was already close to the upper limit.
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Table 3. Exponential specification. Two income levels.
Data and numerical results.
"i = l, w2 = 2, nIl = 0.2, n21 = 0.6, n22 = 0.2
Case l Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
a l 2 1.3
b l 0.75
m 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3
p 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
c 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
R 0.839 0.802 1.119 0.813
Numerical results
tI 0.02 -0.13 0.30 0.001
(t2-tl)/(w2-wl) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
(t2l-tll)/(w2-wl) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
(tU.-t l)/wl 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.13
(t21-tZ)/wl 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.13
(tZ2-tZI)/(w2-wI) 0.749 0.75 0.749 0.69
FU 0.80 0.68 0.80 0.73
F21 0.80 0.68 0.80 0.71
FZ2 0.90 0.83 0.90 0.84
Elll 0.56 0.77 0.56 0.64
E211 0.56 0.77 0.56 0.68
E222 0.36 0.50 0.36 0.44
MIll -0.61 -1.22 -0.44 -0.86
M212 -0.77 -1.49 -0.59 -1 .11
<- MZ22 -0.38 -0.72 -0.Z9 -0.55
R/Y 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
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Looking at case 3 and case 1 we can trace the effects of raising
the total tax level. The remarkable result is that this change does
only produce an upward shift in the whole tax schedule, while marginal
tax rates are left unchanged.
In case 1 to case 3 there is no income effect on labour supply
since b=1. In case 4 there is an income effect, b < 1. At the same
time distributional preferences are obviously affected by changing
a and b. The resulting tax rates lie between those of case 1 and
those of case 2 apart from a small reduction in the top interval
marginal tax rate.
The distributive weight or social marginal utility of income
assigned to a household is a function of the characteristics of the
household. To get some feeling about the weights which are embodied
in the optimum tax situation, we have computed the average weights
obtained by the various income groups in case 1 and case 2, respectively.
In each case the weight given on average to households earning two low
incomes has been set equal to unity. The results are presented in table
4 below.
Table 4. Average marginal welfare of income.
Household characteristics Average distributive weights
Potential incomes Actual incomes Case 1 Case 2
1,1 1,0 1.60 2.87
1,1 1,1 1.00 1.00
2,1 2,0 1.25 1.76
2,1 2,1 0.78 0.61
2,2 2,0 1.24 1.74
2,2 2,2 0.66 0.42
The greater differences in case 2 obviously reflect that a higher
inequality aversion has been assumed. We observe that the weights
given to households earning one high income differ slightly between
households with a low potential secondary income and those with a high
potential secondary income. This is due to the fact that the marginal
welfare of income is also a function of the reluctance to take a job
(the value of z).
- 31 -
In section 4 we discussed the need to impose constraints on marginal
tax rates because of the exogenous primary incomes. To give an idea
of what the optimum would look like in the absence of such constraints
we have computed one free optimum. The data used were n,1 = 0.2,
n21 - 0.6, n22 = 0.2, w, = 1, w2 = 2, a = 1, b = 1, p = 0.01. The
following tax rates were obtained: t, - -0.25, t2 - t, = 1.09,
t21 - t'1 • 1.03, t'1 - t, - 0.15, t21 - t2 - 0.10, t22 '- tZ1 • 0.7Z.
The tax level is one third of the total income. We note that marginal
tax rates on primary income now exceed unity, while th~ taxation of
secondary income remains strongly progressiv~.
EXponential 6jpecification and part-time work
Optimum taxes have been computed for alternative values of the
strategic parameters in the presence of opportunities for part-time
work. The full-time wages are set equal to wl-l and w2-2. A
secondary wage-earner capable of earning a full-time wage wj has the
option of taking a part-time job at the wage 0.5 wj• This will be
a half-time job if total pay is proportional to working hours, but
there is in principle no
part-time wages in our case are wpl-O.S and wpz-l.
parameters and results are provided in table 4 and
need to make this assumption. The relevant
A survey of
table 5.
The following notation is used: The index .5 refers to the part-time
income 0.5. For instance the tax levied on a household with a primary
income w. and a secondary part-time income 0.5 is denoted by t. 5.1 1.
The upper limit imposed on marginal tax rates is denoted by c. As
before F.. denotes",! the share of potential secondary wage earners1J .
from the group of households with potential incomes W., w. in full-time
1 J
jobs. Let P .• denote the similar share of potential wage earners in
1J
part-time jobs, and let the t'otal participation rate be denoted by
R •• - F .• + P ..• The following elasticities have been computed:
1J 1J 1J
Eijj- the elasticity of the full-time participation rate Fij with respect
to the net wage increment from working full time instead of part time,
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Pijk- the elasticity of the part-time participation rate Pij with
respect to the net wage from working part time,
wk-(tik-ti), where wk-O.S Wj'
eijk- the elasticity of the total participation rate Rij with respect
to the net wage from working part time, w -(to -t.).k lk l
The data are varied to produce four different cases. But the
tgeneral taxpattern .is uniform. The marginal tax rate on aeccndazy..income
is rising. It is considerably higher on a high secondary income than
on a low secondary income. The introduction of part-time work has,
however, had a strong dampening effect on the marginal tax rates on
high income. This is not surprising since one would expect the part-
time option to make labour supply on the whole more elastic and the
concern with efficiency more prominent.
We may observe that the effect of raising the total tax level or
lowering the upper limit on marginal tax rates is mainly to push up
the base tax rate, tt'
- 33 -
Table 5. Exponential specification and part-time work.
Data and numerical tax results.
Data
Case l Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
a l 1.2 1.2
b l 0.9 0.9
p 0.01 0.01 '0.01 0.01
m 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
x 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
c 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.65
R 0.969 1. 111 0.971 0.968
Optimum taxes
tI 0.15 0.27 0.13 0.23
2-tl)/(w2-wl) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.65
l.S-tI•S) /(w2-wl) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.65
2I-tll)/(w2-wl) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.65
1.5-t1)I ". 5 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.16
tZ•S-t2)/ w.-5 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.16
tII-tl.5)/(wl-w.5) 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.20
t2Ct2.S) /(wl-w.5) 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.20
t22-t2l)/(w2-wl) 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.47
R/Y 0.35 0.40 0.35 0.35
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Table 6. Exponential specification and part-time work. Data
and computed participation rates and elasticities.
Data
nll-0.2, n2l-O.6, n22-O.2, wI-I, w2=2,
part-time wages"" 0.5 ·.full-time wages
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
a 1 1.2 1.2 1
b l 0.9 0.9 l
p 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
m 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
x 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
c 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.65
Participation rates and elasticities
Fll 0.70 0.71 0.7l 0.70
PIl 0.12 0.l3 0.13 0.11
RIl 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.81
F2l 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
P2l 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11
R21 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.81
F22 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
P22 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15
R22 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98
Elll 0.75 0.71 0.72 0.75
Pll.5 8.28 7.23 7.33 8.26
ell.5 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.53
E2ll 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.75 / ~
P21.5 8.28 7.41 7.48 8.26
e21.5 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.53
E222 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50
P221 4.76 4.58 4.58 4.73
e221 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
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8. CONCLUSION
A model framework for analyzing the taxation of secondary income in
two-person households has been presented. The numerical cases that have
been analyzed provide strong evidence that a low secondary income should
be taxed at a low rate. The marginal tax rate should be steeply increa-
sing to reach a high value at a high secondary income. This outcome
differs from the result frequently obtained in traditional optimal tax
models that the optimal income tax schedule is close to a linear one.
Options for part-time work do, however, have a strong dampening effect on
the marginal tax rate on high secondary income. Our results suggest that
choices among different family tax systems produce welfare differences
that would justify the concern of tax designers, even though it is not a
question of changing the order of magnitude of our standard of living.
In our contest between special systems taxation on an individual base
comes out as the superior one.
The present research can be extended along various lines. One could,
of course, always try different assumptions to a reasonable extent. But
rather than extensively pursuing the implications of other data and
specifications, it would be desirable to adapt these more closely to the
empirical knowledge about the actual economy. In particular this would
be the appropriate direction for further research if the ambition extends
beyond that of achieving a rough outline of the optimal tax system. A
widening of the scope of the analysis would be to consider simultaneously
the taxation of couples and single persons, and to deal more explicitly
with the presence of children and child allowances, which clearly affect
incomes and labour supply behaviour. It would also be desirable to allow
for explicit labour supply reactions of primary wage earners. In the
present analysis potential incomes are taken to be exogenous. A modelling
of wage responses to tax induced changes in labour supply behaviour would
bring the model closer to a general equilibrium analysis. Such responses
would affect both distribution and efficiency, and it is not clear a
priori what the net effect on the tax design would be.
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APPENDIX
A elecaileelelescripcion of all Che CCJIPltat1mswould fill ..ny
pages anelvill noc be preaenced. We ahall, bovever. display two
iaportant CXJIpJtIlt10ns _ The other ~ are very aimilar. LeC
U8 first preaenC the equation syatem which yielda the optimum second
best solution for the logarithmic specification of Che utility function.
Tbe velfare function is expressed as
w - ti,j
for i-I,2,3and j ~i, and che equacion syscem becomes:
g11/(2*wl-tll)+ul*Hl1+u5-u6=O
(~*nl1-g11)!(wl-tl)+ul.(nll-Hll>-u2-u5=O
921/ew2+wl-t21)+ul*H21 +u3-u4·u6-u8=O
(k*n2-g21-g22)/(w2-t2)+~1*(n2-H21-H22)~LI2-u3-u7=0
g22!(2*w2-t22)+ul*H22+u4-u9=O
931/ (,,·.3+wl-t31)+ul*H31+lI8+ul0-ull =0
(k*n3-g31-g32-g33)/(w3-t3)+ul*(n3-H31-H3~-H33)+u7-u10=O
g32/(w3+w2-t32)+ul*H32+u9+ul1-u12=O
g33/(2*w3-t33)+ul*H33+u12=O
hl1=k*ln«2*wl-tll)/(wl-tl»
gll=k*(Hl1-nl1*hll*expC-hl1>*<tl1-tl)*ul)
Hl1=nl1*(1-(1+hll>*exp(-hll»
h21=1~*1n ((w2+Hl-t_Fl)! (w2-t2) )
g21=k*(H21-n21*h21*exp(-h21)*(t21-t2>*ul)
H21=n21*(1-(1+h21>*exp(-h21»
h22=k.ln(C2*w2-t22)!(w2-t2»
g22=k* (H22-n22*h22*e~:p (-h22 J -Il. ( t22-t2) *tl j )
H22=n22.(1-(1+h22)*e~p(-h22»
h31=k*ln«w3+wl-t3])/(w3-t3»
g31=k*(H31-n31*h31*exp(-h31>*(t31-t3>*ul)
H31=n31*<1-{1+h31)*expC-h31»
h32=k*lnC(w3+w2-t32)/(w3-t3»
g32=k*<H32-n32*h32*expC-h32>*(t32-t3)*ul)
H32=n32*(1-(1+h32>*exp(-h32)}
h33=k*ln«2*w3-t33)/ew3-t3»
g33=k*(H33-n33*h33*~xp(-h33)*(t33-t3)*ul)
H33=n33*(1-(1+h33)*exp(-h33»
-A2,-
ul*(tll*Hl1+tl*(nl1-Hl1}+t21*H21+t2*(n2-H21-H22}+t22*H22}=ta~
tax+ul*<t31*H31+t32*H32+t33*H33+t3*(n3-H31-H32-H33J-R)=0
t2-tl-w2+wl+c21=O
wl-tll+d21-w2+t21=O
w2-t2+t3-w3+c32=O
t31-t21-w3+w2+d32=O
t32-t22-w3+w2+e32=O
Y=(nl1+Hll+H21+H31>*wl+(n2+H22+H32)*w2+(n3+H33>*w3
3*R=Y
Fll=1-(1+hl1}*exp(-hl1)
Wl1=nll*(hl1*Fl1+~*ln(wl-tl>-2+2*(1+hll+.~*hl1*hl1}*exp(-hl1»
F21=1-(1+h21>*exp(-h21)
W21=n21*(h21*F21+k*ln(w2-t2>-2+2*(1+h21+.5*h2l*h21>.expr-h2l»
F22=1-(1+h22>.expC-h22)
W22=n22*<h22*F22+k*ln(w2-t2)-2+2*(1+h22+.5*h22*h22>*exp(-h22»
F31=1-(1+h31)*exp(-h31)
W31=n31.(h31*F31+k*ln(w3-t3}-2+2*(1+h31+.~*h31*h31)*exp(-h31»
F32=1-(1+h32>*exp(-h32)
W32=n32*Ch32*F32+k*ln(w3-t3>-2+2*Cl+h32+.5*h32*h32>.exp(-h32»
F33=1-{1+h33)*exp(-h33)
W33=n33*(h33*F33+k*ln(w3-t3>-2+2*Cl+h33+.5*h33*h33>*exp(-h33)
W=Wll+W21+W22+W31+W32+W33
Variables are explained below. The first nine relations are first
order conditions for the welfare maximum which are obtained by deriving-
partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to t11, t1, t21, t2,
t22, t21, t3, t32 and t33• The next eighteen relations define the critical
values of h for the various groups of households and a number of auxiliary
variables used to shorten the equations. The first seven relations on this
page reflect the binding constraints. Then total income, Y, is defined and-the relative tax level is determined. The remaining equations determine
the participation rates and the welfare level. In the welfare equations
it is useful to recall that h .. - k ln(w .•/w. ).
l.J 1J l.0
-AJ-
The output and input table of the computation is
=============-==- VARIABLE SHEET
Input Narrle Output Unit----- ------
t1 -.1193935
t2 .63060650
t3 1.3806065
til -.1108518
t2l .63914816
t2E 1.2C'56852
t31 1.3891482
t32 1.9556852
t33 2.6432426
ul -1.706201
u2 .05118791
(} u3
(I u4
o u5
u6 .01415030
u'" .05468336
uS .01392124
u9 .00523418
(> ul0
(~ ull
(! u12
911 .28927184
g21 .38626885
g22 1.1270739
g31 .34400897
932 .91613278
g33 .22562740
hll 2.5372183
h21 2.1786183
h-~' 2.8528760c:=
h3l 1.91('4994
h32 2.5248967
h33 2.9156950
Hl! .07202552
H2l .09602810
H22 .23333191
H31 .08538410
H32 .17944339
Comment
The nine
tax rates
Sh~dDW price of revenue requirement
The twelve
shado~-.jpr ices
associ~ted with
marginal tax constr~ints
All::·;iliaryver å eb Les
defined in the model
The critic~l valu~s of h
Auxiliary variables
Hi j = ni j *F i j
-AA-
H33 .03939505
.1 nil
.15 n21
.3 n22 Number of househe.Ids
.15 n31 of each type,
.25 n32 ni is the sLIm over j of nij
.05 n33
.45 n2
.45 n3
1 w1
2 w2 Wa.ge levels
3 w3
R 1.1823912 Te·tal :tax revenue
4 k Preference pc:q-ameter
.25 c21 constl-ainingO.25 d21 Parameters
.25 c32 marginal tax rates
.25 d32
.25 e32
y 3.5471735 To t a I income
Fl1 .72025523
F21 .64018730
F22 .77777305 The 5 i x
F31 .56922730 pai-tic i pat r on rates
F32 .71777356
F33 .78790101
~J11 .13~71972
LoJ21 .- .28636508 Si >! au>:iliary ''leIfare
W22 .71707587 variables CI.SSC'Ci ated
W31 .36262280 with the- var ie.us gl-C'UPS
W32 .70384912 of he.useholds
W33 .15550836
W 2.3601410 Tettal welfare-
te-x Aw:iliary val-icoble
-AS-
Applying the exponential specification of the utility function,
the velfare function is expressed as
b z ..- a w .. 1J m6 2'W .. - 1: e 1J n .. f z +P(ln z/z )dz
i,j 1J 1
b CD
-1: -a w.O f zP 2 i,j ..1,2 and j i.e 1 n .• (ln z/z )dz J <i,j 1J ..z ..1J
Solving the integration problem we find that
mo + p-l
f mo + p-2 z 1z lnz dz ..- (ln z - --.-;...-~)+ C .. I(z)mo + p-l me + p-l
'Wefind that
11(1) 0= - + C
(mo + p_1)2
and
lim l(z) ..C, when mo + p < 1.
ø
Hence
z .. q1J mo + p-2 z.. 1 1f z ln z dz ..2:.L(ln z .. - -) +2'
1. q 1J q q
where li .. mo + p-l, and
CD p-lp-2 z .. 1f z ln z dz .. 1J (-- ln z..)•
z .. p-l p-l 1J1J
The equation system which yields the optimum second best solution is
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nl1*vl1*(zll~q*(ln(=11)-1/q)/q+l/qA2)+ul*nl1*(Fll+Fl111*(tll-tl»-u5+u6=O
nl1*vl*z11AP*(1/P-ln(zll»/P+ul*nl1*(1-·Fll+Fl11*(tll_tl»+u2+u5=O
n21*v21*(z21Aq*(ln(z21)-1/q)/q+l/qA2)+ul*n21*(F21+F2121*<t21-t2»-u3-u6=O
n22*v22*(z22-q*(ln<z22)-1/q)/q+l/q~2)+ul*n22*(F22+F2222*<t22-t2»-O
21=-n21*v2*z21AP*(1/P-ln(z21»/P+ul*n21*(1-F21+F212*<t21-t2»-u2+u3
22=-n22*v2*z22AP*(1/P-lnez22»/P+ul*n22*(1-F22+F222*<t22-t2»
21+r22=O
10=wl-tl
11=2*wl-tl1
20=w2-t2
21=w2+wl-t21
22=2*w2-t22
11=exp«wl1-b-wl0Ab>*alm)
21=exp«w21-b-w20Ab)*a/m)
22=exp«w22~b-w20Ab)*alm)
1=a*b*exp(-a*wl0~b)*wl0A(b-l)
11=a*b*exp(-a*wl1-b>*wl1A(b-l)
21=a*b*exp(-a*w21-b>*w21~(b-l)
22=a*b*expC-a*w22Ab>*w22A(b-l)
2=a*b*e~p(-a*w20Ab)*w20-(b-l}
i*nl1+(tll-tl>*nll*Fl1+t2*(n21+n22)+ct21-t2)*n21*F21+(t22-t2>*n22*F22=R
11=1-(1+1n(zI1»/zll
21=1-(1+1n(z21»/z21
22=1-(1+1n(z22»/z22
1111=-ln(z11>*wllAeb-l)*a*b/(m*z11)
2121=-ln(z21)*w21A(b-l)*a*b/Cm*z21)
2222=-ln(z22>*w22A(b-ll*a*b/Cm*z22)
111=ln(z11)*wl0Aeb-l)*a*b/(m*z11)
212=ln(z21)*w20A(b-l>*a*b/(m*z21)
222=ln(z22)*w20A(b-l>*a*b/(m*z22)
wl0+c21-w20>=O
w20+cl0-w21>*u3=O
wl0+cl0-wl1)*u5=O
wl1+c21-w21)=O
=wl*nl1*(1+Fl1)+w2*(n21+n22)+wl*n21*F21+w2*n22*F22
*Y=R
The variables are defined below. The first four equations and the seventh
are first order conditions for the welfare maxbDum which emerge when deriving
the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to t11, t1, t21, t22 and
t2• The next five equations define disposable incomes. Then the three critical
values of z are determined. Equation twentyone is the total tax revenue constraint.
The participation rates and a number of derivatives are defined by the following
nine equations. There are four equations reflecting the constraints imposed on
marginal tax rates. The last two equations define Y and the relative tax level.
respectively.
The output and input table of the computation is presented below.
- A7 -
K.______~__._=K_= VARIABLE SHEET
Input Name Output Unit
----- ------
tl .02222239
tE .77222239
t11 .12364093
t2l .87364093
t22 1.6229591
R .83946051
wl0 .97777761
w20 1.2277776
wl1 1.8763591
w21 2.1263591
w22 2.3770409
y 2.7982017
Fll .80014436
F21 .80014436
F22 .89521550
vi .37614611
'12 .29294289
'Ill .15314669
'121 .11927076
'122 .09282485
z11 19.990787
z21 19.990787
%22 46.102980
\.tl .21899781
u2 .00471603
u3 1.497E-12
O u4
u5 1.497E-12
u6 .00652925
Fllll -.4994420
F2121 -.4994420
F2222 .-.2769798
Flll .49944198
F2l2 .49944198
F222 .27697975
r21 -.(1(184535
r22 .00845348
.... nil.c:.
.6 n21
.2 n22
1 a
1 b
.(11 P
-.99 F'
.3 m
-.69 q
1 wl
2 w2
.25 cl('
.25 c21
.3 S-)
- -._---_._-------_._-_ .._
CClmment
The five tax rate~
Total tex revenue
Disposable incomes
Telta.l income
P~rticipation rate:
Fi~e auxlliary variables
Critical values of z
Shadow price of public r~venue
Shadc.w pr ices CiSSC.Ciated
with marginal tex constraint~
Tax derivatives of Fij
Au:::i li ary
variables
Number of households
of each type
Six preference parameters
F'=p-l
q=m+p-l
Wage
levels
Parameters constrainig
marginal tax rates
Relative tax level
6C H o I C E O F O C C U P A T ION ,
T A X I N C IDE NeE AND P I ECE M E A L T A X
REV I S ION *
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U n ~ v e r sit Y o fOs l o
Abstract
A model is presented in which workers move between two different
occupations in response to economic incentives which are distorted by an
income tax. Prices and wages assume equilibrium values which
are affected by the tax parameters. Incidence and welfare effects of
small tax revisions are analysed within different variants of the basic
model and with particular attention paid to the role of taxinduced wage
and price changes. It is demonstrated that within the economic setting
of the model one may neglect such wage and price effects in assessments
of piecemeal tax revisions. It is also shown that provided that there is
an optimum income tax, there is no need to employ commodity taxation.
l. IN~~ODUCTION
In a general equilibrium setting wages and other prices and pretax
incomes will in general be endogenous variables which are affected by the
tax policy. Taxes which in the first place are imposed on the income or
consumption of one group, may be passed on to some other group when the
market responds to tax-induced shifts in supply and demand. But in most
optimum tax literature assumptions are chosen which rule out changes in
pretax prices and wages and thereby simplify the incidence problems con-
siderably.l) A notable exception is Feldstein (1973). His model distin-
guishes between two classes of workers whose wages are determined by the
market. Both kinds of labour are used in a production process displaying
constant returns to scale so that no pure profit arises. A linear income
tax is imposed. Each class of workers then choose how much labour to supply
and leisure to enjoy in accordance with the standard textbook theory of
labour supply. There is no mobility between classes. Wages then adjust to
clear the markets for the two kinds of labour, and equilibrium wages are
obviously sensitive to the choice of tax parameters. Employing numerical
examples Feldstein found that the optimum tax rates with endogenous wage
rates changed little from those obtained with wages held constant (at no
tax equilibrium values).
Allen (1982) argues that these results are mainly due to the use of a
Cobb-Douglas production function. Using an analytical approach to the same
basic model he argues that the endogeneity of wages may make a considerable
difference to optimal linear tax rates.
The purpose of the present paper is to analyse a tax policy which affect
pretax wages and other prices within a somewhat different economic model,
which may have claim for interest in its own right. The basic assumption of
the model is that workers move between two different occupations in response
to economic incentives which are distorted by taxes. Work effort may be
different in the two occupations, but within each occupation there is no
choice of work effort. A person has to choose a fixed bundle of work
characteristics when he chooses occupation. This seems at least as realis-
tic as the assumption of perfectly free choice of working hours within a
given occupation. Labour from the two occupations are used in production
- 2 -
which exhibits constant returns to scale. From the production sector(s)
there is a demand for labour belonging to each occupation, and wages are
then determined as equilibrium wages in the labour market. Simultaneously
prices adjust to clear the market for consumer goods.
In the simplest version of the model the two kinds of labour are in-
puts 1n a macro production function with constant returns to scale. This
model differs from that of Feldstein in that changes in the supply of the
two kinds of labour are due to mobility between the two categories, and not
to changes in the hours worked by each person. In other respects the models
are similar.
With the assumption of constant returns to scale a major simplification
from most optimum tax theory is retained. This simplification may be a
great help in the search for clear-cut benchmark results. Otherwise one
would also expect results to be sensitive to how the claims for profit are
assumed to be distributed.
The typical outcome of optimum tax analysis is to characterize the
trade-off between efficiency and distributional considerations. The model
of the current paper obviously requires that such a trade-off is considered.
A more progressive taxation will shift a greater tax burden on to the bet ter-
off tax payers, which is presumably desirable from egalitarian distributional
preferences. On the other hand a higher marginal tax will more strongly
distort the wage difference between the two occupations and lead to a more
inefficient allocation of labour between occupations. The priority of the
paper is, however, to focus on other aspects than the familiar trade-off
problem.
As in the articles by Feldstein and Allen the important question is how
tax-induced price changes must be allowed for in the process of tax design.
Although we shall later distinguish between price and wage changes, we now
use price changes as a common term. Since price effects are awkward to cope
with in tax analysis, it is interesting to see to what extent they may be
neglected. Neglecting tax shifting through pri~e changes can mean different
things depending on how taxes are assumed to be designed. One interpre-
tation is that prices are assumed to remain fixed as we move from a situation
without taxation to the tax optimum. But this is hardly an interesting
situation in practice, because taxes are already there when we start thinking
about their optimal structure. An alternative interpretation is that prices
- 3 -
are assumed to retain their initial values when the tax structure is taken
from the initialone to the optimal one. It might then be analysed if and
when such an extreme neglect of price adjustments would be permissible.
The present analysis will adopt a different approach. The basic idea
is that taxes are changed gradually through piecemeal revisions.2) A full
optimization will then be carried out by a step-wise procedure which stops
when a marginal tax adjustment has got no further effect on welfare. One
way to neglect price changes is then to assume at each step that prices
are fixed at the values aatuaZZy resulting from the previous step. We can
say that priae ahanges are negZeated at the margin. It is this case that
will be analysed in the current paper.
To provide a formal treatment, let us take as our starting point the
basic structure of the government's tax design problem. The government is
to choose the value of a tax parameter, t, taking into account the effect
on social welfare. (Without changing anything t may be thought of as a
vector). The welfare level is ultimately a function of the tax parameter
(and other exogenous parameters suppressed here). It is affected by the
tax parameter through various channels. We may distinguish between effects
via induced changes in prices and direct effects which are independent of
price reactions.3) Let p denote the vector of prices. The welfare level
can then be written as a function of t directly and of p which in turn
depends on t:
(1.1) W(t,p) = W(t,p(t».
The direct effect of t on welfare is equal to the partial effect of the
first argument which is expressed by the partial derivative aw/at. The
total effect is expressed by the total derivative
(1.2) dW/dt = aw/at + (aW/ap)(dp/dt),
where aw/ap and dp/dt are the proper vec-tors of derivatives. The second
term is the effect via changes in prices. Let us introduce some more nota-
o o otion. Let t be some arbitrary value of t and let p = p(t ) be the corres-
ponding value of p. To neglect price changes at the margin implies that the
welfare effect of a marginal tax revision at (tO,po) is judged by considering
at that point aW(t,po)/at instead of dW(t,p(t»/dt. This is clearly permissible
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only if the partial and total effects have the same sign.
Within the framework outlined above we shall analyse tax incidence and
in particular the opportunities for neglecting tax-induced price changes
when contemplating piecemeal tax revisions. Before taking up the very tax
analysis, the modelling of the choice of occupation is described in detail
in Section 2. Tax revisions are then explored within three different models
sharing the basic features which have been set out in the introduction.
Section 3 deals with a model of one production sector with two occupations
(labelled model I). Section 4 presents a model of two production sectors
with one occupation in each (labelled model II), while Section 5 presents a
model of two production sectors with two occupations in each (labelled
model III). Some concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
2. TYE CHOICE OF OCCUPATION
A basic model of choice of occupation is an important ingredient of
the analyses to be carried out in this paper. There are two occupations,
labelled l and 2. Let NI and N2 denote the number of workers in the respec-
tive occupations. The total number of workers is exogenous and equal to the
number of consumers, while the distribution of workers between occupations
is endogenous. The size of the work force is normalized at unity so that
NI + N2 - l.
The workers differ with respect to some sort of ability measure, a,
which is taken to be non-negative. There is a continuous distribution of
workers with respect to a described by the density function fea). In this
respect the set-up is inspired by the Mirrlees model where people have
different productive skills (see Mirrlees (1971». But whereas productive
efforts of people with unequal abilities are perfect substitutes in the
Mirrlees model, implying that relative wages reflect relative exogenous
abilities, quite different implications of the ability structure are assumed
in the present analysis.
We shall assume that occupation l is the more demanding occupation, and
that it is too demanding to the workers of lowest ability. Workers of
somewhat higher ability may be able to be in occupation l with strong
enough efforts, but will prefer the less demanding occupation 2 unless
they are compensated by a sufficiently higher wage rate in occupation l.
A person will find occupation l less demanding the higher ability he has
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got, and may even find it the more attractive alternative at a sufficiently
high level of ability.
It is important to note that there may well be people who are skilful
enough to enjoy a very demanding job as well as people who are unfit for
the demanding job. The crucial assumption is that there is a marginal group
of workers who must have an economic compensation to be attracted to the
more demanding job.
The choice problem of an individual is to choose occupation and con-
sumption bundle at given prices, wages, ability and tax policy. Let I denote
after-tax income in occupation j and p the vector of commodity prices. The
utility of an individual in a given occupation as expressed by the indirect
utility function is
(2.1) V(p,I.,a,j),
J
J = 1,2.
Occupation is chosen by picking j so as to maximise V.
Let x .. denote the amount of commodity i purchased by a person choosing1J
occupation j. The demand functions are written as
(2.2) x .. = x ..(p,I.,a),1J l.J J 1,] = 1,2.
We know from duality theory that
(2.3) -1 .x .. = ~ øV(p,I. ,a,J)/øp.,1J 1\j J 1
where A. = øV(p,I.,a,j)/øI .•
J J J
We shall assume that the market situation is such that a higher wage
(w) is paid in occupation 1 in order to attract workers to the mor~ demanding
job: w1 > w2 and Il > 12• Then at some ability level a workers are indiffe-
rent between the two occupations:
(2.4)
Those with higher ability choose occupation 1, while those with lower ability
choose occupation 2. The amount of labour in occupation l equals
- 6 -
(2.5)
CII:I
NI = J f(a)da.
a
The amount of labour in occupation 2 equals
(2.6)
a
N2 = J f(a)da.
O
(2.4)- (2.6) thus describe the supply side of the labour market. If a is
eliminated from this relation system we get
(2.7)
and
(2.8)
We can then analyse the responses of labour supply to price and income
changes. Since N2 = l-NI' it will be sufficient to study the effects on
NI. Let us define
(2.9) D(a) = V(p,Il,a,l) - V(p,I2,a,2).
From the assumptions made above
D(a) < O for a < a,
D(a) = O,
and
D(a) > o for a > a.
Hence
(2.10) D I (a) > o.
Differentiating
(2.11)
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we find that
aa 1..
0
(2.12) 1-- = -i)T ,all
aa 1..
0
(2.13) 2ay-=V'2
o o o o
(2.14) aa
A1Xil - A2xi2-- =ap. D'1
o - / ,owhere Al = aV(p,ll,a,l) all' A2
X~2 = xi2(P,12,a).
We see that
(2.15)
Making use of (2.5) and (2.12)-(2.14) we see that
(2.16)
(2.17)
, (2.18)
We can notice the rather obvious result that a higher income in one occupa-
tion makes that occupation more attractive and the alternative less attrac-
tive. A higher price on a commodity has a far more uncertain effect on the
choice of occupation. It tends to reduce the real 1ncome 1n both states,
and by how much depends on the consumption in both states of the commodity
which becomes more expensive. If the consumption depends only on income
and not on the consumer's occupation as such, and the commodity is non-
o oinferior, then xiI> xi2• In that case the loss of real income is larger
for a person in occupation l than in occupation 2. On the other hand the
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effect of a one unit income loss in occupation 2 may well have a larger
effect than a one unit income loss in occupation 2. To see this, assume
that people become more inclined to choose the less demanding job if the
income level rises without changing income differentials. This will happen
if aNI/aIl + aNl/aI2 < o which implies that - aNl/aI2 > aNI/aIl. Hence the
ultimate price effect is likely to be ambiguous.
Before the model is completed we have to describe the tax policy. The
government is assumed to impose a linear tax function
(2.19) T(w) = tw - b
where O < t < 1 is the marginal tax rate and -b is a headtax which is nega-
tive if b > O. It follows straight away that
(2.20)
and
(2.21)
We can then write
(2.22)
and we see straight away that
(2.23)
(2.24)
(2.25)
(2.26)
- 9 -
In order to add some practical flavour to the theoretical choice of
occupation model, we may briefly review some relevant labour market obser-
vations. A number of jobs are obviously tough, maybe risky, require hard
work, offer bad working conditions, imply long spells of separation from
families etc., but are in return well paid. Oil drilling in the North Sea
and several kinds of construction work may provide good examples. Managers
of big firms are extremely well paid to take heavy responsibility and become
nearly full-time servants of their firms. Liberally interpreted we may also
think of necessary efforts in taking education and acquiring special compe-
tence as the features making certain jobs more than normally demanding and
more than normally well paid. These are all examples of characteristics
captured by the theoretical model.
On the other hand there are occupations which do not fit well into the
model. An obvious objection is that there are jobs which are both unattractive
(for instance tedious or physically strenuous) and offering a rather low
pay. This phenomenon may be explained by lack of workers in these occupations
who are able to compete for more attractive jobs. Moreover, there are people
who are highly paid for other reasons than the need to attract marginal
workers to the occupation in question. There are occupations with barriers
to entry and other departures from competitive conditions. In contrast to
the assumptions of the present model there are occupations where people differ
in their performances, and differences in quality or efficiency are being
screened and reflected in wages. Conspicuous examples are people with
I . f es s i I 4)ta ents as art~sts, pro ess~ona sportsmen, etc.
3. MODEL I: ONE PRODUCTION SECTOR WITH TWO OCCUPATIONS
3.1 The model
We shall assume that only one (aggregate) commodity is produced. The
output, x, is related to the amount of labour in two occupations by the macro
production function
(3.1)
which ~s assumed to be homogeneous of degree one. As assumed already
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NI + N2 = l. The output is used as numera~re. The wage per unit of NI is
w1, and the wage per unit of N2 is w2•
The condition that production takes place on the expansion path is, of course,
that
(3.2)
where F. = aF/aN., i = 1,2.~ ~
we also know that in equilibrium
If we write the unit cost function as c(w1,w2),
(3.3)
It is a well-known property of the cost function that
(3.4) ac/aw. = N./x,~ ~ i = 1,2.
Hence from (3.3)
(3.5)
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) are equivalent to the conditions
(3.6)
(3.7)
Let us then turn to the supply side of the labour market. As special
cases of the relations (2.1), (2.7) and (2.8) of the previous section, we
now get
(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)
V(I. ,a, i),
~
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The budget constraint of the government is
(3.11) = b + x ,g
where x is exogenous government expenditure. When t is determined by the
g
government, the equilibrium values of wl,w2,Nl,N2,x and b are determined by
the relations
(3.13)
x = F(Nl,N2),
Fl wI
-=-
F2 w2'
(3.12)
(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)
which form the complete equation system of the model. All equilibrium
values are then functions of t.
In the previous section we discussed at a rather abstract level the
distinction between. the direct effects of a change in tax policy and the
effects through induced price changes. Considering the equation system
above, we see that by using eq. (3.12) and the equations (3.15)-(3.17) we
can express all quantities as functions of t,wl and w2• Also eliminating
w2 by means of equation (3.14), we are left with only one wage variable.
We can then distinguish between .the partial effects of changes in t and
changes in wI' respectively, as described in the
We now adopt this approach and treat b,N1,NZ and
keeping in mind that wI is ultimately a function
rium which is determined when the expansion path
5)taken into account.
introductory section.
x as functions of t and wI'
of t at the general equilib-
condition (3.13) is also
It is useful to derive the partial effects of t and wI on b. Let the
partial derivatives be denoted by band b , respectively. From (3.15) -
t w
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(3.17) we obtain
(3.18)
where
(3.19)
We assume that n > O which rules out the possibility that a one unit lump
sum transfer from the government generates a more than one unit increase in
tax revenue.
Similarly we find that
(3.20)
Making use of (2.23) - (2.25) we find that
(3.21)
and
(3.22) 1 [ dNl NI dNl]b = - t(w -w )(l-t) - - t(w -w )(l-t) - ~I .w n 1 2 dIl 1 2 N2 o 2
3.2 Incidence effects of more progressive taxation
Let us assume that from some arbitrary starting point where O < t < 1
the tax policy is made slightly more progressive by raising t a little and
adjusting b accordingly. We shall consider the gain in disposable income,
g., obtained by the workers in each occupation; i = 1,2. The gain g. is~ ~
made up of the direct effect of the change in t, denoted by git' and the
consequence of the general equilibrium effects on wages, denoted by g ..
J.w
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Hence, recalling (2.20) and (2.21),
(3.23)
(3.24)
(3.25)
We make use of (3.16), (3.19) and (3.21) and find that
The sign is obviously negative. Hence we have got:
ConcLusion 1: A higher marginaL tax rate has a negative direat effeat on
the disposabLe inaome of the high-wage group.
(3.26)
We make use of (3.16), (3.19) and (3.22) and find that
In a quite analogous manner we find that
(3.27)
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(3.28)
Taking a closer look at gl' we see that
(3.29) ~ _! (-N +t(w -w ) aNl)(W -w -(l-t)w'-(l-t) Nl W')l n 2 l 2 aI2 l 2 l N2 l
From our general knowledge of tax distortions we expect a more progres-
sive tax to cause a loss of a110cative efficiency, and we do not expect
that gl and g2 both can be positive. Another question is whether a higher
marginal tax rate may create general equilibrium effects which outweigh
the direct effect on the disposable income of the high-wage group. Let us
now look into these matters. We let a prime indicate total derivatives
with respect to t. Since total production equals private disposable
income plus the government's share we can write
(3.30) x •g
Differentiating we get
where the production function has been used. Since Flewl, F2=W2 and
Ni - -Ni, we further get
(3.31)
One more manipulation gives us
(3.32)
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We a180 observe that
(3.33)
Let us hypothetically assume that gl were positive. Then it would follow
from (3.29) that gl-g2 > O, and from (3.33) that wl would have to increase
since wl > w2• But then it would follow from the production side that Nl
would be reduced. According to (3.32) this could only happen if 82< O. But
if gl were positive and g2 negative, more labour would definitely move in-
to occupation l, while on the production side labour belonging to occupa-
tion l would be substituted by labour from occupation 2. So adjustments
on the supply side and the demand side of the labour market would not match,
and these effects would not be compatible with the maintenance of a market
equilibrium. Thus we can rule of the possibility that gl> O, and we can
state:
Conclusion 2: A higher mcz:rogina1,tias: rate has a negative total effect on
the disposable income of the high4Jage group.
We see that the direct effect and the total effect have the same
sign and general equilibrium effects on wages do not outweigh the direct
effect. #
We know that when gl < O and g2> O, labour will move from occupation l
to occupation 2 so that Ni < o. We also see from (3.32) that this would be
true also if gl and g2 were both negative. Hence we can state:
Conclusion 3: A higher marqinal: taz rate lIJi1,1, a'Ways cause a movement
of labour from the high4Jage occupation to the 1,OJ}-'IJ]ageoccupation.
Such a movement will only be consistent with necessary adjustments
on the production side if the high wage increases. So we can state:
Conclusion 4: A higher marginal taz rate lIJiH lead to an increase in
the high ...,age and a lowering of the 1,OJ] wage. So induced general equi 1,i-
bz-ium effects on wages will to some eætent , but not entirely, offset the
direct effect on the disposable income of the high-tJage group.
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Since more workers move from the high-wage occupation to the low-wage
occupation, it follows from (3.31) that the total income will fall. This
confirms our expectation that a higher tax progressivity entails 8 loss of
allocative efficiency.
Conc'Lusion 5: A higher marginal, tax rate tends to looe» the total income
of society.
3.3 We1,fa:roeeffects of t-as: poZicy
The social welfare function is written as
CIO aJ V«l-t)wl + b,8,I)f(a)da + J V«l-t)w2 + b,a,2)f(a)da.
- Oa
(3.34) W -
As usual when adopting an additive welfare function the cardinalisation of
V is assumed to reflect the distributional values of the government.
Differentiating with respect to t we find that
CIO a
(3.35) W' .. J Alglf(a)da + J A2g2f(a)da + (V(I2,i,2) - V(Il,i,l»i'f(i).Oa
ø
Due to (2.4 ) the last term vanishes. Let us define
(3.36) l
CIO
Al -- I Alf (a)da,NI a
- l aA2 =- I A2f(a)daN2 O
(3.37)
which are average marginal utilities of income in the two categories of
consumers. We can then write
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Substituting from (3.25) - (3.28) we get
(3.39) W' - 1 aNl- AlNl n(wl-w2) (-N2+t(wl-w2) ,aI2)
- -(l-t) aNI+ AlNl (-N2+t(wI-W2) -) w'nN2 aI2 l
- l ØNl+ A2N2 n(w1-w2) (N1-t(wl-w2) ar)l
- -(l-t) aNl+ A2N2 (Nl-t(w1-w2) ar) w'DN2 ll
(3.40) W' - k(w -w -(l-t)w'/N ) - k(g -g )1 2 l 2 2 l
where k is the expression in square brackets divided by n.
Suppose that in some arbitrary tax situation a small adjustment of the
tax parameters is considered, and we want to know whether it will increase
social welfare or not. An important question is then whether general
equilibrium effects on wages can be neglected. Since wi does not appear in
the expression for k, the sign of W' can obviously be determined without
knowing wi if
(3.41)
We know from the previous sub-section that wl > w2 implies that gl < O, and
from (3.29) we then see that g2 > gl' and (3.41) is satisfied. We can there-
fore state:
Proposition 3.1: Induced wage changes can be neglected when piecemeal tax
revisions are considered.
Let u~/assume that the tax parameters are determined by a step-wise
procedure which stops when a marginal tax adjustment has got no further
effect on welfare when possible wage effects of that marginal adjustment
are ignored. Hence at each step wages are assumed to be fixed at the
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values actually resulting from the former step. Since in practice most
changes in tax policy are small adjustments, and also rather infrequent
major revisions are followed up by small adjustments, this seems to be a
relevant and interesting case. Now it is interesting to notice that if the
tax policy has been worked out by this procedure, the discovery that tax
incidence through wage changes have been neglected makes no difference in
our model. The optimum attained when neglecting wage changes at the margin
is also the true optimum.
Proposition 3.2: A welfare maximum when wage changes are neglected at the
margin, is also a true welfare maximum.
3.4 Further interpretations
(3.42)
and
(3.43)
Define
Our findings in the formulae (3.25) - (3.28) imply that
(3.44)
(3.45)
(3.46)
(3.47)
Hence
(3.48) glw g2w--=--glt g2t
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and .
(3.49)
The optimum condition
is equivalent to
(3.50) = -
But since gl/g2 = glt/g2t' we may as well neglect the marginal wage changes.
The fact is that the marginal change in wage income will change the net gains
of both categories of workers by the same percentage. Hence it is immaterial
when choosing the optimum trade-off between income taken from the one cate-
gory and income given to the other category.
To give an example, let us assume that, neglecting marginal changes in
wage-rates, an optimum has been established where the social marginal utility
of income assigned to an average person in occupation 2 is twice that assigned
to an average person in occupation 1. It is then implied that in order to
transfer one income unit to persons in occupation 2, persons in occupation 1
will have to give up 2 units of income. Since a weight equal to 2 is
assigned to the one unit received, and a weight 1 is assigned to the two
units foregone, the welfare effects just cancel out as they must do at the
optimum.
Suppose that we are now told that wage rates do in fact change, and, as
a consequence, both income effects are in fact only half of what they were
assumed to be. We then realize that it wi11 sti11 be true that one income
unit for the benefit persons in occupation 2 can only be raised if persons
in occupation 1 are deprived of two income units. Hence the same trade-off
is retained, and there is no reason to choose a different policy.
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If at some point we have found that
the information that induced wage changes do occur, implies that glt and g2t
should be multiplied by the same positive figure, which makes no difference
to the inequality. If, say, nine income units to one group is more highly
valued than three income units to the other group, six income units to the
former are also more highly valued than two income units to the latter.
Arguments related to tax shifting are also used in practical policy
discussion. One argument sometimes heard is that the presumably favourable
distributional effects of a marginal increase in income tax progressivity
are likely to be small because the extra burden first imposed on those who
are better off, are to a large extent shifted on to the people who are less
well off through the adjustment process of the market. Under this assumption
it is sometimes argued that the negative effects on efficiency of an increase
in progressivity tend to dominate the distributional impact. But this may
be a too hasty conclusion. The reason is that the effect on efficiency also
tends to be mitigated by the tax shifting. In the present model a higher
marginal tax tends to deter people from seeking the more demanding job and
thus entails a loss of efficiency. But this effect is clearly modified by
the induced rise in the pretax wage received by workers doing the more
demanding job. In fact both effects are modified by the same relative
amount. Hence the partially dominant effect is never overthrown.
Distinctions between the effects which allow for induced wage changes
and the effects which are generated in the absence of general equilibrium
effects, must be interpreted with caution. Since, 1n general equilibrium,
wages are in fact endogenous, the case of no induced wage changes represents
a partial view, and can only be defined by cancelling some relation of the
general equilibrium system. In the current analysis the relation to be
suppressed is the expansion path condition. This has allowed us to carry
out a partial study of local labour supply side reactions for fixed wages
to be compared with the complete general equilibrium effects.
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4. MODE: II: TWO PRODUCTION SECTORS WITH ONE OCCUPA:rION IN EACH
4. 1 The JIIOde Z
In .adel l only one commodity was produced which implied that we
barred ourselves from discussing effects on relative commodity prices.
In model Il we assume that one commodity is produced in a sector using
labour from occupation l and a different commodity is produced in another
sector using.labour from occupation 2. In order to keep down the number
of complications a very simple production structure will be assumed. Labour
is the only factor of production. Let NI and N2 denote the number of wor-
kers in sect~r l and sector 2 respectively, and let ~ and x2 be the corre-
sponding output levels. Each worker in a sector is assumed to do some
specified job which is exogenously given. The production volume in each
sector is assumed to be proportional to the number of workers, and the
units of measurement are chosen so as to make the factor of proportionality
equal to unity. The production functions of the two sectors are then
(4.1) Xl • NI
(4.2) :X2 • N2
Let PI,P2 denote
immediately from
the product prices and wl,w2 the wage rates. It follows
(4.1) and (4.2) that in a competitive market equilibrium
(4.3)
(4.4)
We choose commodi ty 2 as the numeraire so that
The amount of each commodi ty purchased for government purposes is assumed
to be exogenously given equal to ~ and x~ respectively.
At aarket equilibrium the following relations must also. hold
(4.5)
m a
:Xl • x~ + f xll(Pl,Il,a,l)f(a)da + 6 X12(Pl,I2,a,2)f(a)da
a
(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)
( 4.9)
(4.10)
(".11)
(~.12)
- 22-
- .
~ a X~ + £ X2l(pl'Il'a,l)f(a).da + l x22(pl'I2,a,2)f(a)da
a
One relation can be eliminated by Walras' law. We choose to eliminate
(4.6). There are 10 endogenous variables: Pl,wl,b,Il'~2,a,Nl,N2,xl and x2•
To determine the equilibrium values of these variables we have got the 10
relations (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.~) and (4.7)-(4.12). w2 - P2 - l by (4.4)
and the choice of numeråire, and x~, x~ and t are determined by the government.
4.,2 Income ta:J: ana'Lysis
Let us now examine the welfare effects of changing the marginal
tax rate t. We shall stick to an additive welfare function which is writ-
ten as
(4.13) - aW - J V(P1,(1-t)w1 + b,a,l)f(a) da + f V(P1, (1-t)w2 + b,a,2)f(a)da- Oa
Let us define
dwlw' a_
l dt
dP1--dt ' and daal __dtbl _ ~dt
We can then derive
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(4.14) dW_-dt
-m a m
- J Ålvlf(a)da - J Å2v2f(a)da + J Ål(1-t)wif(a)da
Oa a
m a
+ ~ Ålb'f(a)da + l Å2b'f{a)da - D{a)å'
a
D(a) - O and can be eliminated. Let us now make a further simplification
by assuming that the quantities consumed only depend on income and prices
and not on the consumer's occupation. Then define
(4.15)
(4.16)
which are average marginal utilities of income in the two categories of
consumers. (4.14) can then be rewritten as
(4.17) dW--dt
Through (4.1) - (4.4) and (4.7) - (4.12) b, 11,12, a, N
"
N2, xl and
x2 are implicitly defined as functions of t and w,• We use these functions
to distinguish between direct effects of t and effects through prices. The
equilibrium value of w, can ultimately be found by also invoking (4.5).
As before the gain in real disposable income obtained by a worker in
occupation i, g., is made up of a direct effect of t, g. , and an effect
~ 1t
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from price changes, g .• Using (4.17) we can identify the effects as:1W
(4 .18)
(4.19)
( 4.20)
( 4.21)
g ·-w +b
1t 1 t
g • (l-t) - xlw 11 + b \. ••w)W1
g ·-w +b2t 2 t
A change in wl and Pl will affect real disposable income by changing
the nominal income after tax, by.changing the real value of income, and
by changing the transfer payment. Making use of (4.7), (4.3) and the
fact that Nt+N2 • 1, we find that
(4.22)
and
(4.23)
where
(4.24)
We assume that n > O which rules out the possibility that a one unit
lump sum transfer from the government generates a more than one unit
increase in tax revenue. From (4.5) and (4.8) we get
(4.25)
Since Pt • wt the effect of a change in wt on the labour supply is found
by combining the partial effects established in (2.t8) and (2.23). Hence
(4.26)
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We know from (2.25) that
Inserting these equations, we get from (4.18) and (4.22) that
(4.27)
and from (4.19) and (4.23) we obtain
(4.28)
In a similar way we find that
(4.29)
and
(4.30)
Using these results we can write the total effect on welfare as
(4.31)
- J - w +w +(1-t-x +x )W')\ 1 2 11 12 1
where k is the expression in square brackets divided by n. Since
gl - - wl + (1-t-X11)w~ + b' and g2 • - w2 - x12w~+ b' we easily see
that
(4.32)
(4.33)
(4.34)
(4.35)
(4.36)
(4.37)
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W' • keg - g )1 2
Using (4.27) and (4.28) we find that
from which it follows that
From (4.31), (4.32) and (4.34) we see that price effects
can be neglected at the margin if and only if sgn (w2-w1)· sgn gl'
We have assumed that w2-W1 < O. The cruc Ial question is then
whether gl may become positive. From ("4.27)and (4.28) follows
that
where a is defined by the last equation. From (4.29) and (4.30)
follows that
g2 • ag2t
We see from (4.27) that glt < O. gl will then be negative if
a is positive and positive if a is negative. Let us now
recall the equilibrium condition of the market for commodity 1,
(4.5), which we can rewrite as
- 27-
We shall now assume that there is a stable equilibrium in the
8~ns~ that the excess supply of commodity 1 is an increasing function of
Pl when all repercussions are taken into account. Let s11 denote the
direct compensated price derivative of x11' and s12 denote the direct
compensated price derivative of %12. With the ordinary assumptions these
derivatives are negative. The assumption of increasing excess supply
implies that
( 4.38)
Let us then differentiate both sides of the equilibrium condition
(4.37) with respect to t. We get
( 4.39)
Let us define
(4.40)
- "::'0 -
(4.41)
We can then write (4.39) as
(4.42)
Combining (4.38) and (4.42) we see that
(4.43) l Blg1t + B2g2t < O if w1 > OB1g1t + B2g2t > O if w; < O
We can also write (4.39) as
(4.44)
If we invoke (4.35) and (4.36) we can rewrite the equation once
more as
(4.45)
Since the direct Slutsky derivatives are negative we can use (~.43)
to conclude that a is always positive. Hence gl will always be negative,
and we can conclude that price effects can be neglected at the margin •
.-
FToposition 4.1: Induced pr-ice changes can be neglected at the Trr:zrgin
when piecemeal tax pevisions are consideped.
From (4.34) we know that since gl is negative, g1-g2 is negative
too.
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(4.32) ehen eells us ehat the first order optimum tax condition is
. .
4.3 ShouZd a commodity ~ be imposed?
Let us now examine how the introduction of a small commodity tax
in addition to an optimum income tax would affect the welfare level.
Let s be the tax per unit of xl' and let Pl denote the consumer price
per unit of xl. Obviously
(4.46)
NI is then determined by the supply function
(4.47)
The budget constraint of the government now becomes
(4.48)
We keep in mind that PlDWl and P2-1. We differentiate at the point where
5=0 to obtain
(4.49) ~l ~lbs - t(wl-w2) aPl + t(wl-w2) as- bs
aNI
+t(w1-w2) aWl wls + tN1wls + Xl - xf - xtwlS
where subscript s indicates a derivative with respect to s. Hence
(4.50)
(4. Sl)
- ~o -
l ~l ~l
ba • ii[t(wl-w2) (-xII "fi"i:' - x12 ar;)
l aNI
+ n[t(w1-wZ) (l-t-xll) all -
+ x - xg]l l
Substituting from (4.5) and (4.8) we further obtain
Invoking the Envelope Theorem we find the effect on welfare as
( 4. 52)
-
+ A2N2Nlxll + AZN2~2N2 +(l-t-~l)kwls + x12kwls]
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Si~ce t is already at its optimum, we know that k·O and hence
(4.53)
Proposi tier. 4. 2: Provided that there is an optimum income taæ , no corrrnodit;y
ta::: 8hou~d be app~ied.
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5. MODEL III: TWO PRODUCTION SECTORS WITH TWO OCCAPATIONS IN EACH.
s. 1. The 1fr:)ds Z •
There are two production sectors in the economy, each producing one
commodity. The sectors are labelled l and 2 respectively, and ~ and x2
denote the respective production levels. Two kinds of labour are used in
both sectors. Each type belongs to an occupation which from the
workers' point of view is the same in both sectors. The two occupations
are labelled l and 2. We let wI and w2 denote the respective wage-rates
of the two occupations. As before let NI be the number of workers in
occupation 1 and N2 be the number of workers in occupation 2, and the total
workforce is set equal to unity. Let n .. denote the number of workers in
1J
occupation J in sector i. Each sector has a production function vhich is
assumed to be homogeneous of degree one. We let p. denote the price per
'"unit of x., and c. denote the unit cost function of sector i; i - 1,2. The
'" 1unit cost function is, of course, homogeneous of degree one in vI and w2.
The production side of the economy is then described by the following
relations in equilibrium:
(5.1) NI + N - l2
(5.2) NI • nIl + n2l
(5.3) N2 - n12 + n22
(5.4) Xl - xI(n11,n12)
(5".5) x2 - x2(n21,n22)
(5.6) Pl - Cl (WI ,w2)
(5.7) P2 - c2(wl,w2)
(5.8) nIl/xl- c11(w1,v2)
(5.; 9) n2l/x2 - c2l(wl,v2)
- 33 -
where c .. - dc../øw.; i,j • 1,2. (S.1)-(S.3) are true by definition. (5.4)
1J 1 J
and (S.5) are the production functions. (5.6) and (5.7) are equilibrium
conditions, and (5.8) and (5.9) are optimum conditions for factor intensi-
ties.
The workers choose occupation as previously described. The number
of workers in occupation l then becomes a function of pricæand after
tax income levels in the two occupations .»
(5.10)
Commodity demand is assumed to depend on prices and disposable income only.
Let ~ denote the demand for commodity k from a person in occupation b;
k,h = 1,2. x: is the government demand for commodity k, k = 1,2. Market
equilibrium are then ensured by the relations:
(5.11)
(:5.12)
(5.13)
. We choose commodity 2 as numeraire so that
(5.14) P2 • 1.
One of the relations (5.11) - (S.13) is redundant by Walras' law. ~e model
then provides 12 independent relations to determine the equilibrium values
of the 12 variables Nl,N2,nll,n12,n2l,n22,xl,x2wl,w2,Pl and b when t is
determined directly by the government.
Instead of (5.4) and ~.5) we could use
(5.15)
(5.16)
which can be derived by means of (5.8) and (5.9) and the fact that
wlnll!xl + w2n12/x1 - wlcll + w2c12 and wln2l/x2 + w2n22/x2 - wlc21 + w2c22•
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The prices of the model are related by the relations (5.6) and (5.7):
and
_.
where P2 bas been set equal to unity. The two equations implicitly define
WI and w2 as functions of Pl. We can then analyse how a change in PI
affects tbe wage-rates. Differentiating the system we find that
(5.17) l ""
dWI dW2cll d + c -Pl 12 dPI
O ..
dWI dW2c2l d + c -Pl 22 dPl
( 5.18)
Let us define the determinant
(5.19) A =
where (5.8), (5.9), (5.15) and (5.16) have been used. We choose the more
intensive user of labour belonging to occupation l as sector l. It then
follows that A > O. We easily find that
(5.20)
dwl n22--dPl Ax2
(5.21)
dW2 -021
-= .dPI Ax2
We may note that the production side of the model corresponds to the
constant returns to scale, two-commodity, two-factor model which has received
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close attention in economic theory and in international trade theory in
particular. The results in (5.20) and (5.21) are in fact the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem.
B.2. Income tax anaZysis.
By means of the additive, indirect welfare function
(5.22)
m a
W - ~ V(Pl,(I-t)wl + b,a,l)f(a)da + J V(PI,(I-t)w2 + b,a,2)f(a)da
a o
we can investigate the welfare effect of changing the marginal tax rate t.
We let a prime indicate derivatives with respect to t. As before we
can distinguish berween the partial direct effects of t and the effects
_____ c;llanpelledthr9~ induced chang_es in equi~br~~ pri,=es. _
MOre precisely, the relations (5.l) - (5.10) and (5.13) define all
--t-h-e other variables as functions of PI and -t, and PI l.S - inturn a function
of t due to (5.11). The partial direct effecGof t are expressed by the
partial deriv~tives with respect to t. Since ~ll other prices (wages) are
functions of Plonly, price changes can be represented by the change in Pl.
Effects of price changes can therefore be expressed by partial derivatives
with respect to Pl. A subscript t indicates direct effects, and a subscript
P indicates effects of price changes. For instance bt = ablat and
bp - ab/apI.
The gain in terms of an increase in real disposable income obtained by
a worker in occupation i, gi' is made up of the direct effect of t, git'
and the effect from price changes, g. • Differentiating the welfare function
l.p
and making use of the average ~rgina~ utilities of income
X = r; Al f(a)da/Nl and ~2 = J; A2f(a)da/N2, we can express the marginal effect
of t on welfare by
(5.23) W' - dW/dt
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where the last term obviously vanishes due to (2.11). We obviously have
that
(5.24)
(5 .25) g - (-x + b )p' + (l-t)wl',lp Il p l ..
(5·.26)
and
(5.27) g -(-x + b )p' + (l-t)w'.2p 12 P 1 2
Real income effects here include changes directly ~n ~ncome as well
as real income effects of price changes.
Let us define
(5.28)
dWl
ål == (1 - t) - -dPl
dW2
å == (l - t) --2 dPl(5.29)
which are the real income effects from a one unit increase in Plwhen
the effects on wages as well as the real income effects of a higher
commodity price are taken into account. Let us then find the partial
effect of PIon b. From (5.13)
we find that
(5.30)
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Let
We assume that n > O which rules out the possibility that a one unit lump
sum transfer from the government may generate a more than one unit increase in
tax revenue.
Bence
+ t(wl - w2)(-xllaNl/aIl-x12a~aI2:
aNI -U21
t(w1 - w2) (l - t) ar xx-
. 2 2
where (2.18), (5.20) and (5.21) have been invoked. Moreover,
(5.31)
Haking use of (5.11) we see that
(S .32)
n -n
- Nlål - 52/12 - xl + 5 _E + 5 ___1ll b2 2 Ax2
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where (5.19) has been invoked. Inserting this result into (5.31) we get
(5.33)
Rewriting (5.25) as
(5.34)
and substituting from (5.33), we get
(5.35)
In an analogous way we find that
(5.36)
Let us then find the partial effect of t on b. From (5.13),
b + P1xg1 + xg2 = tN1w + tN w ,1 2 2
we find that
(5.37)
where we have recalled that N1 + N2 - 1. Substituting for bt in (5.24) we
obtain
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(5.38)
In an analogous manner we obtain
(5.39)
We can now express the total effect on we~fare by
(5.40)
or shorter
(5.41)
where k is the expression in square brackets in (5.40) divided by n.
If ve are only interested in the sign of W' as we are when we want
to know whether a piecemeal tax revision is welfareaugmenting or not,
we see that the price effects which are generated by the tax reform can
be neglected if and only if
(.5.42)
Since we obviously have that
(5.43)
(5.42) 1S equivalent to
(5.44)
From (5.35) and (5.38) we find that
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(? .45)
due to (5.43). The expression in square brackets is obviously positive
and gi and gl - g2 have the same sign. Condition (5.44) is then equivalent to
(5.46)
We have assumed that market conditions are such that wI> w2• We shall now
explore whether gl > O can be ruled out. From (5.35),(5.36),(5.38) and
(5.39) we find that
(5.47)
where y is defined by the last equation, and
(5.48) g2t • yg2'
We easily see from (~38) that glt< O. Bence if y > O a positive gl can
be ruled out. First we shall make the important assumption that the market
for commodity l is stable in the sense that the excess supplY of the commodity
is an increasing function of the commodity price when all effects of that
price on equilibrium prices (wages) in other markets are allowed for. In
other words we take into account that the excess supply function is a func-
tion of PI also through the relations between wå and w l and Pl'We write the demand for commodity l as ~ which is expressed by the
right hand side of (5.11) where NI is given by (5.10). The supply side can
be described by the relations (5.2)-(5.9). Taking commodity prices (PI and P2)
and factor endowments (NI and H2) as given these are eight relations which
determine Xl (and x2, n12, n21, nll,n22,wl and w2). We denote the supply of
Xl by x~. This model is well known from international trade literature. We
can write the supply of Xl as
(5.49)
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Obviously
(5.50)
The effects of changes in NI (and N2) are easily found by appealing to the
Rybczynski - theorem. Since sector l is the more intensive user of labour
belonging to occupation l, it follows that
(5.51) < O
Recalling that N2 = 1 - NI and that NI is related to prices through (5.10),
the supply of commodity l has been related to Pl. Let us use the notation
{øx/3p)lu to denote a compensated price derivative (or Slutsky derivative) where
u indicates that the utility level is fixed. Differentiating the excess
supply with respe~t to PI we get
ø s øNlfl d • øXl ( aNI ~ g2p )(5.52) ØPI (Xl - Xl) øNI 011 , +n- ,Pl 2 Pl
g2p )
p'I
øNl-x _
11 øl
I
gl 3NI g2_L-x _--L
P, 11 31 p'1 2 l
u
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where the inequality reflects the increasing excess supply assumption and
saNl a~ aN2 3xll aNl aN2-+---N --x --x -l 11 12all aN2 all all all all
(5.53)
( 5.54)
Also differentiating the equilibrium condition x~
t we get
d- xl • O with respect to
( 5.55)
which is equivalent to
( 5.56)
~mbining (5.52) and (5.56) we can conclude that
f ~glt + ~2g2t < O if pt > O
l~l.8!t+
l
(5.57)
~2g2t > O if pi < O
Using that glt • ygl and g2t • yg2 (from (5.47) and (5.48»we can write
instead that
(5.58)
{Y<'181 + '282) < O
ty<.~gl + t2g2) > O
if pt > O
l
if pi < O
Let us then recall (5.55). Since the direct Slutsky derivatives are negative
s·and 3xl,apl > O, we see that
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(5.59)
From (5.58) and (5.59) ve can conclude that y > O, and (5.46) is satisfied.
Propositior. 5.1: Under stability assumptions induced price changes ~an be
neglected at the margin when tax revisions are considered.
5.:3 The effect of a cormr;dity ta:::
Let us consider-the introduction of an excise tax, s, on commodity 1
under the assumption that the income tax has already been optimized. What
are the effects of such a tax? We first observe that the relations (5.6)
and (5.7) are unaffected so that the same relations hold between vI and PI
and v2 and PI where PI is now the producer price of commodity 1. The
effects on the wage-rate will then occur only through the effect on Pl'
In (5.11) - (5.13) and (5.22) PI is now replaced by PI + s which is the
consumer price of commodity l. In general PI now becomesa function of sand
t. It is useful to express b as a function of PI' t and s: b(PI,t,s).
We can then derive the ~elfare effect of changing s marginally away from
zero. The velfare function (formerly (6.22» is now expressed as
(5.60) W - Z V (Pl + s,(l-t)wl + b(PI,t,s),a,l)f(a)da.a
a
+ 6 V (Pl + s,(1-t)v2 + b(Pl,t,s),a,2)f(a) da.
Since t is at its optimum initially, we can apply the Envelope Theorem to
derive
(5.61) dW_-----ds
aw aw dPI I <nJ ab-+--+-
ds ab as
- 44 -
But we know already that at the initial tax optimum a change in PI has no
effect on welfare. So the second term vanishes. Hence
dW aw aWab
(s.62) _- +--
ds a(Pl +s) ab as
We easily see that
.'
aw
(S.63) - -
The budget constraint of the goverment now becomes
(5.64)
Let bs - ab/as. Difterentiating at the point where saO we find that
and further
(S.65)
where (S.l) and (5.11) have been employed·
Using
we find that
aNI aNI aNI aNI aNI
---x --x -+-b +-b
as llaIl 12 aI~ all s aI2 s
Inserting (S.66) into (S.65), we get
aNI aNI -l aNI aN'bs - (1-t(wl-w'2)(- + -» (t(wl-w'2)(-xII - -X12 _l)all aI2 all +Nl~1+N2xl~aI2
where the inverse expression has previously been denoted by l/no Making use
of (S.63) and (5.67) we find that
(S.67)
(5.68)
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It follows that
(5.69)
Then taking. (5.40) into account and recalling that dW/dt - O, we obtain
( 5. 70) dW I - O.ds 8=0
Hence we can s~ate:
Proposi~ion 5.2: Provided that t~ere is an optimum income tax,there is
no need to emp loy commodi ty ta:r:ation.
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e. CONCLUDING REMARX.S
This paper has been concerned with the role of endogenous wages and
prices in tax analysis. The subject has been studied within a model which
has focused on the choice of occupation aspect of labour supply rather than
the traditional free choice of working hours. In other respects the set-
up has been similar to that used in earlier studies of the endogeneity of
wages. (Feldstein (1973) and Allen (1982).) There are constant returns to
scale, two market determined wage rates and a linear income tax. Both a
one-sector version and a two-sector version of the basic model have been
analysed. The latter version is closely related to the famous two by two
model of international trade theory.
The paper has analysed the incidence effects of increasing the progres-
sivity of the income tax. This would lead to an unambiguous redistribution
of income which, however, would be modified by the induced general equilibrium
effects on wages.
Central features of the model are the close relationship between the
distributional effects and the effects on effiency, and the similarity between
direct tax effects and the effects of induced wage (and price) effects. The
behaviour of the workers is essentially governed by the income distribution
between occupations. A reduction of income discrepancies through taxation
directly reduces effiency via the labour responses to the very change in
income distribution. The induced wage (and price) changes affect the economy
1n exactly the opposite direction, but to a lesser extent.
The very important implication is that if the direct redistributional
effect is more (less) highly valued from a welfare point of view, than the
direct effect on efficiency of a slightly more progressive taxation, so is the
ultimate general equilibrium effect on distribution as compared to that on
efficiency. Hence the main finding of the analysis is that, within the
economic setting under survey, induced wage and price changes may be neglected
in assessments of piecemeal tax revisions. This result differs from the
conclusion of Allen (1982) that within a model of free choice of working hours
allowing for general equilibrium effects on wages may be vital. The different
results highlights the roles of different assumptions about the labour market.
The analysis is limited in a number of respects. Only two occupations
have been considered. There is only a very simple tax structure. Ability
has been treated as one-dimensional. Only one aspect of labour supply has
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been modelled. In reality the labour supply side is very complex and involve
a number of decisions with respect to the number of household members taking
a job, working hours, education, willingness to take responsibility, choice
of occupation, etc. All these aspects seem to have a claim for interest
although the scope for the various choices may differ between different
economies. But at the present stage of research partial analyses of the
various aspects in connection with tax theory seem likely to give more insight
into the relevant mechanisms than a simultaneous treatment of a mixture of
aspects, although a synthesis may well be the proper aim in the long run.
Until now general equilibrium effects on wages and prices have received
little attention in normative tax theory. Yet, it may not be fair to blame
the research in public economics for neglect in this respect. On the contrary,
it may well have got priorities right by first developing optimum and tax
revision theories under simpler assumptions. It seems important, however, to
become increasingly aware of the incidence and efficiency aspects of tax
induced general equilibrium effects on wages and prices.
NORGES HANOELSH0 ySKUlt
8t8LlOffKET
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Footnotes
*) A first draft of this paper was presented at the Summer 1982 meeting
of the Yrjo Jahnsson Foundation Study Group on Public Economics. A second
version was presented at the 1983 meeting of Nordic economists at HankØ.
Comments by Avinash Dixit. Agnar Sandmo. Matti Tuomala and seminar parti-
cipants are gratefully acknowledged.
1) For an introduction to optimum tax analysis, see for example Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1980).
2) According to Feldstein (1976, p. 77) "Optimal tax reform must take as
its starting point the existing tax system and the fact that actual
changes are slow and piecemeal."
3) Allen (1982) distinguished between direct effects via the fiscal system
and general equilibrium effects due to changes in pre-tax wages.
4) But even in such instances there may be an element of economic compensation
to the marginal individual. For instance a sportsman's career is usually
short and risky (in terms of success or failure and physical injuries)
and may require a number of sacrifices in other respects.
5) Feldstein (1973) obtained the necessary degree of freedom to keep wages
fixed at the no-tax equilibrium values by giving up theexpansion. path
condition.
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l.INTRODUCTION
The seventies have seen a revolt against the conventional cost-benefit criterion which
simply sums up and compares the costs and benefits of a project without caring who benefit
and who bear the costs. As an alternative the use of weighting systems has been proposed
by which different weights are given to benefits obtained and costs incurred by persons who
differ with respect to income level and possibly other characteristics which are assumed to
bear strongly on welfare. There have, however, been conflicting views on the matter. One
argument has been that the attainment of distributional ends should be the responsibility
of tax policy and should not be allowed to interfere with the assessment of government
projects.
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) have recently given a valuable contribution to the
theoretical clarification of this issue. They showed that under certain assumptions (in their
own words): distributional objectives should affect taxes but not programme choice or
design. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the same question within a more general
economic setting and using a different analytical approach. The more precise purpose is to
establish conditions under which the conventional cost-benefit criterion (that sums up
unweighted net benefits and neglects tax distortions I) or a simple modification of it is valid
in the presence of distributional objectives and second best taxation. Hylland and
Zeckhauser showed that certain assumptions are sufficient to permit the use of the
conventional cost-benefit criterion in the presence of optimal income taxation. This paper
derives conditions which are necessary and sufficient for this criterion to be valid under the
same tax system. In general it extends the analysis to the case of mixed income and
commodity taxation. It also tries to give more attention to the economic content of the
formal results.
It should be made clear that tpe project considered in this analysis is of the public good
type. A related strand of analysis is concerned with the social evaluation of publicly
provided goods which are sold in the market at tax-distorted prices or market goods used
in the public sector. The literature started by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) has
established that when optimal commodity taxes are in operation, private sector producer
prices are appropriate public sector shadow prices for such goods even when distribution
matters. This is an important result which could do a lot to simplify cost-benefit analyses in
the public sector. The Diamond and Mirrlees paper also presented an optimality rule for
the provision of public consumption in the presence of taxation (Diamond and Mirrlees,
1971, Section IX). But no attempt was made to derive conditions which would allow the
use of simple cost-benefit criteria in this case. So this is the problem to which we address
ourselves. We shall return to the relationship between the evaluation of public goods and
that of market goods at the end of the paper.
Section 2 describes the economic setting within which the cost-benefit analysis is to be
analysed. Section 3 presents the cost-benefit problem. The main analysis and results
appear in Section 4, while a more special case is dealt with in Section 5.
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2. THE ECONOMIC SETTING
We consider a population consisting of a continuum of individuals who differ in their
earning ability, a. a is then a continuous variable which is taken to be nonnegative. The
distribution of individuals by ability is given by the exogenous density function f (a). For
convenience the size of the population is normalized at unity.
There are four commodities, two private goods, work effort (Le. hours of work or a
more complicated measure), and a public good. All individuals have the same utility
function u(y, x, g, h) where y,.t are the amounts of the two private goods consumed by the
individual, g is the amount provided of the public good, and h is his work effort.
The wage rate faced by an individual is equal to his exogenous earning ability. Let I
denote his gross income. Only earned income is considered, so that
l=ah. (1)
T(l) is the income tax imposed on a person earning I, and T' = dT/ dl is the marginal
taxrate, Producer prices are assumed fixed. Commodity y is untaxed and serves as
numeraire with its price set at unity, while a unit tax t is imposed on .t. q denotes the
consumer price, and p the producer price of x. By definition:
q =p+t.
It follows that the budget constraint of an individual becomes:
ah - T(ah) = y +qx.
Using (3) to substitute for y, the utility function can be written as
u(ah - T(ah)-qx, x, g, h) = v(h, x).
(2)
(3)
(4)
Each person is assumed to maximize his utility function with respect to h and x taking his
ability, the shape of T, the price q, and the provision of the public good as given. This leads
to the familiar first order conditions:
V" = uya (1 - T') + u" = O
V" = - quy + u" = O
(5)
(6)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the appropriate arguments.
Second order conditions are
V"" <O, (7)
lAI> O where A = [Vit" V",,].
v"" Vu
(8)
The following demand functions and labour supply function are implied:
y(a, q, g)
x(a, q, g)
h(a, q, g).
(9)
(10)
(11)
The functional forms obviously depend on the shape of T.
The government's objective function is taken to be an additive ly separable social
welfare function:
W =fa-"., u(ah - T(ah)-qx, x, g, h)f(a) da.
a-O
(12)
u is interpreted as a particular cardlnalization of the individual's utility function which is
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selected by the government so as to reflect its distributional preferences. As I have argued
elsewhere (Christiansen and Jansen (1978, p. 221» that I do not see the additive form as a
serious restriction.
The limits of integration are the same throughout the analysis. To simplify the
mathematical expressions they will be omitted in what follows. And so will arguments of
functions when convenient and where no confusion is likely to arise.
The optimal tax policy for a given public project is obtained by maximizing (12) with
respect to the income tax schedule and the tax rate t taking (9)-(11) and a revenue
constraint into account. The government's revenue requirement is
J T{ah)fda + t J ;r(a)f da = g +k (13)
where we assume that g is measured in terms of the cost of the public project. k is a
constant which is zero if there is no public expenditure apart from g to be financed by tax
revenue.
For our purpose there is no need to derive detailed optimality conditions. In order to
characterize the optimal income tax we introduce a shift parameter S in the income tax
function. The effect of S on T may be of any kind. A change in S can therefore be used to
describe an arbitrary shift in the tax schedule. An arbitrary marginal shift is denoted by
Ts(I, Sl. hs(a) and xs(a) denote the corresponding changes in labour supply and demand
for commodity x respectively of a person of ability a. We form the Lagrangean
L = J u(ah - T(ah, S)-qx, x, g, h)fda
+p.( J T(ah,S)fda+t J x(a)fda-g-k) (14)
where p. is the shadow price associated with (13).
A necessary condition for optimality of the income tax (for a given commodity tax t) is
that
aL/aS=-J uyTsfda+p. J Tsfda+p. J T'ahsfda+P.lJ xsfda=O (15)
where the individual optimization has been taken account of. The shadow price p. =
-aW/ak evaluated at the optimum. Since there is a social cost to a marginal need for
government revenue p. is positive. The interpretation of (15) is that an arbitrary marginal
shift in the tax schedule should lead to no change in social welfare allowing for the resulting
change in tax revenue evaluated at its shadow price. Otherwise a marginal shift in the tax
schedule could always raise the welfare level, and then the initial schedule could not be
optimal. A necessary condition for the commodity tax to be optimal as well is that in
addition to (15):
aL/at=-J uyXfda+p. J xf da+u. J T'ah,fda+p.tJ x,fda=O (16)
where h, =ah/at and X, =ax/ at.
We are now endowed with the necessary tools for coping with the cost-benefit
problem.
3. THE COST-BENEFIT PROBLEM
Let us consider a government programme which implies a marginal change in g. How
should this change be evaluated in a proper cost-benefit analysis? The effects are listed
fairly easily. g has obviously a direct beneficial effect because it appears in the utility
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function. y, X and h will generally change in response to a change in g. Since y. x and h
initiallyare set optimally by each individual. the only welfare effect of the induced changes
in these variables is the effect of the ensuing change in tax revenue. g is financed by taxes,
and the cost of a marginal unit of g equals one marginal tax unit. These effects can be
brought out by applying the Envelope Theorem" to (14), Le. by differentiating the
Lagrange expression with respect to g at the appropriate tax optimum. Then we find that
dW/dg = fUl! da + lJo f T'ah,! da + IJoIf x,!da -1Jo· (17)
The marginal valuation of g by an individual in terms of the numeraire is
m = uJuy (18)
m is obviously a function of a (for given g and tax policy). We can then rewrite (17) as
dW/ dg = f mud da + lJo f T' ah,! da +IJoIf x,!da -1Jo· (19)
uy plays the role of a distributive weight which varies across individuals, When discussing
distribution it is useful to establish a reference distribution as a benchmark for comparison.
We choose as reference distribution one which is such that the sum of relative shares
weighted by the appropriate distributive weights equals 1Jo. This distribution is. of course,
equivalent to giving the entire benefit to a person with distributive weight 1Jo. We therefore
rewrite (19) as
dW/ dg = lJo f m!da + f [uy -1Jo 1m! da + lJo f T' ah,! da +IJoIf x,.f da -1Jo (20)
which we can easily interpret. The first term is the welfare effect which would obtain if the
whole benefit were distributed by the reference distribution. The second term is the
redistribution effect obtained because the actual distribution deviates from the reference
distribution assumed in the first term. The remaining terms are the same terms as
explained earlier.
We assume that gross income increases with the ability, i.e. I is an increasing function
of a. This function can be inverted. It follows that we can write h(a(l) and m(a(I».
Under these conditions a redistribution equal to that in the second term of (20) might have
been implemented (or reversed) by means of the tax policy. Since the tax policy is optimal
and all potential gains are exploited, the gain from such a marginal redistribution must be
just offset by the cost of achieving it. To see this, consider the shift in the tax schedule
which for every person is equivalent to the change in g:
T, = -m = -u,/Uy. (21)
In contrast to S which was used to denote an arbitrary shift parameter, a lower case s is
used to indicate this particular shift. Applying (15), which is true for any marginal shift in
the tax schedule from the optimal one, to the shift expressed by (21), we get exactly the
equality between the redistributional gain and the cost of achieving it:
f [uy-lJo]m!da= -1Jo f T'ahs!da-IJoI f x/da. (22)
Let B be the total direct benefits from a one unit increase in g:
B = f m!da = - fT/ da (23)
where the last equation is due to (21). Similarly it may be convenient to let C denote the
direct total cost which actually has been set equal to unity. Introducing Band C. and also
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inserting the result in (22) into (20), we obtain:
~; / J.I. = [B - C]+[ f ra», -h,)! da + t f {xg -x.)! da].
The welfare impact of the public programme is divided into two effects, each in square
brackets. The former effect is the difference between total benefit and cost in the
traditional sense, the sign of which is the conventional criterion for accepting or rejecting a
programme in cost-benefit analysis. On its own B - C has two essential limitations. It
gives the same weight to the net benefits of everybody, and it does not allow for the
distortion effects of second best taxation. To make up for these shortcomings the second
term is added. This is the difference between the effects on total tax revenue of the labour
supply and demand reactions induced by the programme and those of the supply and
demand responses to the equivalent tax revision. The former are efficiency effects of the
programme, and, as we recall from (22) the latter reflect the distribution effects. If and
only if these effects are equal, is the conventional cost-benefit criterion valid. Such an
equality might obtain by chance because of the special values of the parameters of the
economy, or because the utility function implies that the effects cancel out for each
individual. We shall in the following section investigate under what conditions this
situation will materialize.
(24)
4. WHEN IS THE CONVENTIONAL COST-BENEFIT CRITERION VAUD?
Since the optimal income tax will depend on the values of aH the parameters of the
economy, and the marginal income tax will be positive, we cannot expect the effects on the
tax payments of each individual to cancel out unless hg - h, = (xg - x.) = O for all a. So far
in our analysis we have only assumed explicitly that the income tax is optimal. No
assumption has been made about the commodity tax. If ( simply assumes an arbitrary
value, the condition obviously becomes hg - h, = xg - X. = O. We therefore need to analyse
the responses of the labour supply and the demand for x. Keeping in mind that h, and x,
are the derivatives of h and x with respect to the shift parameter s, we get from (5) and (6):
A(h.] = (UyaT~ +a(1- T')uyyT, +UhyT'J
.t. -qul'yT. + u"yT.
(25)
and
A(hg] =(-a(I-T')Ul'c-U/tc].
.tc quyC - u"r
(26)
A sufficient condition to ensure that hg - h, = xg - X. = O is obviously that each element of
the vector on the right hand side of (25) equals the corresponding element of the vector on
the right hand side of (26). Making use of (5), (6) and (21) these equalities become
Uh , u/tug U~U --Uh -U aT, +u --+u/t -=0
Ylu C Y YYu U "
" "l' Ul'
(27)
and
U" U" ur urul',-- U"' - Uyy--+ Ulel'- = O
Ul' Ul' Uy ul'
which is equivalent to
a (Uc) a (Ul)U,,- - -u,,- - =0
ay Ul' ax Ul' (28)
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and further
.!!..(Ul() _ O
dy u" u.,g,h
t28')
which means that for a given utility level and constant gand h, a movement in y-direction
does not change the marginal rate of substitution between gand y. In order also to
reformulate (27), we first find T~by making use of (21):
aT' ,..!...aT,.. [a(us/ uy) u" _ a(u,/ uY)]xr -"';'(uyUSy _ U,uyy)(1- T')-- a(u,~ uy) hr
as al as oy Uy ax u y a
(29)
where xi= dx(a(I»/ dl and hr'" dh(a(I»/ dl. The term in square brackets vanishes
because of (28). Then substituting for T~ in (27) and performing some simple manipula-
tions we fina that (27) holds if and only if
a(u,/ u,,) (1- h )=O
Uy ah ar.
We have assumed that a and I are positively related. By definition I = ah which implies
that
(30)
1- ah, = hda] dl> O. (31 )
Then (30) holds if and only if
(32)
Since ur/ uy is independent of h, it follows immediately from (28) that so too is u.] LIv. So
the private goods and the public good are weakly separable from h. Hence LI belongs to the
class of utility functions:
u(y, ."C, g, h)æ.,.,(~(y, .r, g), h). (33)
Thus the combination of (28') and (33) is sufficient to ensure that (24) is reduced to
dW/JI.=B_e
dg
and the traditional cost-benefit analysis is valid.
(34)
Proposition 1. If the utility function exhibits weak separability between hand
combinations y, x, g, and the marginal valuation of g in terms of the numeraire is independent
of y and x as long as g, h and the level of utility is constant, then it is always permissible to use
the conventional cost-benefit criterion B >CtB <C) for accepting (rejecting) a public project
euen if there is an arbitrary commodity tax, and euen when distribution matters. hut is taken
care of by optimal income taxation.
If consumers were identical or distribution simply did not matter, a uniform head tax
would be the optimal tax, there would be no distortions, and the conventional criterion
would, of course, always be adequate.
Let us now briefty consider the case where the commodity tax is zero. Then:c vanishes
from the government's budget constraint. Also when prices are given, the private goods
may be aggregated in the utility function to be represented by the disposable income used
to purchase these goods. Let us denote disposable or after-tax income by Y = I - T(l) =
y +qx, and write the utility function as u (Y, g, h). (For convenience the old function
symbol u has been retained.) We can now perform exactly the same kind of analysis as
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above. The only difference will be that we are no longer concerned with what happens to x.
What we do may be conceived of as leaving out x and substituting Y for y. So whether the
conventional cost-benefit criterion is valid or not only depends on whether or not the term
(hg - h.) vanishes. It does if and only if (27) holds (with subscript y now referring to Y),
which is tantamount to (32) being satisfied. Hence it can be stated:
Proposition 2. - It is always permissible to use the conventional cost-benefit criterion
when distribution matters and is taken care of by optimal income taxation, and there is no
commodity taxation, if and only if the utility function exhibits weak separability between h
and combinations of Yand g.
Now if the utility function is weakly separable between private goods and the public
good taken together and work effort, it has very interesting implications. It has been
shown by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) that this implies that an optimal tax system will
include no commodity taxation '(possibly apart from a uniform tax rate which is equivalent
to an income tax), so that t = O is optimal. Obviously it also implies that the separability
condition of Proposition 2 is satisfied. Once again (24) reduces to (34). Hence the
conventional cost-benefit analysis holds if the utility function is weakly separable in the
sense defined above and the overall tax policy is optimal.
Apparently distribution effects are neglected in (34), but this is only apparently. What
happens is that in the presence of (33) and optimal income taxation distribution effects are
just offset by the (in)efficiency effects of labour (dis)incentives. Both distribution effects
and (dis)incentive effects are properly allowed for, but they happen to cancel out under the
present conditions. Thus (33) and optimal income taxation permit us to use the con-
ventional cost-benefit criterion without being guilty of neglecting income distribution
effects.
The nature of the distributional objectives, expressed for instance by the degree of
inequality aversion, will not affect the form of the decision rule set out above. But this is
not to say that the choice of projects is unaffected by the distributional objectives since the
valuation of benefits by the consumers (expressed by B) in general depends on the
distribution of income. This would of course also be true if lump sum taxes were available.
5. A' MODIFIED COST-BENEFIT CRITERION
So far we have considered an arbitrary commodity tax and the case where t = O is optimal.
By assuming in general optimal design of both commodity and income taxation one might
hope to find ways of deriving meaningful characteristics of wider classes of utility functions
which allow the use of conventional cost-benefit analysis. However, since both kinds of
taxes in general depend on all parameters of the economy, this turns out to become very
difficult, and no further results to that effect can be reported.
It turns out, however, that under certain conditions the general second best cost-
benefit criterion can be simplified in a way which leads to a modified version of the
conventional criterion. As was briefly discussed in the introductory section a simple
cost-benefit criterion for private goods is obtained by using producer prices as publi.. sector
shadow prices in the presence of optimal commodity taxes. We shall now consider how an
analogous modification of the conventional cost-benefit criterion is valid under certain
conditions in the case of a public good.
To provide a link between the private good case and the public good case il is
convenient to give the case to be dealt with a particular interpretation in terms of
production of basic goods. As shown by Sandmo (1973) a public good can often be
considered as an input which is used together with private goods to produce some kind of
basic good. A standard example is road travelling being produced by means of road
services and privately purchased commodities such as cars, petrol, oil, tyres etc. We shall
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consider the case where each consumer enjoys two basic goods in amounts y and z, y is
itself a private good. z is produced by means of a private commodity in quantity x and a
public good in quantity g. The production function is given by
z=z(x,g) (35)
where sz] ax = ZJC > o and azl ag= Zl > O. In other respects the assumptions are still those
made earlier in the paper. Formally the only difference from the previous analysis is that
the utility function formerly expressed by (4) is now written as
u(ah - T(ah) -qx, z(x, g), h) = v(h, x) (36)
The optimality conditions of an individual are essentially those derived in Section 2. In the
present formulation they become
Vit = uya(l- T')+ U" = O (37)
VJC = -qu" + UZZJC = O.
It is useful to note that at this optimum
t38)
Ul UZZ, Zg
-=-=q-.
Uy U" ZJC
(39)
In the previous section we considered the shift in the income tax schedule which was
equivalent to a change in g. In this section we shall instead make use of an equivalent
change in t. Let us therefore define tit as the change in t which is equivalent to a one unit
increase in g in the sense that it confers the same direct benefit on everybody. At this stage
we obviously encounter a problem. t and ~t are required to be the same for everybody.
But in general such a uniform ~t may not exist. We therefore have to impose such
conditions on z (x, g) as will allow the utility effects of a marginal rise in g for all consumers
to be equalled by the utility effects of a suitable change in the unit tax I which is the same for
everybody. By definition
(40)
The left hand side is the direct benefit of increasing g, and the right hand side is the direct
utility effect of a commodity tax change. Combining (39) and (40) we find that
år= -qzJzJCx. (41)
Since ~t must be the same for everybody, it can only depend on factors which all
consumers have in common. q and g are such factors, but x will vary between consumers
with different income. Hence we see from (41) that we must impose the condition that
zJzJCx only depends on g (and not on x):
zJ ZJCX = tp(g). (42)
This is a partial differential equation which can be solved to obtain
z =t/I(~(g)+lnx) orequivalently z =fi(A(g)x). (43)
(43) defines the class of permissible z-functions. The main characteristic of this class,
which is imposed by (42), is that the marginal rate of substitution between x and g
(dX) z"- -. =-=~(g)x=tp(g)xdg z conscant ZJC (44)
is multiplicatively separable in the two arguments and proportional to x for given g. We
see immediately that the Cobb-Douglas function belongs to the class of functions defined
by (43r-which is much wider than the class of Cobb-Douglas functions. Production
CHRISTIANSEN PUBLIC PROJECTS 4.55
functions from this class, e.g. of the Cobb-Douglas type, are widely used in empirical
analyses, and therefore interesting.
The total tax policy is assumed to be optimal so that both (15) and (16) hold. In the
analysis that follows we shall make active use of (16) which it may therefore be convenient
to repeat: J llyxf da = Il- J xf da + Il- J T'ah.] da + 11-1J x.f da. (16)
The effect of g on W is found in exactly the same way as before. We have that
dW/ dg = J llzZ,f da + Il- J T' ahgf da + 11-1J x,f da -Il- (45)
which is equal to (17) except for the fact that g is now assumed to work through z, Our
purpose is now to show how this cost-benefit expression can be simplified under the
assumptions that have been made. First substituting from (40) into (45) and then invoking
(16) and (41), we obtain
dW/ dg == II-qJ :: f da -Il- + 11-1J (x, - x,a/)f da + Il- J T' a (hg - h,,lt)f da. (46)
(x, - x,At) is the effect on x of combined changes in gand t where the change in t is the one
which exactly offsets the direct beneficial effect of the change in g3 (hJII-h,,lr) is the
corresponding effect on h. For short we use the notations x' and hi for the respective
effects. z' and y' are defined equivalently. To find these effects we have to use (37) and
(38) which determine the optimum choice of an individual. We will show that the effects
which satisfy (37) and (38) are:
y'=O, h'=O, x' = - :' and hence z' = O...... (47)
(47) implies that no argument in the utility function u(y, z, h) is changed, and we
immediately see that nothing is changed in (37) which thus remains satisfied. (38) is
equivalent to q/ z.. = uz/ uy• Obviously nothing is changed on the right hand side. The only
thing which remains is then to examine what happens to the left hand side. Differentiating
q/ z .. and taking into account that dq = -ål, we find that
d(
q) z ..( -At)-q(z ....x' +z"g) d q(Zg/x)+qZu(zf/zx)-qzXJlld- = g=., g
Z" z ; z; (48)
which is obtained by making use of (41) and (47). From (43) we find
Zl = 1/1'fP,
1z, = 1/1'-,
x
" 1Z"I = 1/1 fP-·x
By inserting these results into (48) we obtain
d(i..) =~(I/I' + 1/1" -1/1' -I/I")dg = O.e, XZ"
Thus the left hand side is also left unchanged, and we have shown that (47) satisfies (37)
and (38). Combining (46) and (47) we now obtain
dW/dg = II-qJ Z, fda -lI-tJ Zg fda-II-
z.. z"
=1I-(q-t)J ~'fda-II-
""
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or slightly reformulated:
dW/ I Zg- IJ. = p- f da -1.
dg z"
This is the total welfare effect of a marginal increase in g measured in terms of government
. revenue. The expression is easily interpreted. -1 is simply the subtraction of the direct
cost of one unit of g. Zg/ z, is the marginal value of g to a consumer in terms ofr. It is the
change in x which is equivalent to a one unit change in g. In the conventional cost-benefit
criterion this marginal equivalent would be evaluated at the consumer price of .l' for every
consumer, and the total value would then be calculated by taking the integral over all
consumers. In Samuelson's famous formulation {Samuelson (1954» the comparison is
between the marginal cost of the project and the sum of marginal rates of substitution:
J{ug/uy)fda, which in this case equals Jq(Zg/z,,)fda. We see that (49) equals the
conventional cost-benefit criterion except that the producer price of x is used instead of the
consumer price. Thus (49) is simply a modified version of the conventional cost-benefit
criterion.
(49)
Proposition 3. With the utility function u (y, 0(A(8)X), h), optimal income tax and an
optimal unit tax on x, a cost-benefit assessment of increasing g can be carried out by means of
the conventional cost-benefit criterion except for the modification that x is evaluated at its
producer price.
This means that if the petrol tax were imposed only for fiscal and distributional
reasons, and (43) described the technology of road travelling, the benefit arising if a road
improvement lowers the use of petrol is the amount of petrol which is saved evaluated at
the petrol price net of tax. The fact that the kinds of technology very often assumed in
applied work belong to the class defined by (43) seems to add some flavour to our result,
although it must be admitted that the basis for making such assumptions is sometimes
rather weak.
Our result implies that the conventional cost-benefit criterion evaluating x at its
consumer price overestimates the social net benefit of a project when t is positive, and
underestimates the social net benefit when t is negative, i.e. there is a subsidy.
The result would hold if there were also n other commodities on which unit taxes were
imposed and which entered the utility function in addition to y, Z and h. It is important,
however, to notice that in the analysis t is only imposed for fiscal and distributional
reasons. If t were imposed to charge consumers for social or external costs, our result
would not hold. This is presumably the case with the petrol tax, which is partly levied to
charge the drivers for the cost of providing road services.
We have seen that under optimal taxation and the existence of a commodity tax
change which is equivalent to an extra unit of a public good, the social benefit from an extra
unit of the public good can be found by evaluating the equivalent change in the
consumption of a market good at its producer price. It is interesting to observe that this is a
result which is indeed closely related to the result that market goods should be evaluated at
producer prices when commodity taxes are set optimally. Thus the two strands of analysis,
concerned with market goods and public goods respectively, are brought together under
certain conditions.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present article has established conditions which permit the use of the conventional
cost-benefit criterion or a simple modification of it even when the cost-benefit analysis is
carried out in a second best economy where distribution matters. The conditions are
I.
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separability properties of the utility function or properties of the technology available for
producing basic goods, and optimality properties of the tax policy.
The analysis h~ a number of limitations. The individuals of the society differ only in
one dimension, and ~onstant returns to scale prevail so that producer prices are constant.
(These are limitations which the present analysis has in common with the bulk of literature
on optimal taxation so far.) Intertemporai problems of taxation have not been considered.
Nor have the special problems raised by the combination of a national tax policy and the
provision of local public goods.
The results of the analysis show that there are interesting cases in which it may be
possible to simplify the cost-benefit analysis considerably even though' the second best
cost-benefit criterion in general is quite complicated. The limitations of the analysis show
the need for further extension and generalisation of this work.
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NOTES
l. Public projects will generally induce changes in the use of taxed commodities which tend to increase or
reduce the amount of inefficiency due to tax distortions. It is these effects which are neglected by the conventional
cost-benefit criterion,
2. About the Envelope Theorem see for instance Dixit (1976, pp. 24-30).
3. Note that this change in t is -~t. where .lt is determined by (41) so that da = -.lt.
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